THE DYNAMICS OF RAPPORT IN A COLONIAL SITUATION

David Schneider's Fieldwork on the Islands of Yap

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After reading the first seven hundred pages of the field notes of his student David Schneider, Clyde Kluckhohn confessed to "a feeling of embarrassment—as if I had stolen a peek into a friend's private diary"; the notes were "frankly, almost as (perhaps more than) revealing of you as of Yap people and culture" (HYE: CK/DS 3/3/48). Two weeks later, Schneider wrote back from the field that "the value of all that material" on his own "concerns and emotions" was that it might allow his evidence on Yapese culture and personality to be "corrected" later for "observer's bias." Concerned, like Kluckhohn, with the ethnographic equivalent of psychoanalytic transference, Schneider said that although he would hesitate to "publish the sort of notes I have been writing," at least "I will know later, when the materials are written up, to what extent I pulled paranoid material and to what extent my behavior impelled it" (HKL: DS/CK 3/16/48; cf. Kluckhohn 1944b:505, 1945:139).

Inasmuch as Schneider never wrote about Yapese culture and personality, his concern proved superfluous. Already by late June, when he returned to the United States, he had decided "to throw that overboard" and "report" instead on "kinship" (SPR: DS/Gorer 7/7/48). Later, however, in the 1960s, Schneider came to regard the kinship studies project to which he had turned in his post-Yap scholarship as itself an insidious mode of perpetuating a more general "observer's bias"—the "ethnocentric bias" that was integral to the very aims of kinship study (Schneider 1984:177, 197). In this context, it may be appropriate to draw upon "all that material" in Schneider's field notes in order to illuminate his turn to kinship study (cf. Schneider 1965a, 1965b, 1969b, 1972, 1989).

That material appears differently now than when it was written. In 1947, another Harvard reader felt that Schneider was oversensitive to the "situation created by [his] own presence" (HPM: Oliver/Scott 12/1/47). Today, we may discern in this same sensitivity a potent reflexivist concern not then yet respectable in the discipline. For unlike Malinowski's Diary in the Strict Sense of the Term, where intimacy is manifest primarily in Malinowski's reflections on his romantic relationships, the intimacy of Schneider's field notes is manifest when Schneider reflects on the dynamics of his rapport with Yapese informants—the ways in which his own identity was construed by them, in relation to their experience of colonial domination, and in the context of his own identification with victims of oppression.¹

Immigrant Radicalism, Ivy League Anthropology, and the Study of Subjectivity

Born in Brooklyn on the last day of World War I, Schneider was the first child of Eastern European Jewish Bolsheviks. His childhood, as he later re-

¹. An extremely heterogeneous document of some 1,650 pages, the field notes contain a wealth of ethnographic and contextualizing material far in excess of the portion digested in Schneider's published writings. Typed up in triplicate (with carbons) while Schneider was in the field, they served at once as a personal diary and as a record of interviews and observations; thus they tend to collate a varied ethnographic repertory with politically and psychologically vivid accounts of relationships with informants, as well as analyses of these again in relation to Schneider's reactions, intellectual interests, and psychological fluctuations. Coupling often profound and sometimes brutal introspection with a record of his movements, queries, and recording activities, Schneider's field notes are a document of rare immediacy for the history of anthropology, specifying evolving interpersonal and intellectual dimensions of a field encounter in almost daily detail and with reflexive attention to its own perspective. I am greatly indebted to David Schneider for the field notes themselves and for his willingness to let me use them—without requesting any measure of editorial control. I am also grateful for his graciousness in consenting to be interviewed; our conversations took place on August 17, 18, 22, and 23, 1989, at Schneider's home in Santa Cruz.

The ribbon copy of the notes is held by the Regenstein Library at the University of Chicago (SPN); one carbon is kept in the archives of the Harvard Peabody Museum (HYE). Each copy is interleaved with a small measure of unique material—correspondence or handwritten notes—and both include some thirty pages of notes by Schneider's colleagues. Although the copies follow the same page order, they use different methods of pagination until page 550; the page numbers on the Regenstein copy being sequential from start to finish, I have used them in citations throughout. In editing the notes, I have sought to preserve the flavor of material that was composed impromptu under field circumstances; I have thus corrected Schneider's spelling and in a few cases clarified punctuation, but refrained from imposing an arbitrary consistency on Schneider's attractively idiosyncratic and irregular style of punctuation and capitalization.
membered it, was partitioned between two spheres. One was the immigrant world of his parents, a world of militant Stalinist politics and fervent hopes for a new and more egalitarian America. In this world, Schneider's father ran a leather business that went bankrupt in the Depression, when he took a job as a travelling salesman of ladies' dresses. The other and more attractive world was that of Cherry Lawn, an "extremely progressive" rural boarding school in Connecticut to which Schneider was sent at age nine following the birth of his only brother. He had been doing so poorly in public school that his parents, worried that he had a congenital deficiency, had sent him to a counselor, who recommended the change. At Cherry Lawn, Schneider's resistance vanished and his performance improved; but his family's privations in the Depression tugged at his conscience along the tether of tuition, and when the time came he chose a college subsidized by the state (DSI).

Following a common poor man's route to premedical training, Schneider studied industrial bacteriology at the New York State College of Agriculture at Cornell, on the same campus as the sister private school. There he was classed with a group of opportunistic "city folk," who were resented by fellow students more genuinely committed to the soil as a vocation. His efforts to pay his way reinforced his perception as an outsider. In the familiar rituals of college life, he participated almost exclusively in the close-but-distant role of a service employee, observing the football fanfare behind an Indian head-dress and tray of novelties and the fraternity mysteries from behind an apron in the kitchen. Although his extracurricular attentions were focussed on class injustice, he did not see himself as following in the footsteps of his parents, with whom he in fact broke ties after Stalin's pact with Hitler. But he "tried on" the labor activism of the American Student Union, and in his sophomore year this considerable distraction from his studies elicited threats of expulsion from the bacteriology program, where he was earning mostly D's. Schneider thought of following two friends to Spain to fight against fascism, but he decided instead to transfer to the study of anthropology (DSI).

In the state college the program was officially Rural Sociology, but it benefited from "strong informal links" to the liberal arts faculty at the university, where the young Harvard-trained anthropologist R. Lauriston Sharp had been hired one year before, and was soon to join the social-psychologist Leonard Cottrell in setting up a combined Department of Sociology and Anthropology (Smith 1974:11). During this period Sharp was interested in the neo-Freudian currents of "culture and personality" anthropology, highlighting in his classes the work of Ruth Benedict and Margaret Mead. In 1939, Mead herself lectured at Cornell on the relevance of anthropology to contemporary problems—which in that season between Kristallnacht and the invasion of Poland meant, above all, the terrifying success of Hitler's movement in magnetizing some common element in the personalities of millions. Anthropology, optimistically, might help to arrest these dark impulses; at the very least it celebrated the social value of the diversity that Nazi fascism attacked (Yans-McLaughlin 1984, 1986). And in America culture and personality anthropologists sought to expand the boundaries of social "tolerance," by demonstrating, ethnographically, "the relativity of normality," and showing how the "apparent weakness" of many "less usual types" was "illusory" from the perspective of "potentialities" honored in other cultures (Benedict 1934:277-78; Mead 1928; cf. Caffrey 1989). Although culture and personality anthropology championed the "deviant" and emotionally "tortured" more than the economically oppressed (Benedict 1934:278-79), a leftism circumscribed by nonconformism was not uncongenial to Schneider. He thought he had found his calling, and he stayed in Ithaca for another year after graduation, earning the first advanced degree conferred by Sharp's department (Smith 1974:11; DSI).

His master's thesis was an exploration of "the relationship between dreams and culture," based on 148 dreams of Yir-Yoront aborigines collected by Sharp some years before in northeastern Australia (Schneider & Sharp 1969:13). Although Schneider found a methodological guidepost in Freud's discussion of "typical" dream motifs (Freud 1900:274-310), his paper pointed toward a relativization of the "dream work," utilizing Sharp's Yir-Yoront materials to interrogate the cultural patterning of motivation and the cultural relativity of the internal symbology of the psyche. Given that Schneider was back at work refining this essay on the eve of his departure for the Yolks Islands, it is notable, too, that the paper considered in detail Yir-Yoront dream "symbols" associated with white Australians "and their culture"—prefiguring the reflexive impulses manifest in his fieldwork (Schneider & Sharp 1969:44).

In the fall of 1941, with Sharp's encouragement, Schneider transferred to the Department of Anthropology at Yale, where the ultra-politivist behavioralist George Murdock had succeeded to the chairmanship upon the death of Edward Sapir two years before. Sapir was in many ways a poignant archetype for Schneider, who was soon initiated into a vivid oral tradition linking Sapir's death with "nasty anti-semitic treatment," including the denial of Sapir's application for admission to Yale's Graduate Club (HKP: DS/CK 9/12/50; cf. Darnell 1990:401-2). In the "sons of light" versus "sons of darkness" structure of the legends, the sons of light were sympathetic to the theories of the Viennese Jewish psychoanalyst; and broader resonances had been noted by Sapir himself, who suggested that the "discovery of the world of personality" was "apparently dependent upon the ability of the individual to become aware of and to attach value to his resistance to authority." Freud was the flag of "temperamental radicals," whereas "naturally conservative people" found it "difficult to take personality valuations seriously" (Sapir 1934:592). As this mythic structure was played out in Yale's social science community, the establishmentarian majority at the Yale Institute of Human Relations tended
to acknowledge Freud's "genius," but questioned his "scientificity"; less in need of an emancipatory vision, they felt that the necessary "first step" was to formalize Freud's unruly theories into general and mostly mechanistic "hypotheses," which could then be related to the behaviorist principles of Clark Hull (Murdock 1949:xvii, 1940a:364). Physically, the Survey was a cross-indexed set of files, in which Murdock aspired to contain "all" of the available "cultural information" on a "representative sample" of "the various societies of the world" (1940a:362). Its scheme of classification incorporated the suggestions of nearly one hundred "leading specialists in many fields" to render the materials of the Survey responsive to as broad as possible

a range of interests (Murdock et al. 1938:xiii). But although in general it was intended to be theoretically agnostic, "an exception" was the section on "social and kin groupings and organization," where "a series of analytic distinctions" was incorporated in the interests of "consistent usage" (Ford 1971:182). The particular distinctions were derived from Murdock's own theory, which might be described broadly as a compound of structural-functionalism and updated social evolutionism. Accepting the Boasian critique of evolutionism in the narrow sense of its application to "unilinear" theories, Murdock did not postulate a set of "stages" so much as hypothesize a set of likely (though "in some instances" predetermined) "transitions," whose motivational logic was provided by Hull's behaviorist psychology and Keller's formulation of "cultural change" as an adaptive process "accomplished through the blind trial-and-error behavior of the masses of a society" (1949:xii-xiv, xvi-xvii, 184, 197). The transitions were between "types" and "sub-types" of "social organization" (xii, 197-99), and the analytic discriminations used in founding this typology were concisely defined in the companion "working manual" of the Survey's Outline of Cultural Materials (Murdock 1949:15, 202-26; Murdock et al. 1945).

Schneider took a lecture course in which Murdock read directly from the manuscript of Social Structure, and worked for Murdock on the Cross-Cultural Survey. Although he could not presume to contest Murdock's command of the comparative ethnographic literature, and had as yet no developed sense of his theory's limitations, Schneider had a rather powerful sense that evolutionism was not "his kind" of anthropology—a sense born of his distrust of the notion of civilizational "progress," and confirmed by his personal relationship with Murdock, who seemed "prejudiced against anyone who wasn't Old New England WASP" (DSI). The closest approximation to a moment of sympathetic personal contact in the long history of their relationship came with Schneider's decision to leave Yale and end his studies: getting up from behind his desk and placing a hand somewhat awkwardly on Schneider's shoulder, Murdock assured him, "I know you'll be a success in something, Dave—but it wasn't anthropology" (DSI).

Immediately after leaving Yale, and again after the war, Schneider worked in Washington for the Division of Program Surveys, an agency of the Department of Agriculture, which was then pioneering "open-ended" interview techniques for public opinion polling. But his main anthropological "connection" during this period was the English anthropologist Geoffrey Gorer. An eclectic Freudian close to Mead and Benedict, Gorer had been a maverick on the faculty at Yale, where he was the only one to encourage Schneider's interests in personality psychology. After the attack on Pearl Harbor, Gorer began a program of research on "Japanese National Character" at the Office of War Information in Washington (Mead 1959:352), where he contacted Schneider at the Division of Program Surveys. When Schneider was drafted late in 1942,
Gorer advised him to "take copious notes" on his process of "acculturation" in the army, in which he served as a psychiatric social worker. Out of Schneider's army experience came a report published in the bulletin of Mead and Gregory Bateson's Institute for Intercultural Studies, as well as two papers in Psychiatry—one of which analyzed the "sick role" in army basic training as a culturally "patterned kind of behavior" (1947:326–27; 1946; DSI). When the Social Science Research Council turned down Schneider's application for a demobilization grant under the "G.I. Bill," he went to see Gorer and then Mead, saying that he was not willing to try a second time to work his way through graduate school. Mead told him to go to Harvard "and see Clyde Kluckhohn and tell him that he owes me academic favors and that you are one of them" (DSI).

Mead's intuition in dispatching Schneider to Kluckhohn proved sound; the two were to develop a psychological intimacy comparable in intensity to psychoanalytic exploration. Kluckhohn was known for encouraging students "to go ahead on their own" to discover their creative potential by exploring novel ideas and unorthodox approaches (Parsons 1962:143; DSI; Taylor et al. 1973; cf. Kluckhohn 1939a:341). In contrast to Murdock, Kluckhohn, too, was an outsider, although in a different way than Schneider. To judge from an autobiographical statement he contributed (anonymously but recognizably) to a psychological study of social scientists, Kluckhohn was acutely conscious of ambiguities in his upbringing and position (Roe 1953). Five years after his mother had died giving him birth, he was adopted into the family of her well-to-do brother, whose wife was not accepted by the "more snooty" residents of their Iowa home town. Although money from his foster father enabled him to attend Princeton, "rather involved difficulties" (vaguely referred to as "ill health" in two posthumous sources, but perhaps related to his homosexuality) led to Kluckhohn's departure in his freshman year (Roe 1953:18; cf. Parsons 1962:141; Fischer & Vogt 1973:1; FSI; DSI). There followed an extended visit to a ranch near Ramah, New Mexico, owned by relatives of Kluckhohn's adopted mother; intellectuals with "a good library" who became his second adopted family (Roe 1953:18). Their "nearest neighbors" were the Navajo, among whom Kluckhohn visited frequently in the remaining thirty-eight years of his life (Fischer & Vogt 1973:1–2).

Klukhohn's aspirations were at first literary, and in 1927 he published a romantic travelogue of a summer horseback adventure through the Navajo reservation. But at his second college, the University of Wisconsin, Kluckhohn was convinced by his teachers that his ornamental prose "was not likely to set the world on fire" (Roe 1953:18). With Lauriston Sharp, later Schneider's teacher, Kluckhohn formed a "Sanskrit letter" club for weekly "intellectual discussion," as a "counterweight" to the Greek letter fraternities (Smith 1974:8). Graduating in 1928, he returned to the southwest for several years and then went off to Vienna, where the royalties from his novel paid for a ten-month psychoanalysis (HKP; FSI), and to Oxford, where he studied as a Rhodes Scholar under the anthropologist R. R. Marett. After two years teaching in New Mexico, Kluckhohn finally entered Harvard for his doctorate, and when Lloyd Warner left for Chicago in 1935, Kluckhohn (although still a student) was appointed as instructor (Fischer & Vogt 1972:2; Eggan 1968:139). His intellectual affinities, however, were strongly Boasian (Kluckhohn 1944b; Caffrey 1989:265; Parsons 1962:146); in 1936–37 he commuted to Yale in order to study linguistics with Sapir, staying over in Sapir's home (HKP: CK/DS 9/27/50). Although Kluckhohn's advisor, Alfred Tozzer, had been linked to Boas since before the infamous censure episode of 1919 (Stocking 1968:295), the dominant tradition at Harvard was anti-Boasian, and Kluckhohn was not made full professor until 1946, when he was offered a position at Chicago. He was prevailed upon to stay by Talcott Parsons, then organizing the Department of Social Relations, to which Kluckhohn moved his office that autumn (HKP: Parsons/CK 3/11, 3/18, 3/21/46).

Parsons' new department aimed to gather under a single institutional umbrella sociologists, anthropologists, and clinical and experimental psychologists, toward the promotion of a theoretical "convergence" of interdisciplinary scope (Parsons 1956). It was, however, a very different place from the Institute of Human Relations at Yale, where "behavioral scientists" sought to eradicate "subjectivity" and "individual idiosyncrasies," in order to foster rigorous "hypothetico-deductive" research (Morawski 1986:237, 239). At Social Relations, the four central founding members—Parsons, Kluckhohn, the psychoanalytic psychologist Henry Murray, and the social psychologist Gordon Allport—were all self-consciously idiosyncratic scholars, outsiders in their own departments, who were strongly committed to revaluing "subjectivity" in more positive theoretical and methodological terms. Later, Social Relations orthodoxy became orthodox, but in these first years, when it was nicknamed by undergraduates the "Department of Residual Relations," it was a place of exciting unconventionality; Schneider later remembered it as "just what I had wanted" (DSI). He was there when its doors opened, enrolled on a special fellowship for his tuition, arranged by Kluckhohn, with a research assistantship in the Laboratory of Social Relations as well. There, although his field of "concentration" was Social Anthropology, under Parsons' program for encouraging interdisciplinary contact he was "distributed" to Murray's Psychology Clinic at 64 Plympton Street, and on working days was sometimes invited to Murray's nearby home for elegant set lunches (DSI). Moreover, at Social Relations, Freud was prized. Parsons had just entered into formal psychoanalytic training at the Boston Psychoanalytic Institute (Parsons 1970:840), which led him to highlight problems of unconventional predispositions (Parsons et al. 1951) within the general framework of his attempt to "construct a theory of the
Japan had secretly negotiated British support for its claims in Micronesia, in who pleaded.

Although these arrangements were opposed by the Colonial administration (Schneider 1945:332). In the Department of the Interior, which administered the Philippines, early plans for Micronesia translated that precedent into liberal, assimilative policies, emphasizing the opening of Micronesia to economic "development," and the prompt organization of self-government on a Western, democratic model (Richard 1957:II, 60-62; Ikies 1946).

The constituency favoring Micronesia's annexation was slower getting organized, for within the Navy—its historic and eventual home—its advocates had their hands full, during the first year of the war, with mobilization, reconnaissance, and the planning of invasion (Richard 1957:II, 55). Instead, the annexation forces were set in motion by scholars at East Coast universities, and particularly Columbia, where an "emergency meeting" of sixteen faculty members, including the anthropologist Ralph Linton, was convened in March 1942 by Professor of Government Schuyler Wallace (I, 9; Connor 1950; Linton & Wagley 1971:61). Anticipating enlarged postwar requirements for administrators overseas, the meeting planned an "Emergency Program of Training in International Administration," and was later regarded as the founding moment of the postwar "area studies" concept (Connor 1950:12; Wallace 1944:32). That it became significant for the history of Micronesia was a circumstantial matter. After failing to sell the program to other government agencies, Wallace gained an ad hoc appropriation of $60,000 from the Navy, as a favor from the prewar dean of Columbia's School of Engineering, who was then serving as an assistant to the Secretary of the Navy. In August 1942, a new "school" opened at Columbia (Connor 1950:8-15; Richard 1957:1, 9-12).

For the first two months of the school's existence, no one in the Navy was charged with "cognizance" over occupation planning, or even for oversight of the school, its students, or its curriculum. The school's curriculum, designed by Wallace to be a showpiece to other agencies, emphasized problems of long-term administration (Richard 1957:1, 46-49, 63-65; Wallace 1944; Hessler 1943), and at first seemed useless to naval officials, who then envisioned transferring control of captured Micronesian islands promptly to a civilian agency (Connor 1950). But in September 1942, when the Navy planned to terminate its association with the program, Wallace fought back politically.
to keep the school afloat, bringing the school to the attention of President Roosevelt and Under Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, and arranging a series of visits by high-ranking officials (Connor 1950:12–17). These secured “top recognition” for the school, and led to the creation of a two-man naval office to “advise” on “naval participation in the administration of occupied areas” (Richard 1957:I, 13–14). Once established, the office quickly mushroomed into a seven-officer “section” (35), and became a platform for advocating a naval role in the postwar administration of Micronesia. Murdock joined in the spring of 1943, bringing along with him the Yale Cross-Cultural Survey (50).

Urging its “practical value” as ethnographic intelligence on indigenous peoples in the war zones, Murdock shortly after Pearl Harbor had displayed the Marshall Islands file to Army and Navy intelligence officials. They advised a concentration of future efforts on regions of strategic importance, and a grant from the Carnegie Corporation enabled Murdock to hire a team of translators and assistants, in a rush to complete the Survey’s files on Micronesia (Ford 1970:7; NAS2:1942–43; NASI: “Cross-Cultural Survey File . . .” [1944]; Richard 1957:I, 50). Meanwhile, Murdock’s outline was distributed to other agencies, which collected “information of practical value on the peoples” of other regions. From Murdock’s perspective, there was “no conflict between theoretical aims and practical utility such as is inherent in most scientific research” (NASI: “Strategic Bulletins . . .” 1/2/43). Just as the scientific objectives of the Survey proved readily convertible to applied aims, these applied involvements furthered the program of gathering “a large number of cases” (Murdock 1940a:369).

Murdock’s earlier army experience had acquainted him with the forms of military organization, and the no-nonsense, cultural self-assurance of his scientific progressivism impressed Navy officers inclined to suspect the university man of impracticality and abstract-mindedness (Useem 1945:4). Murdock quickly became a Navy insider, with access to top officials in the Pacific Ocean Areas Command and in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. In April 1943, two months after arranging a Navy takeover of Cross-Cultural Survey research on Micronesia, he accepted a commission as a Navy lieutenant commander, persuading his Yale colleagues, John Whiting and Clelland Ford, to enlist as Navy lieutenants (junior grade) (IHR: Murdock/Chief of Naval Personnel 8/14/45; Whiting 1986:684). The three entered duty in the Naval Office of Occupied Areas as “Research Unit Number One” for the Japanese Mandated Islands of Micronesia (Richard 1957:I, 50).

It would not be an exaggeration to say that the memorandum sent from the Office two days after their arrival established the postwar framework of colonial rule in Micronesia. Travelling over the signature of the Office’s Officer-in-Charge, the memorandum percolated up the echelons to the Secretary of the Navy and Joint Chiefs of Staff. In reaction to planning for Micronesia then in process at the Department of Interior, and to the news that President Roosevelt had provisionally endorsed the Hull proposal, it urged the Navy to resist these internationalist developments, in language that leaves little doubt of Murdock’s primary authorship:

For years to come, the chief significance of these islands will remain their actual or potential use as sea and air bases. Most of the islands consist of small volcanic or coral island atolls with little economic importance, with a scanty native population possessed of a very primitive social organization, and with only a primitive political tradition. Autogenous government has always been limited to feudalistic family, clan and village systems. . . . Attempts to impose government systems based on representations which cut family and village lines are, for the time being, doomed to failure.

For these “strong reasons” the memorandum argued, “it would be extremely unwise” to establish “prematurely” in Micronesia a “civilian government which attempted to rule the inhabitants along a Western cultural pattern.”

All in all, the interest of the inhabitants (and incidentally, the best interests of the United States) would best be served by establishing in most of these islands a strong but benevolent government—a government paternalistic in character, but one which ruled as indirectly as possible (i.e., one which made minimum interference with local family and organization and custom).

The memo called upon its powerful recipients to insist upon “full and undivided” naval control “until the final peace treaty is signed,” and, if possible, “on a permanent or at least a semi-permanent basis” (quoted in Richard 1957:I, 18–19).

In May, the three-man “Research Unit” was transferred to Columbia University, where Wallace’s program had at last received an official designation as the Naval School of Military Government and Administration (Wallace 1944:30). There Murdock and his colleagues pressed on toward the completion of the Survey’s files on Micronesia, synthesizing the collected materials in a series of eight Civil Affairs Handbooks for use by military government officials (Richard 1957:I, 50–51; OPNAV 1944). After the last Handbook was finished in September 1944, the Unit was posted to the Pacific command in Hawaii, where it became part of the rather heterogenous staff of “regular Navy officers, former college professors, policemen and orientalists” engaged in planning and setting up military government on captured islands (Worden 1945:11; Richard 1957:I, 51; Walker 1945). Accompanying the invasion of Okinawa in April 1945, the Unit worked under harsh conditions in unsecured areas (Ford 1950), with Murdock supervising political affairs and public safety in the principal area of native settlement (IHR: GPM/MM 7/29/45). The day after V-J Day, Murdock, still on active duty in the Pacific, reported back to Mark May, director of the Institute of Human Relations, that his war experi-
ence had convinced him "of the need of selling social science by demonstrat-
ing its practical utility." "We'll have a lot more to say on this score when we

Early in January 1946, Murdock was back in Washington setting up plans for
a meeting of the National Research Council Committee on the Anthro-
pology of Oceania, and lobbying naval officials for new research (NAS:
Handy/Harrison 1/22/46; NAS5: Minutes 4/20/46, p. 9). Meanwhile, at the
Research Council, three plans for the scientific exploration of Micronesia were
already in circulation, one of which was closely in line with Murdock's own
formulations (NAS4). Drafted the previous summer by the Harvard Peabody
Museum anthropologist Douglas Oliver, it was premised on the "assumption"
that "Micronesia will remain a kind of government reserve for a long time,
... requiring close control over the activities of civilian visitors—in regard to
mobility and access to native populations." Under these circumstances,
the plan called for the establishment of a "post-hostilities organization for
systematic scientific exploration," which "besides possessing intrinsic sci-
entific value," would "assist powerfully in the administration and develop-
ment of the area" (NAS4: "A Plan to ..." [6/45]).

Actually, in this immediate postwar period, two broad scientific constitu-
encies were offering competing visions of the future of scientific research in
Micronesia. The first was an emergent network of academic veterans of the
war agencies, based for the most part in major East Coast universities, which
Murdock drew together behind Oliver's plan for a centrally coordinated
investigation. In the committee structure of the Research Council, this group
was represented by the Committee on the Anthropology of Oceania, which
had been formed under Murdock's chairmanship in February 1942 (NAS2:
1942-43), and included Ford, Mead, Linton, Cora Du Bois, Fred Eggan, and
Lauriston Sharp—all now newly discharged from work related to the war effort
(NAS: NRC, Organization & Members, 1941-47). At the first postwar meeting
in March 1946, a Pacific Science Conference—at which delegations from the
Army, the Navy, "and probably" the Departments of State and the Interior
would be presented with an elaborated version of Oliver's proposal—was put
on the Council's calendar for early June. Murdock attempted to limit the Con-
ference program to "the geographical and human sciences (including public
health)," as promising "the greatest help to practical administration," but was
overruled—temporarily, in the event (NAS2: Murdock/Miles 2/6/46; Revi-
talization, 1946; NAS5: Minutes 4/20/46, p. 9; NAS3). The conference was
broadened to include the biological and other sciences, and a Harvard zoo-
lngist, Harold Jefferson Coolidge, was appointed to administer the conference
organization (NAS3: Merrill/Harrison 3/25/46). Coolidge, however, deferred
exclusively to Murdock on matters anthropological, becoming almost an ad-
ministrative factotum for Murdock when he resumed a full teaching schedule
at Yale.

There was an alternative vision. Notwithstanding its formidable connec-
tions in Washington, in the context of Pacific science Murdock's was an up-
start group, and it encountered significant opposition from a second, much
older, scientific constituency, whose institutional foothold at the Research
Council was the Committee on Pacific Investigations. Unlike those associ-
ated with Murdock's network, the scientists of this group—including Herbert
Gregory, E. S. C. Handy, and Felix Keesing—were mostly affiliated with insti-
tutions on the West Coast and in Hawaii, and all had a strong allegiance to
the Pacific Science Association, which had grown out of a series of interna-
tional Pacific Science Congresses held triennial since 1920 (NAS4: 1945-46;
Cochrane 1978:485-86). The style of interdisciplinary collaboration charac-
teristic of Association research was closely akin to the approach of Bosian
"historical" ethnographers of indigenous peoples of North America; like the
Boasians, Association ethnologists saw the "ethnographic salvage" of vanish-
ing artifacts and traditions as a project of the utmost urgency. Although some
younger Association ethnologists had begun to consider problems of "accul-
turation" and "culture contact," the dominant modes of Pacific basin field-
work were quite different from those advocated at the Yale Institute of Human
Relations or the Harvard Department of Social Relations. Both these groups
brought to bear a variety of social scientific theoretical perspectives on the
analysis of a presumed phenomenal unity, human behavior. In contrast, the
Association approach involved the analysis of substantially different phenom-
enal entities—myths, artifacts, languages, zoology, botany, ethnobotany, and
so forth—toward a unified reconstruction of human and natural history, an
approach which did not lend itself easily to producing results of any "utility"
in colonial administration.

Pacific Science Association scientists were therefore alarmed by the "socio-
logical" and "applied" angle of Murdock's plans for "overall Pacific research.
Handy warned that Pacific research "will assume a very different shape if Mur-
dock picks it up and carries on with it," and he "emphatically" opposed sug-
gestions "that the future of research and administration in Pacific islands is
to be largely a function of the U.S. Navy Department" (NAS3: ESCH/Harris-
on 1/22/46; NAS4: ESCH/Harrison 11/16/45). Modelled on older tradi-
tions of Pacific science, the key elements of the proposals advanced by mem-
bers of the Pacific Science Association were a loosely coordinated mixture of
pure science, applied science, and historical research, emphasizing the affilia-
tion of scientific enterprise to internationalist organizations, including the
newly formed United Nations (NAS4: Embree, "Proposal" [1946]; Buck, Bur-
rows, and Keesing [proposal] [1945]).

But despite their differing goals and approaches, the two groups could at
least agree on the desirability of a major research undertaking. For anthro-
pologists and other scientists, Micronesia at the end of World War II repre-
sented "a rich, virtually untouched field" for new research (NAS4: "A Plan
to..." [6/45]). For some Pacific Association scientists, however, the American takeover offered a chance to break the pattern by which Micronesian research had been an exclusive preserve of scientists of the reigning colonial power (Berg 1988; NAS4: Gregory/Harrison 7/11/45; Handy/Harrison 11/18/45; Embree, "Proposal" [1946]; Buck, Burrows, and Keesing [1945]). In this sense, the debate on the future of scientific research in Micronesia was linked to the colonial future of the islands themselves.

In the case of Pacific islands not considered vital to United States security, internationalization remained a live option throughout most of 1946. The Departments of State and Interior were solidly behind it, and although President Truman was more wavering than Roosevelt had been, he appeared at this point to support it as well (NAS4; Pearson 1945; NYT: 1/16/46, p. 1; Hitch 1946; Hayward 1950; U.S. Dept. of State 1945:127–30). Continued military control of Micronesia was seen by the more internationally minded as making a mockery of the anticolonial stance the United States had taken throughout the war, and of the high moral ground it assumed in granting the Philippines independence (Ickes 1946; Embree 1946; Amerasia 1946; Levi 1946; Rachlis 1946). Army and Navy officials, on the other hand, were loathe to relinquish hard-won Micronesian islands—useful strategically and for atomic testing—to a meddling internationalization, and numerous calls were issued for their outright "annexation" (NYT: 4/5/45, p. 1; 4/13, p. 18; 6/25, p. 1; 8/20, p. 11; 9/16, p. 1; 1/13/46, p. 6; 2/3, p. 1; Stimson & Bundy 1948:599–604).

In June 1946, such political disagreements plagued the Pacific Science Conference organized by Coolidge and Murdock. Referring to a request by the University of Hawaii for research access to Micronesia that had been put on the back burner at the Navy through the direct intervention of Coolidge and Murdock (NAS3: U. Hawaii 1946; NAS6: Coolidge/Ryerson 10/23/46), a high level representative of the Department of State cautioned the Conference that it was "especially important" that "international cooperation" be strongly encouraged, and that no single group of scientists, or special field, be given "a monopoly to the exclusion, or even to the limitation of others" (NRC 1946:9–10). This incident provoked complaints by Pacific Association scientists, followed up later by letters protesting Murdock's "scheme" for "monopolizing" Micronesian research (NRC 1946:50–51; NAS3: Bachman/Harrison 5/2/46).

Although eventually there was a movement toward compromise (NAS6: 1947), it was abruptly overtaken by political developments. In early October 1946, the American delegation to the Trusteeship Committee of the United Nations received intelligence that the Union of South Africa planned, in contravention of the United Nations Charter, to annex the former German colony of Southwest Africa. Some clarification of the United States' position in Micronesia was therefore imperative to prevent collapse of the new trusteeship system, and the head of the American delegation, John Foster Dulles, met extensively with Administration officials in October to try to break the nearly four-year-old policy deadlock on the question (NYT: 10/29/46, p. 5; 1/31, p. 6; 2/3, p. 1; Bedell 1946). Finally, on November 6, President Truman announced that the United States was "prepared to place" Micronesia under trusteeship, "with the United States as the administering authority." It was, however, to be a unique, "strategic" trusteeship that would allow the United States to fortify the islands militarily, and to continue indefinitely administration by naval authorities (U.S. Dept. of State 1947:30, 73–75; Newlon 1949:49). Dulles then served notice to the U.N. General Assembly that if other nations did not accept this, the United States would continue "de facto control" nevertheless (NYT: 11/8/46, p. 1; Dean 1946); but the Soviets, as it happened, pragmatically acquiesced—in order to gain bargaining power for their unmet demands for a similar trusteeship in Italy's former colony of Eritrea (Goodman & Moos 1981:69; Bedell 1946).

Although the Washington debate over the final disposition of Micronesia continued into 1948, it was now clear that the immediate future of Micronesian research lay with the Navy. At the National Research Council, planning turned decisively in Murdock's favor. A Pacific Science Board was constituted with Harold Coolidge as executive secretary, and Murdock announced at its first meeting that the Navy would soon be lodging with the Research Council a "request" for a predominantly anthropological research program in Micronesia (NAS6: Minutes, 12/12/46). The Navy indeed soon offered $100,000 for "a program of research in anthropology, human geography, linguistics, and sociology." Drawing on language in Murdock's own earlier draft proposals, and noting the Navy's "pressing need" for information relevant to "problems of island government," the formal request specified "the obscurity of the native system of land tenure and the scarcity of knowledge concerning the political and social structure of native communities" (NAS6: General, 1946–47; Lee/Bronk 12/24/46).

The resulting program, which was called the Coordinated Investigation of Micronesian Anthropology (CIMA), was structured as an ensemble of separate expeditions, each mounted by a museum or university under an agreement with the National Research Council Pacific Science Board. All in all, forty-two scientists from twenty-one institutions joined in the CIMA program, including three geographers, four linguists, and three physical anthropologists, and a majority of social and cultural anthropologists (Pac. Sci. Bd. 1947). As the first foray of American scientists into the Micronesian region, the CIMA program marked a radical expansion of American ethnographic interests in the Pacific (Marshall & Nason 1975).

The agreement between the Pacific Science Board and Navy was clear in emphasizing "the importance of the freedom of science"; it reserved to CIMA
Throughout the history of Western colonialism in the Pacific, depopulation—presenting the spectre of extinction—stood as the definitive and ultimate colonial problem: What clearer indication could there be of the failure of a colonial regime to promote native welfare and advancement? The problem engaged the interest of colonial administrators, missionaries, and, not surprisingly, anthropologists. The most famous anthropological statement on depopulation was that of W. H. R. Rivers, who had argued that “underlying” the “more obvious causes” of depopulation, such as “the new diseases and poisons,” was a “psychological factor”: the “loss of interest in life” caused by colonial disruptions in the religious and economic institutions that had previously motivated vigorous native pursuits. Loss of interest enhanced morbidity by suggestion; it also motivated natives to practice “voluntary restriction” or abortion—that potent “instrument of racial suicide” (Rivers 1922:96, 103–5). Since in this view the ultimate causes of depopulation were European practices, the cure clearly involved ameliorative policies, including a greater emphasis on maintaining “old customs and institutions,” and the restoration of native vitality by substituting “new” interests like competitive games and Christianity (Rivers 1922:107; Stocking 1988: cf. Williams 1933). But for many who accepted the Riversian diagnosis, unprogressive colonial policies merely accelerated a postulated, “inherent” decaying tendency in certain native populations (Pitt-Rivers 1927:49). Thus the major prewar textbook on Population Problems of the Pacific, heavily influenced by the eugenic theories of the day, argued that in certain areas, including Yap, the islanders were already “a decadent stock when the first navigators came.” Operating through moral mechanisms alleged to influence the birth rate, the “un speakable corruption” of Yapese cultural practices had brought “their inevitable retribution” in the guise of a decline in population (Roberts 1927:59–62). Viewed from a comparative perspective, the problem could be formulated as why, given a colonial presence that was presumed to be constant in many regions, the Yapese depopulated while many other peoples did not—a formulation that suggested the appropriateness of concentrating research on distinctive Yapese customs or traits of physiology.

The focus on depopulation at first led Donald Scott, the Harvard Peabody Museum director, to decline to participate in Murdock’s CIMA program (HYE: Scott/Coolidge 1/21/47; Scott/Brew 6/30/48). From Scott’s perspective as a museum archeologist, it was by no means clear that solving practical problems was a museum expedition’s business. However, other Harvard faculty members were more sympathetic. Because Murdock had insisted that “research in physical anthropology” was “imperative” (HPM: Murdock/[participating institutions] [2/47]), the physical anthropologist Carleton Coon supported the expedition, as did the Museum’s Pacific expert, Douglas Oliver, whose earlier proposal gave him a stake in realizing the CIMA program. When Oliver “added...
his plea and agreed to take responsibility for the project, Scott gave his blessing to the expedition plan. Under the circumstances, a focus on depopulation was the necessary price of mounting an expedition at all, and, "as in the case of all expeditions," other valuable "material would be gathered" (HYE: Scott/Brew 6/30/48).

While supervising, the summer before, an economic survey of Micronesia for the Foreign Economic Administration, Oliver had learned of the results of Japanese medical studies (Oliver 1946; Useem 1946) that had cited gonorrhea—probably a misdiagnosed form of yaws (Hunt et al. 1954:41; McNair 1973:55)—as the "chief cause" of the low Yapese birth rate (Japan 1930:139, 1936:114–16), and he sought to recruit a gynecologist to the Harvard expedition. Fortunately for the Yapese, however, the gynecologist never materialized, and the main thrust of the expedition proceeded along other lines, partly dictated by the pool of eligible graduate students then available for the research. A student in sociology, Nathaniel Kidder, was to analyze the demographics of "fecundity" on the basis of a census; he was advised by Samuel Stouffer of the Department of Social Relations. Coon contributed a physical anthropology student, Edward Hunt, Jr., to conduct an anthropometric survey and consider questions of racial origins (HPM: "Plan of Investigation of Yap Somatology" [3/47]). In ethnology, recruitment was hamstring by the accelerated CIMA timetable; most social and cultural anthropology students were not ready to begin fieldwork, having only just entered graduate school after military service. But Oliver found one second-year student, William Stevens, whose undergraduate training was in biology, and who proposed to examine "the possibility of relating physique and culture." The other ethnologist was Kluckhohn's student David Schneider (HPM: "Proposed Plan and Personnel of the Yap Study" [3/47]).

The three dissertation topics Schneider contemplated that spring and summer were all variations on the theme "the cultural patterning of X": Yapese dreams, Yapese aggression, and Yapese sickness. Each was developed as a point of entry into social psychological problems: the individual as conditioned by socialization and as responsive to values and norms (HKP: DS/CK 8/6/47). Although sickness was clearly the most pertinent topic to the applied aim of the expedition, Kluckhohn favored the proposal to study aggression, as did Gorler, Parsons, and Schneider himself (HPK: CK/DS 8/12/47; DSI).

While Kluckhohn appreciated the opportunity that the expedition offered to Schneider and supported his participation, he was opposed to the more general Murdockian project. At about the time the CIMA program was launched, he warned pointedly that "human-relations scientists, exhilarated by newly discovered skills and possibly a trifle intoxicated by the fact that for the first time men of affairs are seeking advice on a fairly extended scale, are encouraging hopes which their science is not mature enough to fulfill."
motivations" and "difficulties," and his interpretations of the "motivations" and "personalities" of his informants and interpreters (1945:124–26). In conceptualizing the field rapport relationship as essentially "dual"—at once empathetic and instrumental, an affective bond and a technique—Kluckhohn modeled its ideal conditions on the "psychoanalytic interview"; the anthropologist should seek a level of empathetic understanding that allowed him to serve as both a "sympathetic friend" and a "blank screen upon which the relevant [sic] could project his fears and fancies" (122; 139).

To achieve this level of "trust" in intercultural situations, where "intransigence of whites" was often "culturally enjoined," Kluckhohn took for granted that the anthropologist, through his actions, would distinguish himself in native eyes from other ambassadors of his home culture—especially including predatory figures like colonial officials (1945:117, 122; DSL). For Schneider, of course, to stand apart from other representatives of his culture was a familiar social posture, an element of his awareness of his own social identity. But in his field research on Yap, any attempt to dissociate himself from Navy colonialism was compromised by the genesis and aegis of the Harvard CIMA expedition—indeed perhaps by the very existence of an American colonial regime. Certainly, for the Yapese, Schneider's association with the Navy was never in doubt; what was at issue was simply the terms in which it was to be construed. Thus the duality of rapport turned out to be more than that of the researcher's motivation; since for the Yapese, as for Schneider, rapport was an instrumental as well as empathetic matter. And it was ultimately they who forced upon his consciousness a deeper understanding of the dynamics of rapport in a colonial situation.

Yapese Adaptations to Colonialism, 1885–1947

The "field," of course, is an experiential haystack, and one hesitates to construe the problem as a search for a single needle. Rather, one finds a complex pattern whose coherence was largely motivated by Yapese understandings of Schneider's presence, Yapese interests in the encounter, and Yapese efforts toward structuring Schneider's relations. This need not be surprising, for the encounter was meant to be an interchange, and, obviously, in Yapese society, Schneider operated at a disadvantage. By the same token, however, the encounter presents historiographical problems closely analogous to those Schneider faced in his field experience. Events often had meanings for Yapese that were inaccessible to Schneider, although in some cases he was later told by close informants what had earlier "gone on." Events transpired at the intersection of two different schemata of cultural meanings, with both Schneider and the Yapese keenly aware of cultural difference. Furthermore, Schneider was perceived as—and was—a significant political agent in the Yapese field of relations, and the information he received was deliberately controlled—differently, by different Yapese parties. Typically, he was "shut out" of consultations on how to deal with him, and his actions resonated politically in ways he often could not fathom, until he gained an orientation to local political situations. It might even be said that one of the most significant events of his fieldwork actually took place four months before his arrival, when the administration had destooled an impostor "king of Yap," and reallocated appointments to the chiefly offices that it recognized. Although Schneider re-
mainly largely unaware of it until he was already settled in a Yapese village, this event was a touchstone of Yapese understandings of his advent, and it crystallized the factional conflicts that defined the political context of his field encounters. With the benefit of hindsight, and of later understandings achieved by Schneider, we may explore the background of this event in the context of Yap's history of foreign rule.

On Yap, the colonial chronology begins in 1885, twenty-six years after the first European trader had landed there without being driven away or murdered (Shineberg 1971:274–78; Tetens 1958:12; Hezel 1975:6). During this interval, the small, reef-fringed archipelago became the center of the Caroline Islands trade; exporting copra and beche-de-mer (the sea slug highly valued in certain Chinese soups), it was visited in the 1870s by thirty foreign ships a year. Then Yap became the object of a dispute between Spain and Germany. Spain claimed absentee sovereignty on the basis of the Bull of Pope Alexander VI in 1493 and its role in exploring the region in the early sixteenth century; Germany, which unlike Spain carried on a substantial trade, argued that no sovereignty claim was valid without de facto occupation (Brown 1976; Hezel 1983:8, 306–9).

The dispute came to a head in August 1885, when two Spanish galleons landed at Yap to unload a governor, priests, soldiers, oxen, riding horses, and flags, as well as stones to build a jail, a governor's residence, and a proper church. For their new capital, christened Colonia, the Spanish selected a defensible islet guarding the mouth of Yap's central harbor. But just as they were planning a ceremony for taking possession, a German warship raced into harbor with full canvas spread and steam; its crew debarked, planted a flag, and claimed the islands for the Kaiser. Johann Kubary, who witnessed these events, reported that the "dumbfounded" Spaniards "knapsibly" raised their own flag later that night, but lowered it in the morning and sailed back to Manila (quoted in Müller 1917:5–6). When the incident nearly precipitated war between Spain and Germany in Europe, the dispute was submitted for arbitration to Pope Leo XIII, who affirmed Spanish sovereignty, but enjoined Spain to grant German traders full, unprecedented rights of access (Brown 1976:99–106; Hezel 1983:312–13; Townsend 1930:166–17; Pauwels 1936:18–19).

The Spanish administration is of more interest for what it failed to do than for what it did. To preserve Spanish "honor" in upholding its claim, Madrid was content to administer the islands at a loss, supporting missionization but remaining largely unaware of it until he was already settled in a Yapese village, this event was a touchstone of Yapese understandings of his advent, and it crystallized the factional conflicts that defined the political context of his field encounters. With the benefit of hindsight, and of later understandings achieved by Schneider, we may explore the background of this event in the context of Yap's history of foreign rule.

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The Spanish administration is of more interest for what it failed to do than for what it did. To preserve Spanish "honor" in upholding its claim, Madrid was content to administer the islands at a loss, supporting missionization but not mercantile expansion. Importing Filipinos for their garrison and Christian Chamorros as domestic servants, the Spaniards had little need for native labor and were thus inattentive to Yapese chiefs (Oca 1893; Hezel 1970a, 1975; Christian 1899; Salesius 1906:156).

This changed when the Germans took over in 1899: maximal "utilization of the earth," and "above all" of its native people, became the final cause of administrative policy (quoted in McKinney 1947:96). To facilitate exploitation, the District Officer, Arno Senft, initiated "public works"—including planting of coconut palms; building roads, piers, and a canal; and constructing a causeway from Colonia to the main Yap island—all of them undertaken entirely with drafted Yapese labor. The workers were paid in valuables earlier expropriated by the administration, and discipline was enforced by a drafted native police force and by monthly visits of German warships. Obviously, Senft required considerable "help" from Yapese leaders, and he created a system to hold them accountable in taxation, labor recruitment, and other demands of the administration (McKinney 1947:76–77; Salesius 1906:159).

Senft was well aware of basic features of Yapese political institutions. He knew that different kinds of Yapese "chiefs" exercised different kinds of authority, and that three main chiefly offices were recognized in every village. He understood the preeminence of the three centers, Tomil, Rull, and Cagil, and that alliances linked together villages that were not geographically "contiguous, but rather interspersed among the others over the whole" of the Yap Islands (Senft 1903:57–59). But as these institutions were too indefinite and resistive to be efficiently controlled, Senft regarded them, quite correctly, as impediments to exploitation. Irked by chiefly tabus impeding labor recruitment, he attempted radical measures—including forced interisland migrations—to hasten a day when "the power of the chiefs, based on nothing but superstition, would be broken" (quoted in McKinney 1947:107). Thus the system of "official" native chieflyships that he instituted in 1900 or 1901 was not intended to be a homologue of indigenous political structures; it was rather the familiar, twotier "district system" employed throughout the German colonies (76).

Territorial groupings being easier to conceptualize and administer, the units of this system were defined by boundaries drawn on a map: 106 formal villages, each with a single "village chief," grouped in eight territorial "districts," each with a single "district over-chief" (McKinney 1947:76). The system did take into account one aspect of indigenous Yapese polity, inasmuch as the eight village capitals were those generally cited as "most important" in precolonial and Spanish reports (Miklouho-Maclay 1878:42; Tetens & Kubary 1873:85, 93; Oca 1893:266–67). This apparent congruence may have been a factor in the later impression of foreign observers that Senft's system as a whole reflected the indigenous one (Yanaihara 1940:95–96, 223, 264–65; OPNAV 1944:67; Murdock 1948a:16; Schneider 1962).

Indeed, each of Yap's first four ethnographers, in German, Japanese, and American times, had to rediscover for himself the separate existence of indigenous Yapese political institutions (Müller 1917:137, 242, 254, 330; Yanaihara 1940:223, 263–66; Useem 1946:16; SFN). Whereas the common pathology of colonial administration is that indigenous offices become redefined when their occupants are drafted into the colonial framework, Yap's indigenous in-
Institutions were well defended against such subversion by the native cultural logic of chiefly authority. Indigenous political relationships were not constituted as relationships between people or groups of people but as historically sanctioned relationships between pairs of places, or land estates. Thus Yapese myths are mostly stories of initiatory progressions between places, beginning at superordinate locations and passing to subordinate locations; the specifics of the progression—what moved, how, why, and when—indicated (or were deduced from) the customs of the relationship between those places, which was spoken of as a "pathway" (tha) between a pair of land estates. The alliances were networks of pathways, for which the Yapese image was a string fishing "net" (mug), held up by one of the knots. People acted politically as representatives of land estates, speaking with the voice of a particular land estate; "they keep saying," Schneider reported, "that it is not the person but the land" which has authority. A "chief," (piling, literally, "a strong voice") exerted authority in "remembering," or calling upon, the myth-historically sanctioned relationships between his estate and others; as offices, the chieftainships always referred to land parcels (SFN: 637, 670; cf. Müller 1917:242, 245; Lingenfelter 1975:25, 77–80; Labby 1976:94–113; cf. Parmentier 1987). When a person was chief to two land estates, he was understood to speak for either one or the other, depending upon the context. Similarly, where a person occupied simultaneously a colonial and a Yapese office, the two chieftainships remained distinct—separate capacities of action sanctioned in different lands.

In the case of the colonial chieftainships, this land was the colonial capital, to which the district chiefs were summoned monthly to receive orders from the administration, which then travelled outward along pathways radiating from Colonia. Populated by foreign officials and heavily Christianized Chamorro comparadors, Colonia, the islet, was clearly a place of foreign customs; from the perspective of Yapese it was not even a part of Yap (SFN; cf. Kirkpatrick & Broder 1976:201; Marksbury 1982:24). Hence, its "voices"—the colonial chieftainships—were seen as "customs of the foreigners" (SFN: 1206): a view continually reconstituted by the uses to which they were put.

For themselves, then, the Yapese explicitly recognized the sanction of the colonial chieftainships as an extension of the power (warships) of the foreigners. But fearful in general of contradicting foreign opinions, the Yapese had good reason actually to promote foreign misunderstandings of the colonial offices. In the indigenous context, the highest chiefs were sacred figures, often aged and largely immobile, whose dignity was ill-served by running errands for the foreigners. The foreigners, for their part, wanted foremen and not oracles, and preferred to deal with Yapese who were able to speak their language; most of Senfft's appointees had been high-middle-level only, younger figures in local Yapese hierarchies (Müller 1917:254, 228, 330; Yanaihara 1940:264; SFN). Whereas foreigners saw these men as active, executive authorities, the Yapese saw them as messengers, bearing messages from Colonia; in practice, colonial chiefs returned to consult with their indigenous chiefly superiors, who convened councils to chart responses to the initiatives of the administration (SFN; Useem 1946, 1947:1). Ultimately, this interposition of communal deliberation between colonial order and implementation strengthened Yapese attempts to minimize foreign interference—which may account for Yap's reputation in German, Japanese, and American colonial circles as the most "stubbornly resistant" and "primitive" society in all of Micronesia (Peattie 1988:89; OPNAV 1948:44; Salesius 1906:161; Yanaihara 1940:125; Japan 1928–37; Weller 1949). In foreign eyes, the principal sign of enduring backwardness was native loincloths and bare breasts. But for Yapese, the maintenance of loincloths and grass skirts was deliberate resistance, by order of their chiefly councils, Yapese wore Western clothing only on visits to Colonia (SFN).

In Japanese times, the emphasis was on settler colonial expansion, and Yapese lands were expropriated for plantations run by Japanese nationals (Yanaihara 1934, 1940; League of Nations 1928–37; SFN). But the focal point of antagonism between the Yapese and the Japanese was the dramatic acceleration of Yapese depopulation. Regularly, beginning in 1924, the Japanese delegation to the League of Nations Permanent Mandates Commission was criticized regarding the "alarming" danger of "extinction" of the Yapese native population (PMC 1931:80, 1924:11, 1928:204, 273, 1929:49–50, 1930:65, 211, 1932:109, 119, 1933:91–92, 1935:142–43, 201, 1936:191, 1937:120, 135). Nevertheless, the upshot on Yap of these manifestations of international sympathy was a redoubled administrative effort to wipe out Yapese "age-long evil habits," and two separate series of Japanese medical studies, in each of which over four-fifths of the indigenous population (men and women) was subjected to forced genital inspections in notoriously semipublic settings (Japan 1928:204, 1929:145–46, 1936:114–16; SFN:704, 941; DS[CK] 10/7–11/47). Amid suggestions that the "utilitarian" administration policy was in fact "to leave the natives to dwindle naturally and let the Japanese immigrants fill their place" (Yanaihara 1940:298, 1934), Japanese officials apparently convinced themselves that "psychologically, the natives were absolutely indifferent to . . . their extinction" (League of Nations 1933:91–92; cf. Harris 1934:283–87).

But obviously no one was more concerned about depopulation, ultimately, than the Yapese. And they based their theories on the empirically formidable premise that the Yapese people had been numerous before the coming of the foreigners (Müller 1917:9; Useem 1946:6; SFN:12–14, 363, 605–7, 668–69, 876–77, 916–20). From this perspective, Japanese "counter-measures" were seen to be part of the problem, inasmuch as most of them interdicted practices viewed by Yapese as specifically necessary for successful reproduction. The major fertility rituals of the islands' ceremonial calendar were branded licentiousness and were prohibited, and the administration instigated "physical
leading to a civil war with Gagil in 1867 (Tetens 1958:97). But as the foreign trade settled into the pattern it retained for half a century, the traders, beginning with the American David O'Keefe, usurped the Rull chiefs' monopoly on new "stone money" from Palau, significantly undercutting the traditional bases of Rull's power (SFN:948; Hezel 1983:263-89). Chiefs of Rull became the closest Yapese associates of German and Japanese officials; and in Rull, unlike in Tomil or in Gagil, the highest-ranking indigenous chief—holding its most sacred land estate—had by the end of the German period assumed the colonial district chieftainship (Müller 1917;249; Yanaihara 1940:124-25; Lingenfelter 1975:163-65).

The great vulnerability of this arrangement became apparent when this chief died, and Rull's highest council selected a successor. Their choice was overruled by the Japanese officials; upholding the presumably "hereditary" character of the colonial chieftainships, they policed the succession using a rule of patrilineal primogeniture (Yanaihara 1940:214; Lingenfelter 1975:165). The Japanese appointed a man named Ruwepong, the son of the deceased chief, who "stubbornly refused to capitulate" when the council asked him to resign (Lingenfelter 1975:165). Fluent in Japanese, Ruwepong became the foreigners' agent, and the leader of an emergent faction of Japanese-educated younger men, who favored the adoption of certain foreign "customs" (Yanaihara 1940; SFN). But even he still obediently consulted with Rull's council, until shortly after the transition to American naval rule (SFN).

That transition followed a period of unprecedented privation. During World War II, the Japanese drafted Yapese labor to build airstrips, bases, and a long defensive seawall (SFN:25, 884; Gilliland 1975:10; Peattie 1988:251-53), and they garrisoned the islands with over 6,000 Japanese troops, bringing the total foreign population to well over 7,000, compared to a Yapese population of less than 2,500—down from an estimated 28,000 to 34,000 before the islands' foreign penetration (Richard 1957:119; II, 50; III, 566; OPNAV 1948:59; Hunt et al. 1954; Schneider 1956:6). When the Americans besieged Yap in 1944, and people went hungry, Ruwepong provided food to the family of a Gagil man named Fani'ch'or; after the surrender and repatriation of the Japanese, Fani'ch'or supported Ruwepong in dealing with the Americans. Ruwepong had anticipated that the new American commander would inquire as to the identity of Yap's high chief, and made sure that he and Fani'ch'or stayed close to Colonia; the commander inquired, Ruwepong stepped forward, and Fani'ch'or confirmed that he and Rull were "number one." Fani'ch'or was appointed the new district chief of Gagil, and the Americans invested Ruwepong with a novel title: hereditary "king of Yap" (SFN:28, 76, 157, 1036; Trumbull 1946:60).

Yapese initially accepted this arrangement as simply an extension of the patterns of the Japanese era. Having proven themselves adept at manipulat-
Exchanging Japanese yen for U.S. dollars on an outer island. (From Richard 1957(1), 231.) In the late 1940s, Yapese often told dollar-peddling American visitors that they had seen Spanish reals, German marks, and Japanese yen each come and go (Wright 1947:149; Weller 1949:127).

...ing foreign rulers, Ruwepong and Fanitch'or were convenient front men for long-protected indigenous chiefs, who were fearful that the Japanese might return, and in no hurry to step forward. When the Americans held an election in the summer of 1946, the "hidden powers"—Yapese councils— instructed voters how to vote, and Fanitch'or and Ruwepong retained their colonial positions. But by the end of the following summer, the arrangement had broken down (Lingenfelter 1974:56; SFN).

It was by then evident that the Americans were there to stay, and some Yapese attributed to the American "gods" the reversal of the depopulation trend in the spring of 1947, when births officially outnumbered deaths (SFN: 13, 28-29, 986; DS/[CK] 10/7[-11]/47; HYE: Andrus memo [7/47]). In contrast to the Japanese, the Americans distributed substantial material benefits through the chiefs—relief food, lumber, tinsheets, and a "whale boat" for each district. This made the colonial chiefship a viable as independent power bases, and soon Ruwepong and Fanitch'or had "ceased to consult" with the older chiefs and chiefly councils (SFN:28, 158). Ruwepong had the ear of naval officials, visiting journalists, and congressional inspectors; he even told villagers how to answer the queries of a visiting anthropologist, John Useem (Trumbull 1946:60; Useem 1947:1; SFN:945-46, 1091). But the Japanese-style punishments Ruwepong threatened in order to gain compliance with naval orders invariably failed to materialize under the American administration. In this context, he and Fanitch'or were increasingly resented by other Yapese, particularly in Tomil and Gagil, which Ruwepong claimed were subordinate to Ruil (SFN; Useem 1946:16; cf. Richard 1957:752). Redress, however, could only come from the Americans, and the attempt to gain it brought on the crisis that Schneider unwittingly stepped into on his arrival on Yap.

During the spring of 1947, a young naval officer, Lt. Kevin Carroll, was approached by a man from Tomil and told of Ruwepong's usurpation. As manager of the boat pool, Carroll was one of only three or four Americans (of a population of forty) who regularly ventured from Colonia to areas of Yapese habitation (Richard 1957:210-11; SFN: DS/[CK] 10/7[-11]/47). Launching a private investigation, he conducted interviews throughout the islands, and in June took advantage of the departure of Yap's naval commander to institute a reapportionment of the administration's chiefly appointments.

Carroll had become aware that in terms of the "native system" the colonial districts were "artificial units" and the colonial chiefs a mere apparatus of "effective intermediaries" (SPR: Carroll, "Yap Traditional Government, Special Report," 6/8/47). But he nevertheless handled the reapportionment as if the two systems could be made to correspond: that is, he sought to appoint to colonial chiefships the occupants of corresponding "traditional, hereditary" Yapese statuses. His decision may have reflected the statements of informants, who responded to his questions about hereditary criteria by advancing claims couched in an idiom of hereditary customs (SFN:159, 162, 1036). He may also have been influenced by his primary ethnographic reference, the West Caroline Islands Civil Affairs Handbook that Murdock's unit had prepared in early 1944. Largely based on German and Japanese reports, it presented the district system as "aboriginal," the village and district chiefships as indigenous offices, and chiefly succession as "patrilineal" primogeniture (OPNAV 1944:67). But for whatever reason, Carroll maintained the colonial system, and while he did not insist that succession be patrilineal in all cases, he did attempt to link colonial chiefships to specific chiefly land estates, thus partially subverting the traditional Yapese accommodation to colonial power. In the process, Fanitch'or was replaced, and Ruwepong exiled to distant Guam—along with Fanitch'or's young acolyte, Gumedak, whom Carroll arranged to have attend a school for native teachers (SFN).

Four months later, in September, when the four Harvard anthropologists stopped in Guam for two weeks on their way to Yap, they were put in touch with Gumedak, who gave them lessons in Yapese. Managing for himself a two-month holiday from the school, Gumedak travelled back to Yap with...
the anthropologists (HKP: DS/CK 9/27/47; SFN:28). To the Yapese, it appeared that the American anthropologists had returned Gumedak from his exile, thereby renewing the hopes of Fani'ch'or's faction in Yapese politics—into which Schneider was thus inadvertently and unknowingly plunged.

Adapting Research Strategy to a “Delicate Situation”

Schneider's first field site was Gatchepar, the leading village of Gagil, to which he and Stevens proceeded after a brief stay in Colonia. They went to Gatchepar largely because there they could work with Gumedak, the only interpreter then available on the islands—and because Carroll, now the officer for island “internal affairs,” had recommended Gatchepar over Gumedak’s nearby home village, apparently to lessen the political consequences of Gumedak’s working with the anthropologists. Certainly, from Carroll’s perspective it was best that the anthropologists study in Gagil, which with its changes had become the political showcase of the administration. Tomil had asked to be exempted from his new appointments policy, and there the colonial chief was merely a “delegated spokesman” for the chiefly council; Rull was in disarray in the wake of Ruwepong’s ouster, with four chiefs installed successively in the first nine months alone (SFN:996, 1036–39; SPR: Carroll/DS [1950]). In Gagil, by contrast, the apical alliance leader was a strong “legitimate chief,” and he had agreed to replace Fani’ch’or in the colonial district chieftainship. Thus on October 15, Schneider and Stevens boarded a naval landing craft for a short journey around the coast to Gatchepar’s pier, while Hunt and Kidder stayed in Colonia to prepare the anthropometric survey and the census they later took to every Yapese village (SFN:17).

Although Gumedak was under orders to take them from the ship to Fani’ch’or, the two ethnographers arrived in Gatchepar while he was teaching in the Gagil school, and were greeted instead by an agent of the Gagil chief. When he then summoned Gumedak to interpret for the Americans, the dealings were brought decisively within the chief’s political orbit, and it was with the chief, Fithingmau Niga, in consultation with the village council, that Gumedak thereafter cleared arrangements for the visitors’ care and contacts (SFN:17, 83–84, 168). Such mediation was essential because Yapese houses were dispersed through the lowlands jungle, and it was not thought politic to “barge around” on people’s land (SFN: DS/CK 10/14/47). Gumedak thus became a linguistic and social lifeline. Dressed in black shoes, bright yellow socks, and a loincloth cut from a Navy signal flag, he was clearly someone “caught between two cultures” (SFN:19, 189). But it was this very ambiguity that made him useful to the anthropologists, as he led them from early days of inactivity and helplessness—occasioned by intense disorientation, dehydration, failure to eat, and heat prostration—out to increasing participation in the social world around them. Schneider called Gumedak “a gem and a paragon of all the wonderful things on earth” and planned to “pump the hell” out of him before he returned to Guam in mid-November (19–20).

What they “pumped out” of Gumedak was Yapese language and ethnographic information, on a range of topics thought appropriate to their “delicate situation.” On the morning he and Stevens emerged from their initial culture shock, Schneider declined to attend a meeting hastily called by the high chief’s son—who planned to lecture “everybody” on Navy sanitation regulations—insisting to the Yapese that he and Stevens were not “tied in with [the] navy” (SFN:20). Although the Yapese postponed the meeting, and made no further overt references to the anthropologists’ presumed Navy connection, Schneider soon grew anxious again that he and Stevens might subtly be evoking colonial fears. Confiding to Kluckhohn in late October that it had taken time to “realize” that they did not have “good rapport yet,” since “everyone” they encountered was “so generously polite,” he was worried because “people still don’t understand any satisfactory reason for our presence”—that “issue” being further “confused” by the unfortunate coincidence that we are camped on the former Japanese police station. To minimize the “risk of an irrational association with Japanese times,” he and Stevens were avoiding potentially controversial investigations, including mapping village lands, which in that period had been “a police function” connected with land expropriations (HLP: DS/CK 10/28/47).

Since it required “guesswork” to know which subjects might be “tough,” they were focusing interviews for the moment on Yapese “kinship” and “old yap culture”—which Kluckhohn had recommended as “impersonal” topics useful to “win the confidence of the tribesmen” (SFN:20, cf. 303; HPM: DS/CK 1/20/48; Kluckhohn 1945:111). For Schneider, in those first weeks, gaining the confidence of the Yapese became the “paramount and immediate problem,” as he and Stevens learned in Gatchepar of Fani’ch’or’s intrigue with Ruwepong, of Carroll’s political changes, and of how they themselves had “catapult[ed]” their interpreter Gumedak “back into politics” (HLP: DS/CK 1/20/48; SFN:28, 76–77, 156–63). And because Schneider felt that honesty and “good will” were incompatible with colonial power, the “ever present risk” of “being frozen out” by the Yapese became a “twenty four hour” anxiety.

...
He decided, therefore, to devote his "major reflective efforts" for the "next two or three months" to efforts to ameliorate "the problem of rapport" (HKP: DS/CK 10/28/47; HPM: DS/CK 1/20/48).

From a Yapese perspective, it must have seemed evident that the anthropologists had to be somehow associated with the Navy. Back in Colonia, on the first Sunday after their arrival, Gumedak had seen them conferring with "Mr. Carroll," who had then accompanied them on their preliminary visit to Gatchepar, to secure the permission of the Gagil chief (SFN:6-8, 17, 1033; DS/CK 10/14/47). They had Navy food, Navy tents, Navy furniture, and Navy equipment, and they were periodically resupplied from Colonia on Navy vessels. Thus when Schneider insistently denied being "part of the Navy," Gumedak seems suddenly to have had a revelation—that the two anthropologists were in fact superior to the Navy: "His whole body bloomed into wreaths of understanding, smiling and agreeing motion. His eyes got slightly damp, and with heavy emotion he announced, 'oh, you very rich, very very rich!'" (20). Schneider, who did not normally regard "rich" as a compliment, interpreted it as flattering polysemy ("rich used twice now as synonym for smart, wise" [11]). But since Gumedak aspired mightily to political recognition by the Navy, a more likely gloss would probably be "powerful"—the more so, since the ethnographers could requisition from the Navy what they wanted and insisted on that their departure they were going to talk about Yap to "the people of America" (231, 312)—that is, to some higher authority back in the United States. If the Navy then was "rich," Schneider and Stevens were "very very rich."

In this context, kinship inquiries had a different meaning for Yapese than for Schneider. In the investigations the preceding spring that had led to the ethnographers could requisition from the Navy what they wanted and insisted on that their departure they were going to talk about Yap to "the people of America" (231, 312)—that is, to some higher authority back in the United States. If the Navy then was "rich," Schneider and Stevens were "very very rich."

Yet while motivated partly by a desire to enhance communication, in the colonial context kinship study tended to confirm Yapese impressions of the anthropologists as colonial agents. This became evident early in November, when the first typhoon in thirteen years struck the Yap Islands (Schneider 1957b). For the anthropologists, whose tent was the only dwelling in Gatchepar to blow down, the storm occasioned a six-day-long distraction, during which they waited for the Navy to deliver replacement tents from Colonia (HKP: DS/CK 11/13[-17]/47). But for Yapese, typhoons were sorceries of vengeance, invariably caused by the magic of indigenous chiefs of exceptional power; this one, it was believed, was Ruwepong's revenge for his dethronement (SFN:509, 689, 1119). And if Ruwepong could conjure a typhoon, his power was not merely an extension of colonial forces, but also had a specifically Yapese substance. In this context, the ambitions of Ruwepong's political allies were renewed, and Fanitch'or, who thus far had had no contact with the anthropologists, made bold to approach Stevens, speaking with him briefly, while Fithingmau Tulug, the high chief's son, watched with evident "hostility" and "caution" (SFN:97, 147).

Given that Carroll had linked the colonial district chiefship of Gagil to the sacred land estate of Gagil's apical indigenous chief, for Fanitch'or to have had a claim upon the colonial office required setting aside the special custom by which the sacred estate was held only by members of a single matrilineal group (or genung). Because of depopulation, only four male members of this matrilineal group were alive in 1947: the current very aged chief; another very old man; one who was too young; and another currently a stu-

3. The topic of the genung is worth a separate comment. Consisting generally of a group of people who claim descent from the same womb (at broadest range that of a mythical ancestress), its more particular constitution has been described by Labby (1976). Kirkpatrick & Broder (1976), Lingenfelter (1975, 1979), and Schneider (1984). Since its characterization by Schneider (using technical terms like "clan" and "tribe") is itself at issue in the present discussion, I gloss it below as "matri-group," a deliberately nonstandard usage, though one which conveys its essentially matrilineal constitution.

The evidence strongly suggests that before 1860 the custom of reserving ownership of a land estate to the members of one matrilineal group was unique to the apical land estates in Tomil, Gagil, and Rull. In Rull, to judge from recorded genealogies, a patriloc was permissible so far close upon the heels of the arrival of white traders (Müller 1917:252-54; Yamaihara 1940:59-25; Lingenfelter 1975:112, 163-65). In the early stages of Schneider's fieldwork, he accepted Carroll's opinion that a transition from matrilineal to patrilineal succession was now imminent also in Gagil—although in the interests not of Fanitch'or, but of allowing the competent Fithingmau Tulug to
dent in the naval medical school on Guam, to which he had been “railroaded” the year before by Ruwepong and Fan'i'ch'or. In the effective absence of available successors, some Yapese favored suspending the special inheritance custom at the death of the very aged current chief, for whose position jockeying had already begun (SFN:3, 152–60, 1039). But the special custom had broad political and social significance: looking backward, it established the connection of current leaders, wielding powers over the islands’ fertility, with founding ancestresses who had first imbued the land with productivity; looking forward, any movement from matrilineal to patrilineal customs would necessarily be a highly politicized issue. In this context, Stevens recorded that Gumedak made the ethnographically “surprising statement” that matri-group exogamy was “no longer” in effect (100).

Fithingmau Tulug, however, apparently sensing that a putsch was in progress, paid a visit to the anthropologists’ camp on November 9. As “a hush fell” among other Yapese onlookers (SFN:104), he pointedly recounted a myth of his father’s chiefly land estate, which traced the origin of the estate’s special matrilineal customs to founding journeys of ancestral female spirits (150–51). That evening the waters rose, signalling the onset of a second typhoon, and Schneider and Stevens were ushered to shelter in the house of Fithingmau Niga (78, 146). By now Schneider was convinced that he and Stevens were considered “chief-changers and chief-makers” (SFN:149, 163); back in Colonia, he had interviewed Carroll about the spring investigations, and he now appreciated why the Yapese “insisted on classing us as Navy.” Realizing also that no single faction had a monopoly on “political scheming,” he concluded that Fithingmau Tulug’s “motivation” in offering shelter in the second storm “definitely” reflected a “fear” of American-instigated political repercussions (152, 161–62). In this context, that night Schneider “broached” to Tulug his intention of transferring to a new fieldsite on Rumung, the politically less consequential northernmost island of the archipelago. Appearing “anxious” to keep Schneider and Stevens in Gatchepar, Tulug responded by inviting them to move permanently to his father’s land estate (217). But Schneider now felt that too many “mistakes” had already been made in Gatchepar, and to accept Tulug’s invitation would make it impossible to start afresh (HPM: DS/CK 1/20/48).

Things came to a head one week later at a farewell party for Gumedak, who after failing to persuade the anthropologists to keep him on Yap, had now to return to the naval school on Guam. Although to increase his prestige as the Americans’ “friend” Gumedak had sought to hold the party at their camp, it was held instead at the house of a fellow schoolteacher in his home village, near Gatchepar (SFN:74, 115). There, when Schneider and Stevens were seated at a “japanese-style” table and honored by a special dish of chicken, served only for them, Schneider’s ingrained egalitarianism led him to refuse it. Undaunted, Gumedak lectured other Yapese on how to treat “My friends the americans”: “anything they say, hurry up give them” (117, 125, 128). The Yapese men eventually “got crocked to the gills,” and they began to caress each other and sit upon each other’s laps; later, when the anthropologists had put away their cameras, Gumedak danced drunkenly “like a burlesque queen,” rubbing his “exposed” penis against the “erect” foundation pole of the house. Although older men assured the anthropologists that this was just innocent “fun,” Stevens reported that his “guts turn[ed] over,” and he had a “mild tussle” with Gumedak to avoid being seated on his lap (122–23, 178–80; HYP: DS/CK 11/13[–17]/47). Writing to Kluckhohn, Schneider remarked on Stevens’ “overreaction to the homosexuality,” which “shocked and disgusted and upset him like nothing else” — indeed, to such an extent that Stevens soon returned to Colonia and ceased to keep regular field notes (HPM: DS/CK 11/13[–17]/47; SPR: DS/Gorer 6/4/48; HYE).

For Schneider, however, it was the first half of the party that was the more profoundly disturbing. He had been “acutely uncomfortable” in the role of “exalted chicken eater,” and he had shuddered at Gumedak’s self-aggrandizing proclamations: “I, gumedak, only one friend to americans” (SFN:125). And what had made the schoolteacher’s display still “more difficult to take” was that Schneider had felt that Gumedak would have been “happy,” and their relationship “superb”—“if I could only act like a japane[se] policeman” (115–16). To avoid that compromising situation, Schneider would definitely remove himself to Rumung, where he planned “to keep dissociated” from “Gumedaks circle— the school teachers, the ingratiators”—the “japanese educated kids,” who “dont know from nothing about their culture” and who therefore “necessarily invoke external assistance—first the japanese, now the americans” (128, 142, 224, 229).

“I Am like Your Father” — “You Are Chief over Me”

Later, when Schneider spoke of his Yap fieldwork, he mostly referred to his six months on Rumung, a small, hilly island of just 130 people, and the furthest point on the archipelago from Colonia and the Navy. He chose it because he had heard it was the part of Yap “least touched” by Japanese and American
“influence” (HKP: DS/CK 12/4/47). But Yapese, unlike foreign administrators and anthropologists, did not consider Rumung properly a part of “Yap” at all, classing it instead with the distant Central Carolines, as an “outer island” vassal within the Gagil alliance “net” (SFN:463-67). To mainland Yapese, Rumung’s dialect was inferior, its culture less sophisticated, and its people generally “black”—although Schneider could detect no difference (239, 463). In this colonial situation within a colonial situation, Rumung chiefs took orders not only from Colonia but from Gatchepar as well.

The chiefly spheres of authority were based on a complex set of divisions, the legacy of an era when the Rumung islanders probably numbered 1,500 (Schneider 1949). The six remaining villages were grouped into a northern and a southern alliance; each village had sections, and there were both village and section chiefs. The three most important kinds of chiefs, found at both levels, were associated not just with lands but also each with a different age-grade. Thus the most active type was also the lowest, the “chief of young men,” who led young men’s communal work and discharged all save the most important political tasks requiring travel far afield. In contrast, the “chief of lands” was older, higher, and less vigorous; expected to mostly “sit”—consult, deliberate, and speak—he was the “strong voice” of the village in its political dealings and directed the activities of the local chiefs of the young men. He in turn deferred, however, to the pilibithir, or “ancient voice,” an extremely aged figure, soon to join ancestral spirits, who sat immobile and remote from mundane business, but was consulted in exceptional matters as a voice of “custom” and mediation (Lingenfelter 1975; Labby 1976; SFN). Besides Fithingmau Niga, who, though off in Gatchepar, was pilibithir of all Gagil, there was no single chief on Rumung with island-wide authority. The two highest villages were Fal and Riy, which headed up the southern and northern alliances. But which was higher was controversial in late 1947.

Traditionally, it had been Fal. Although Fal’s old men’s house was no longer standing, in principle it served the entire Rumung island, and its meeting ground was the mythic terminus of pathways from Gatchepar (SFN:444). Riy, however, was then the terminus of pathways from Colonia, which passed through Lirau, Riy’s chief of young men, who was also the colonial district chief. First appointed by the Japanese, Lirau had retained the colonial office under American administration, distributing Navy “gifts” so as to build up Riy’s prestige (672). In his investigation, Carroll had learned that Lirau was subordinate, but the older chiefs were too old for frequent journeys to Colonia—and less resentful of Lirau’s arrogance than they were terrified of the foreigners (467, 974–76, 1235). Thus in Colonia, and to the important constituency of Chamorro and Navy delivery men, Lirau was seen as the “chief of all Rumung” (218, 288). Schneider’s arrival, however, shifted power to Fal.

Although as yet unaware of Rumung’s internal politics, Schneider was determined to arrange his move through Yapese, not colonial, channels; briefed by Carroll, he specifically avoided Lirau, and instead waited for a favorable opportunity to consult directly with Fithingmau Niga, who unhesitatingly arranged for two men to canoe him to Rumung. On Fithingmau Niga’s instructions, they landed at Fal and first sought Tannengin, who was Fal’s vil-
lange chief of lands and the highest chief in Fal's old men's house. Marvelling that the foreigner had followed the traditional pathway, Tannengin asked how Schneider had known to ask Fithingmau Niga "where to come"—and, rhetorically, why had Schneider not gone first to see Lirau. That "seemed to clinch the whole thing," Schneider recorded in his field notes (SFN:217-23).

While Schneider was back in Gatchepar picking up his gear, Tannengin called a meeting of all the island's villages, at which it was agreed that Schneider would stay in Fal, but also be visited by "northern" people. Explaining that Schneider wanted to write down "on paper" the language and customs of Rumung, Tannengin reminded the young people that old customs were better recounted by the old men; the young could teach Schneider language, learning English in exchange (SFN:240-41, 911-12). Early in their first conversation, Tannengin had requested that Schneider "teach the children american," and although Schneider had resisted on the grounds that speaking English would slow his progress in Yapese, Tannengin was adamant (232-33)—because (as he later confided to Schneider) it would lessen Rumung's dependence on any one person, like Lirau, for mediating relations with the island's newest colonial governors (845, cf. 19, 84, 806-8).

When Schneider's boat arrived on December 10, Tannengin was ready to start the "school rumung" and "school merikan." Schneider put him off, while straightening up his camp and typing field notes from the move, until early on the third day, when Tannengin positively insisted that they begin. They worked thence daily from morning to midnight: Tannengin, his Riy counterpart, other old men, and several teenagers. When working on "the language of Rumung," Schneider would venture a word and all the old men would correct him, until Tannengin shut them up with his official toothless version. Studying "merikan," they sat with notebooks, reviewing the Yapese words Schneider had recorded on cards (SFN:240-41, 245, 256). Although Schneider hoped that this "artificial situation" would in time break down, he was pleased by his warm reception, which seemed "open and of common interest"—not "servile and all out to fence me in with kindness" (235, 241). One welcome sign was that Rumung women did not avoid him, as had all but the very oldest and very youngest in Gatchepar (223). There was thus breast-feeding to observe, and behavior of and toward young children—mainstay Freudian data Schneider thought critical to his aggression research. When a sexually mature young woman, "mystified at the typewriter" on which he was recording notes, actually ventured unafraid into his tent, Schneider broke the flow of his notes to type: "this moment . . . marks a milestone in rapport" (279).

This did not mean that rapport problems had vanished, but his experience in Gatchepar suggested to Schneider that it was a question of alliance. On one hand was Tannengin, a repository of local cultural knowledge and a connection to other old men, to whom everyone openly deferred. He was himself dignified but deferent, spoke calmly but was heeded, and under his wing, conforming to Yapese proprieties, Schneider did not "make people" avoid him (SFN:314). To side with Lirau, on the other hand, would likely "antagonize the old men"—and also yield "unreliable" information (231, 311). Educated in Japanese schools and ashamed of Yap's "bad customs," Lirau had insisted, one night when Tannengin was not around, that Yapese kin terms worked the "same way" as kin terms in America (231). It was satisfying when Schneider's more traditional conception of Yapese kinship was vindicated by the older chiefs. But the social logic of his position was nonetheless disquieting to his egalitarian American predispositions.

He was able to dismiss the problem of associating with "high ranking people," which might have shut him out from "the other side," if that side had been like a "union membership" and the chiefs like "union big shots" (SFN:313). But he worried that the "other side" seemed in fact to be full of "deviants like Gumedak and Lirau," whom in a different political or cultural context he might have empathized with or pitied (311). Here, however, they were humiliated—"fawning"—colonial subjects, asking Schneider which of their traditional customs to change "immediately"; and here Schneider himself was the hoped-for instrument of their colonial ambitions (232). Wrestling with this situational and cultural ambiguity produced pages of catharsis, self-justification, and self-doubt:

[How conservative the ethnologist becomes out of his own culture, how he despises the radicals, the break-aways, the deviants. Or just ethnologist Schneider? . . . no doubt in my own culture I'm a bit of a deviant too. the judgement is not mine to make but I keep catching myself making it. (231)]

On Yap, "the deviants" seemed "exploitative": Lirau had announced to him, "I am chief of rumung"; in Gatchepar, Gumedak had mistranslated, inventing demands on his own behalf (234, 250). Even so, it was "wrong" to simply neglect "gumedaks kind of deviant," if only because such behavior was a patterned deviation from Yapese cultural norms (314).

[And I must admit that gumedaks exploitation outraged and surprised me a little bit unduly. After a bit of consideration I realized that I must be living in some kind of fantasy world of my own to expect to come and plump down in the midst of a going concern like Yap culture and expect them to rush around to my tent all day long and every night supplying me with exhaustive accounts of everything from their hidden fantasies to the technique of mat weaving. I know what's in this field trip for me; what I didn't stop to consider was what was in it] for the Yap people. Hence I should not have been either outraged or surprised that they had motivations too and that theirs should be no less selfish than mine. . . . I'm here to pump them dry and to get home; the more I pump the happier I'll be when I'm home. In other words, how different is my
behavior from gumedaks or lirasus and on what grounds my outrage (except for the frustration it would cause me to come here and learn nothing). (301–2)

It seems a clear and out and out case of being either a human being or an ethnologist, and you take your choice knowing you can't be both simultaneously. In this situation of course we choose the latter—but only . . . after we know there is no other way out of it and only . . . towards the end of the field trip. . . . So far as is possible, that is, and that qualification is a very big one since in the end the whole job is like walking into an unfamiliar dark room the dimensions of which are only vaguely known and the distribution and disposition of obstacles and items which aren't obstacles is quite unknown. You just tread gently so as not to bark your shins and so as not to ruin the china. (303)

Already sensitive to this in Gatchepar, he and Stevens had been "over-generous" with gifts "to the point of eccentricity," and they had "carefully—clumsily of course, but as carefully as we were capable of—explored before we entered, felt out before we questioned, [and] sensed before we conducted inquisitions" (SFN:302–3). In Gatchepar the "situation" had been "almost wholly a blank," and it had "always seemed to hang by a balance so fine as to be tipped at the slightest misstep, the initial contact with a people." At least here in Rumung, Schneider felt he was no longer "wandering around in the same pitch black room":

Here, although the room is still largely unlit, corners and spots have been illuminated. I know this kind of deviant, and I know what to expect, and I know what two alternative courses of action would ultimately mean for the field work. I know, that is, that if I give lirau the attention and the response he wants Tannengin will just kind of evaporate and I'll not be able to find him and he'll be afraid of me. And Tannengin is my contact man with the old men. . . . That one fact, that Tannengin is my contact with the old men, means more to me now than anything I can think of. (312–13)

Tannengin gave Schneider a month to learn the language, then pressed on to the "customs" of each Rumung village (SFN:312). Clearly taken aback by the "grueling pace they set," Schneider wanted to "procrastinate on the ethnography" until he had better fluency in Yapese (265, 432). But Tannengin had already arranged for old people to visit, by rank order of the villages, and on January 5 they began with "the customs of the village of Fal" (406ff., 431). Ultimately, Schneider sought to probe social psychological dynamics that turned on "their definitions of right and wrong," on their cultural "phrasing of sex roles," on Yapese ways of treating children, on Yapese "compulsions and obsessive behavior," and on the Yapese "life-cycle pattern of intimacies" in its "ideal" formulations and actual, behavioral instantiations (HYE: DS/CK 1/20/48; SFN:306, 320, 378). By temperament and situation, he was of course interested in politics, which also meant learning what his position was and who were his informants. But for Schneider, an odor of the museum clung to "esoteric subjects like myths," of which the old German ethnographer Müller had collected "enough to fill a boat"; Schneider merely snorted that these were "accurate and authentic" (152, 400). In contrast to Schneider's modernistic psychological ethnography, Tannengin was himself more inclined to an old-fashioned, early Boasian salvage mode. Now that under the American administration culture change was "voluntary," which "customs" to change and how much to change them was widely debated throughout the islands. Most young people—by no means only "Gumedak's circle"—were sympathetic to a movement then underway to relax the segregation of eating by rank; but this change was opposed by many chiefs, and even by old men like Tannengin who favored changes in many areas (Stevens 1949; SFN). Tannengin applauded Schneider's "little speech" about cultural relativity: American customs were good for Americans, but "customs of American people not so good for Yap people." Recalling Gumedak's earlier emphatic disagreement, Schneider was pleased (76–77, 249).

However, a vision of culture change as loss only began to approximate the view of Tannengin, who had seen the changes worked by four successive colonial administrations. Annually performing ceremonies that no one else remembered, he regarded the forgetting of customs as an actual threat to Yapese survival, because words to be spoken to the spirits were "lost and cannot be recovered." Lamenting depopulation—the people had died around him—he wondered if the spirits of fertility had not already "all gone away from Yap" (SFN:606, 918, 1130). Tannengin deplored particular colonial polices that had severed lines of cultural transmission. Under the Germans and Japanese, young men had been removed to Palau to mine phosphates; under all four administrations, pacification had ended wars in which few were killed, but which also had been occasions when the young sought skills and magic from their elders. In attempting to "solve" depopulation by accelerating "civilization," Japanese teachers had in fact ordered children not to listen to their parents and had beaten them for conforming to "bad" and "crazy" Yapese customs (606–7, 1608, 1634–35). Against this long experience of cultural dissolution, Tannengin felt a strong appreciation for the remembering power of "the paper"—which was Schneider's project—and was sorely anxious about what was recorded on it.

Back in December, on the first day of the "school rumung," one of the words they "hit on" happened to be a kinship term, and Schneider decided to pursue the "whole [kinship] business again" more systematically. The next afternoon, after a break, Tannengin arrived at Schneider's tent "perturbed, sweating, and standing up" on his bad leg, and said he'd given Schneider "the wrong names for the kinship." Pointing to Schneider's file box, he urged Schneider to redo the word cards, but soon "got twisted up and confused" again, and they let it go until evening when Schneider took the genealogy
of Tannengin's estate—"and the terms straightened out mightily" (SFN:242-43). But in fact confusion continued as to the meanings of the terms, which (as in Catchetap) were never spontaneously employed (251–53, 256). Indeed, because none of his informants seemed to "know the terms off hand"—"they get confused, correct themselves, argue among themselves"—Schneider wondered "how much functional relevance" the "kinship relationship" actually had (461). But it was hard to say, because similar problems arose in researching customs that were still practiced. Tannengin also came back anxious to "fix" the paper soon after they had discussed the areal division of responsibilities between Fal's two chiefs of young men, and on various issues different informants would defend different answers to Schneider's questions (431, 461). At this point, however, Schneider was inclined to interpret such disagreements optimistically in "freudian" terms, thankful that their "ego-involvement" in "different theories" led to a concern that his "record be right" (403).

And at this point Schneider still thought that "freudian" topics were his primary ones. When a typhoon on January 13 forced him to take refuge in the nearby house of Fal's pilibithir, he saw it as a wonderful opportunity to observe family roles: "the baby," he wrote, was the "most important character" in his research, and the "merit of typhoons" was that he could "see them in people's houses" (SFN:478). The issue of focus surfaced again shortly thereafter, when a summons from Kidder brought Schneider to Colonia, where the Harvard "team" discussed a letter from Douglas Oliver and their advisors, who (except for Kluckhohn) had met in Cambridge for an end of year "stocktaking." Reminding the four students that Harvard had accepted "substantial grants from the Navy," the letter quoted the group's March 1947 proposal to Murdock, which had emphasized research on the causes of depopulation (554; HKP: "Committee"/HYE 12/47). Although professing surprise that depopulation was a "binding obligation" rather than merely a "pregnant" research "suggestion," each of them submitted by letter a brief report (HYE: Kidder/Scott 1/20/48). Schneider's was the only one not to mention depopulation, focussing instead on language and rapport, which still required close attention to informants' "motivations" and "expectations" (HKP: DS/CK 1/20/48).

These again became problematic on his return to Rumung Island. When he took a break from his "godforsaken typewriter" to accept an invitation to go fishing with some Yapese men (SFN:531, 543), his young assistant "insisted" that the small fish he caught be given to Tannengin. Sharing it with the pilibithir of Fal, Tannengin the next morning handed Schneider an ear clip and a shell (570). Schneider at first saw the gifts as artifacts, which he had in fact requested from Tannengin for the Peabody Museum (573). But clearly the Yapese, too, were concerned with a problem of rapport, which in their version was to bring Schneider, however ambiguously, into the sphere of Yapese relationships. Two days later, at a village distribution of Navy relief food, Tannengin announced that Schneider had caught a fish and given it to the pilibithir, and that in turn had given Schneider an ear clip and a shell. Schneider was now a "person of Fal" and henceforth would confine his "benefits" to Fal's villagers; Tannengin repeated several times that Schneider was "no longer [to] give tobacco to the people of Riy" (580–82). That he had somehow been "appropriated" seemed "clear" to Schneider—and in fact to Yapese as well (582).

That night a house was burned in Fal—a traditional method of Yapese vengeance. It was apparently ignited by Ralop, who as the son of Tannengin's dead older brother was the likely heir of Tannengin's land estate—the old chief being a widower without living sons (SFN:632, 689). But because of an old grudge, Tannengin and Ralop were not on speaking terms, and the burned house belonged to Mo'n, whom Tannengin had, though still only informally, adopted as a replacement heir (443, 618, 653, 909). Although Yapese played down the significance of the fire to Schneider, it had destroyed the exceptionally valuable gau necklace Mo'on had probably meant to give Tannengin, in exchange for his land, to seal the adoption. The very next day Mo'on's wife's father died in a village on the main Yap island, to which Schneider's informants went three days later for the funeral (626, 632–34).

Discouraged from attending, Schneider stayed in Fal and "got the kinship terminology cleaned up." He was pleased that "it really pans out nicely," and thought it "the 'polynesian' type of cousin terminology" (Murdock's Hawaiian type), though he was still "not certain" (SFN:626; Murdock 1949:223). Tannengin, the week before, had hit on the idea of having him use a deep but politically inconsequential genealogy for establishing the terms and had brought Schneider to a very old man in one of the lower-ranking villages (SFN:605). Even so, when Schneider reviewed the genealogy with Tannengin and Fellan, his second main informant, there were important disagreements. As the "higher" of Fal's two chiefs of young men, Fellan was Tannengin's extremely devoted helper, despite the fact that, following the Japanese injunction not to follow his parents' "crazy" customs, he had married within his matri-group—which, by traditional belief, should have led to the deaths of his offspring (607, 668). Of the thirty-four terms Schneider collected on the genealogy of the old man, Tannengin and Fellan, in separate interviews, disagreed on nine of them—all of which were of course affinal relations (621). Fellan refused to let Schneider inscribe his version on "the official paper with the more than supernaturally validating machine"—not until first checking with Tannengin (609, 620). In the end, then, the terms were Tannengin's, and on this basis Schneider drew a neat kinship diagram (622)—which looked "of a piece" and "that's what counts" (626).

Soon after, and late at night, Tannengin announced that he would tell Schneider about Yapese customs of marriage exogamy—apparently a ploy to get rid of Fellan, for whom the topic was embarrassing (SFN:668–70). When
Fellan quickly left the tent, Tannengin, with "great conspiratorial mien," slipped Schneider a present, urging him to tell nobody; it was one of the valuables of his estate, and he was dispossessing Ralop of it (674). "The pot boils," Schneider entered in his journal:

Why does tannengin give me these invaluable presents? Why does he do it in that conspirator's way? Why does he stay until 4 a.m. tired and exhausted as he is? I don't know the answers yet. But I would hazard this guess; there's something very valuable ... that I'm giving tannengin by our relationship. (675-76)

Sensing that Schneider was not getting the point, Tannengin organized an interview at which he spoke of the father-son relationship:

On Yap, a son fished for his father in exchange for learning customs; the father, "a sort of teacher," fed the child when he was small, and then when he was old, he was fed by his grown son (693). Schneider had been feeding Tannengin fairly regularly since the typhoon, which had destroyed Tannengin's house, and he had caught the fish, which cemented the relationship. Ever concerned with

"distinguishing real from ideal," Schneider checked Tannengin's account with other informants—without yet consciously realizing that in this case he was the "real": that he was becoming Tannengin's heir unapparent (694-95).

During this period, the two continued to see delegations of old men, and Schneider began a project to map village lands throughout Rumung. In Gatchepar, no one had spoken to him of chiefships as having "sanction" in land "estates," as Schneider had seen noted in "older" ethnographic sources; the people of Gatchepar being more accustomed to foreign inquiries, informants had simply portrayed chiefly customs as based on customs of heredity—save for Oumedak, whose account Schneider had discounted because of his "miserably ambitious position and our relationship to him as political assets" (SFN:156). But on Rumung, where he had seen informants illustrate chiefly customs by drawing sketch maps of village lands, it dawned on Schneider that "land" was "a cornerstone to yap culture" (718). Now the delegations from the villages listed customs by estate, and Schneider went out with young men and mapped estate and village divisions.

The work on customs of village lands crystallized the problem of conflicting testimony. Different Yapese knew (and were expected to know) about different aspects of "their culture," and when they disagreed head on, there were often ulterior motivations. These were not so easily grasped in the context of an ostensibly "neutral" subject like kinship. Fellan knew perfectly well on which terms he differed from Tannengin—he listed them for Schneider before Schneider's interview with the old man. Fellan was in effect using Schneider to propose changes to Tannengin—who rejected them because he regarded Fellan's marriage within the matri-group as an abomination. But Schneider had simply thought that Fellan was just "not sure" of the terms. In the case of customs, however, the political logic was less culturally obscure; it came out vividly in discussing the chiefships of Riy village.

Each of Riy's two sections had a land estate sanctioning a chiefship of lands. But the question was which section chief was the chief of the whole village. From the perspective of Fithingmau Niga in Gatchepar, who was the relevant indigenous legitimating authority, the Lanturow section was higher because it had "long ago" been higher, and Gatemangin, its chief of lands, was the chief of lands of Riy. But the local "traditional" logic had it that the Lendri section was higher, because in Lanturow there was no longer a meeting ground (an abode of village-protecting spirits). What gave the local argument force was the personalities involved. Gatemangin was a senile old man who was rumored to have broken serious tabus in having had sexual intercourse with his wife while preparing her body for burial. Folebu, chief of the Lendri section, still had his wits, and he therefore acted as the village chief in most actual contexts, while Gatemangin was treated as pilibithir. In practice it was possible to sustain diplomatic ambiguities, but writing things on paper forced
the issue of competing claims—all the more so as paper, to the Yapese, was a primary symbol of foreign power. Since Spanish times, foreign officials had posted codes and pointed to rulebooks; and recently the Navy had issued its chiefs appointment letters, with Carroll telling Yapese, "You are a chief because you have a paper" (SFN:1094; OPNAV 1948:104). Schneider’s often-repeated question—Who is really chief?—could only be asked by an outside observer concerned with problems of legitimacy, and as an American who was known to have been sent by Fithingmau Niga, he himself was associated with not one but two recognized higher authorities.

The drama unfolded throughout January and February, from the first session on Ryi customs to the completion of the Ryi map, and the one thing to emerge with clarity was that Ryi "functioned" without a consensus. True, whenever Gate-mangin was within earshot, everyone agreed that Lanturow section was higher and that he was chief of Ryi (SFN:437-47, 730-31). But when he departed, responses varied significantly. His main opponents were Folebu and Lirau, who pressed Schneider to "correct" all papers listing Gate-mangin as chief (555). Tannengin and Fellan initially supported Gate-mangin—until late January, when it had become clear that Schneider did not report back to Fithingmau Niga (437-47, 555-56, 575, 689). When the two then changed sides to that of Lirau, this forced Schneider to reevaluate Lirau, who his investigation had also revealed was "rightly and properly" the chief of young men in Lanturow. Indeed, given the precedence of age criteria, it was actually somewhat ambiguous which estate really sanctioned which section chieftainship, so that Lirau also seemed Gate-mangin’s likely successor (434; cf. 555-56, 731): "The picture I had sustained previously of him as an interloper, a climber ... just didn’t hold together as well as I had thought it did." Perhaps his arrogant manner was "something called ‘personality’ first and culture a little later": "what the hell did I really know for sure!" (434). Bringing together politics and personalities, the "Infamous Affair of the Chieftainship of Ri Village" ended with Schneider beset by methodological doubts (730).

In a sense, he was rediscovering the Kluckhohnian problem of “typicality.” But as the tabular roster of Ryi chiefs and their chieftainships in his dissertation would later suggest, he still felt an imperative to adjudicate in matters of “basic” ethnography (Schneider 1949:250-52). Here, as with his investigation of kinship, it was the problem of “fixing the reliable” that transformed a preliminary study of backround ethnography into a prolonged, ego-invested "affair" (SFN:459). But in this context, kinship seemed actually all the more attractive, because there Schneider’s model of alternative viewpoints was simpler and apparently apolitical.

[In studying customs] you take the essence of the interview and re-do it with Tannengin and Gate-mangin. . . . And find what: find that its essentially slightly different . . . ; what do you do then; you say, well, either . . . we warped the responses in writing them or the different people in different statuses gave different responses. Not equipped with a coin to toss, you are left with a messy sack. To take one is dishonest; to take the other equally so. To take both leaves a quandary. To write it off as a mistranslation seems shamefully [a] waste. You then think, am I anthropologist or what; can I come home and report well look here I got some confusing stuff. [No.] a scientist gets the facts. . . . Well, the facts are confusing. So we take things which can be "established" fairly easily; the yap term for mothers brother is what; you ask around and no matter what you get its good, for it shows either [a]) that they know, or b) that they don’t know, or c) that they don’t use that term or d) that the kinship system is a little secondary to other things and has somewhat less social importance on yap than is generally found elsewhere. thats good, clearcut, sizeable. (460)

But in psychological contexts, where Schneider was concerned with idiosyncrasy as itself a theoretical problem, there were anxieties about his rapport relationships, about their attendant anxieties, and about his limited insight in evaluating subjective phenomena in the Yapese context. And not long after revising his earlier "mis-estimates" of Lirau (SFN:436), he also reevaluated Tannengin—although here significantly at a psychodynamic rather than a conscious methodological level. While in Colonia to resupply, he had insomnia on his last night there and stayed awake until dawn, thinking about home:

particularly of my father. It was immediately afterward that I went through the simple and almost infantile fantasy of catching a very big fish to give to Tannengin. With that fantasy came the phrasing which I have learned in yap and heard so often; when the child is young the mother and father feed it and care for it and when the child grows up it feeds and cares for the father and mother and they teach it the customs of yap.

That morning he returned in a small boat to Rumung, fishing the whole way; and when it arrived in Rumung waters he hooked a twenty-five-pound barracuda. He did give it to Tannengin, who was indeed pleased. It fulfilled "the yap formula to the letter except for the 'actual' kinship relationship": "So that my 'bias' is clear, then, I record that apparently I've managed to identify my chief informant with my father" (779-80).

A week later, after Schneider had given Tannengin a parcel of rice and sugar, Tannengin surprised him by making the transference reciprocal: "You have no father here and so I am like your father. You always give me food" (SFN:859). Tannengin proceeded then to teach him of the fertility rites for girls—first menses ceremonies that had only recently been revived after having been banned under the Japanese, as one of their "solutions" to the problem of depopulation. Clearly, here was another "milestone" of rapport: "I first claimed [Tannengin] for a father surrogate and now he has claimed me for a son" (SFN:859). But given the nature of Schneider's research, this identification impulse seemed methodologically ambiguous. Aware that his relation-
Like any standardized research technique, they required the standardization of a specific social situation, and for "rapport reasons" Schneider was wary to exert "force" or impose his "will" (SN:242). Later, however, writing to Gorer, Schneider said he did not "believe" the tests were "such super-hot stuff," but he could not yet "afford" to proclaim "out loud" this "heresy" (SPR: DS/Gorer 7/7/48).

So what remained in March of Schneider's psychological "method" were simply his own human entanglements, epitomized by Tannengin's—or was it Schneider's?—patrifiliating counter-transference. Here, Schneider was ambivalent—such entanglements were "so difficult to manage" (Schneider 1949:14)—even when accomplished in the Yapese terms that were the object of his research. Writing to Kluckhohn two days after Tannengin's moving acknowledgment, Schneider confessed to "less and less hope of getting the psychological materials" (HKP: DS/CK 3/8/48); soon after, he sent Kluckhohn a revised thesis proposal, which reformulated the "aggression" problem with greater emphasis on ideal patterns. Kluckhohn and Gorer had "both agreed," before he left the United States, that "more than a bit of spectacular baby watching" was needed for his research, and feeling now that the "time allotted" was too short for achieving adequate psychological "coverage," Schneider took "pains" in the new prospectus "to exclude matters psychological." For "rational and irrational reasons" he wanted "to become a professional anthropologist, and not a deviant psychoanalyst or a stranger in someone else's domain" (HKP: DS/CK 3/11/48).

Although Kluckhohn did not respond to this comment, he could well appreciate the self-doubt that was projected in the fieldnotes when Schneider saw Yap's deviants as interlopers, climbers, rebels eager to be co-opted, and despised them as illegitimate, opportunistic, and misguided. Kluckhohn knew also of Schneider's worries over postwar teaching prospects (HKP: DS/CK 8/6/47), and of the anxieties aroused when he himself had encouraged Schneider to send his masters thesis on Yir-Yoront dreams to psychoanalysts like Géza Róheim, who had responded critically to the treatment of psychoanalytic questions by a person not yet analyzed (HKP: DS/CK 9/3/47; DSI). Finally, Kluckhohn himself had sent a letter that crossed Schneider's in the mail, expressing concern that while Schneider's "stuff" had "all the reality... of clinical [psychoanalytic] data," it had a similar "intangibility," an "elusive, non-scientific character" (HKP: CK/DS 3/3/48). It was surely not lost on Schneider that what Kluckhohn praised without qualification was his "filling in of the ideal patterns" of "kinship and political organization"—there he was bringing home "some real meat" in a "first-rate" set of notes (HKP: DS/CK 12/5/47, 3/3/48).

In the same mail came a follow-up communiqué from Oliver addressed to all four students, affirming that the "emphasis" on depopulation was in-
deed an "obligation" that they had assumed "in accepting the Navy funds," and that their individual thesis projects should therefore remain only "secondary considerations." Oliver also made it clear to Schneider and Stevens that it was a part of their particular obligation to the Navy to develop a "clear picture" of "Yap social organization"—not like Naven, in which Gregory Bateson had not carried out his responsibility to his readers, but more like Reo Fortune's Sorcerers of Dobu, which although offering perhaps "too pat an analysis," at least "tied together [the] material into a coherent and plausible system" (HPM: Oliver/Stevens 3/4/48). Nor was this admonition really news to the anthropologists, who had already heard "from various sources"—presumably other CIMA anthropologists—that they had better "fill the categories of the cross cultural survey," or their "findings" on depopulation would not be "acceptable" to Murdock (HPM: Stevens/Oliver 1/20/48). At the beginning, Schneider had apparently thought he could do this and at the same time investigate "subjectivity." But another feature of the CIMA program was its compressed, inflexible schedule, designed to hasten the reporting of anthropological "findings" to the Navy. Now, forced to choose how he would allocate his last three months, Schneider grew "depressed" by the thought that he needed another year (SFN:907). In justifying to Kluckhohn his decision to drop psychology, Schneider had in fact pointed to the "priority" of collecting "the standard and full ethnographic materials" (HPK: DS/CK 3/8/48)—as defined in Murdock's Outline of Cultural Materials. The institutional context of Schneider's research was thus not intellectually neutral, but channelled his interests and energies in a Murdockian direction.

Institutional pressure was magnified by group dynamic processes. Although his "teammates" Hunt, Kidder, and Stevens left Schneider alone with his "psychology," where ambiguity was known to be endemic, they were all anxious to satisfy Murdock as to kinship and social structure, where positivistic preconceptions suggested that data were either "right" or "wrong." In a Murdockian epistemology, the team format conduced to "truth," since the likely source of error was thought to be the investigating subjectivity; while Schneider by no means accepted this, he did feel a competitive impulse. Despite the fact that he thought that he had got the kinship firmly fixed in February, he rechecked his work twice more when the "half-assed ethnography" of his fellows produced differing versions, raising the spectre of being contradicted by a "vote" of "three to one" (SFN:1067, 1236, 1239, 1338). The first recheck was crucial, for it in fact reoriented his interpretation of the importance of the matrilineal customs. Working from Tannengin's information, Schneider had decided in late January that "descent" was "strictly" matrilineal (624), but by late March Stevens was disputing this finding. When Kidder and Hunt brought their census and anthropometric survey to Rumung, Schneider designed a questionnaire and interviewed every Rumung adult, taking people aside after they had finished with Kidder's census. Tannengin had warned him that a person's matri-group was considered intimate and kept a secret, and Schneider was aware that even asking about this was a step away from "human being" toward "ethnologist." But it was "so easy" in the census context "to do a survey on a larger sample," and the focus of concern shifted to what to do with the results (1267). Having been exhorted to do so by Tannengin, "at least 50%" divulged the name of their matri-group; but the other half (including Fellan) professed ignorance—leaving Schneider in a quandary. Although still "very very unsure," he was inclined to think that people had "answered 'honestly'"—the mixed result implying then that the matri-group was of "little functional importance." He had, after all, had the older men's consent, the interviews had been "private," and by now he had "good rapport" (1048-68, 1265-67).

Schneider continued to record psychoanalytically relevant observations, but by mid-April his psychological ambitions had come to seem dubious and impractical. Their most valued product and promising vehicle was the rapport he had created with specific informants. But now, abruptly, the integrity of that rapport seemed compromised. Although still "very very unsure," he was inclined to think that people had "answered 'honestly'"—the mixed result implying then that the matri-group was of "little functional importance." He had, after all, had the older men's consent, the interviews had been "private," and by now he had "good rapport" (1048-68, 1265-67).

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tarian notions. His marginality in America was meaningless to the Yapese; there was no simple community of the oppressed (1174–77; SPR: DS/Gorer 6/4/48).

As in Gatchepar, so on Rumung: his rapport techniques had only raised his colonial status higher. At a canoe-launching in December, wanting desperately "to be liked," Schneider "got tight" on toddy to avoid the appearance of "alignment" with the Navy's blue laws for natives. But if "refusing to drink" meant Navy, drinking also had implications: if Schneider broke laws willingly and with impunity, it could only mean that he was above them. To every subsequent ceremony, Tannengin had Schneider bring two bottles of beer, which he would insist that they drink at a climactic moment (SFN:315, 330, 582, 635–37, 898). Wondering "why tannengin ostentatiously drinks beer with me," Schneider noted in February the old man's "advertising" that "I am of even higher rank than the navy" in Colonia (636, 670).

The problem, for Schneider, was that what Tannengin said was true. His team's interim CIMA report, prepared in December, had come to the attention of Admiral Carleton Wright, with its "finding" that "all foreign people" could "leave Yap immediately," with no adverse effect on "the pattern of [native] life" (NAS6: CIMA Interim Reports, 1947–48). In late January, when Yap's naval complement was reduced to just nine men (HYE: Kidder/Scott 2/1/48), Schneider discussed these changes with his informants; they knew that his actions had provoked them (SFN:673, 764–65, 810, 840). In late March, when Admiral Wright visited Yap to supervise the deportation of the last Chamorros, Schneider went to Colonia, thereby confirming his involvement (Richard 1957:III, 156; SFN:844, 1072–75). He had also helped to get the Navy to cancel road construction, to which Yapese objected (336, 1312; DS/Carroll [n.d.]). It was obvious that he had great power—power which they lacked.

He also had great wealth, which, distributed for rapport purposes, posed perniciously through Tannengin and Fellan, it elevated their position and that of Fal. Already in February, Schneider was conscious of the resentment of other villagers; in March, Riy moved to "control" the Rumung visit by Kidder's CIMA census and the distribution of Navy lumber, in order to counterbalance the privileged access of Fal villagers to gifts from Schneider (SFN:810, 891). When Schneider gained permission for Fellan to scavenge a decommissioned Navy landing craft—for "my own evil ethnographic purposes," in order to see how the booty was later distributed—it was clear that his generosity could overwhelm any effort of reciprocity (1032, 1048–53).

During his speech at the April party, Tannengin had said that it was because "they had nothing" that the people of Rumung were "low," whereas Schneider was "great and high" because he "had things"—"high" things—and "gave everybody everything": tobacco, prestige foods, "high [tools] from the [Navy] boat" (SFN:1163). Discomfited at being named "chief over everybody," and recalling the "earlier drunk with Oumekad," Schneider again objected to his imputed loftiness. In response, Tannengin began to debase himself, mustering incidents to prove his lowliness: he was not even chief, but only regent. Soon, he, Limu, and Fellan were arguing passionately, each claiming that he of all was the very lowest (1163–64), and when the argument turned eventually to "aggressive" mutual accusations, one was made against Schneider for passing information to Carroll (1166–72). "The experimental administration of beer to a native population sure as hell" brought up "things" that were "not welcome" (1174–75). It marked the second (and decisive) turning-point in Schneider's fieldwork.

From that drunken party until the end of his Yap field stay, changes in Schneider's views of rapport crystallized a shift in the focus and method of his research, setting the lines of his future scholarship. Rapport, now that he had it, was suddenly onerous, a false grail. Far from opening up possibilities for empathetic understanding, it constrained him: he was "isolated" at the "center of a series of concentric rings" (SFN:1380, 1423). In the aftermath of the party, Schneider became "disgusted" by Yapese "greed" (1302). He now felt himself "scrounged off... mercilessly" by "selfish and grasping" informants; themselves "exploitative," they had "built" him into a "role of being exploited" (1422–24, 1603). No longer a wise father, Tannengin now seemed "just like" Oumekad, out for "a bigger share"; far from being deviant, Oumekad had been "typical" (1177, 1380). Complaining of the daily and nightly "conferences," once welcome in his tent, now Schneider wrote: "goddamn them one and all" (1372).

Such resentments cloud his field notes through May and June. Aware that they were in part his own "paranoid suspicions," he saw their compartmentalization in the notes as a constructive, cathartic process (SPR: DS/Gorer 7/7/48; SFN:1313). Still, he was growing anxious over the value of "all that material" which in March he had been optimistic might allow the correction of his evidence (HKP: DS/CK 3/16/48). Increasingly, it was becoming clear that the problem of "bias" was interactive, involving not only the selectivity of his observing subjectivity but also alterations that he induced in the objects of study: Yapese people. They were not transparent, and he was no "blank screen"; how they saw him had been revealed, layer upon layer, in a process by no means complete, and neither painless nor itself unreactive. He suffered insomnia and ceased to dream; what was he hiding from himself? Linking this "datum" in early May to uncertainty over his revised plan of research (SFN:1248), he wrote despairingly two weeks later that his aggression project was finally "up the creek": most of the aggressive behavior he had witnessed had been partly instigated by him (1399).
Left directionless, he turned to Murdock's framework—a decisive step, in retrospect, from anxiety to method (cf. Devereux 1967). The CI MA-issued *Working Manual* of Murdock's *Outline of Cultural Materials* now helped him to "think" and to "organize," Schneider recorded in mid-May, adding that he now "kicked himself" for having failed to bring his kinship notes from Murdock's lectures (SN: 1398–99). He used Murdock's theoretical vocabulary—the terms concisely defined in the *Manual*—in reconsidering his March interview survey on the matri-group. Adopting the Murdokian term "sib" for the group he had formerly called a "clan," Schneider suggested that its "minor importance" in Yapese "social structure" was "demonstrated" by the "fact" that half of his respondents had not known their "sib affiliation." Troubled about the facticity of this fact—the real "fact," he reminded himself, was that many had "answered 'I don't know'"—Schneider pressed Tannengin on the question of whether people had told "the truth." His suspicions were aroused by Tannengin's suspiciously emphatic confirmation ("... as if there was actually some doubt..."), but Schneider dismissed them on the naïvely rationalistic basis that a "hypothesis" remained "legitimate" until explicitly "rejected" (1265–67). Clearly, Schneider was losing patience with the subtleties of interaction.

Although he made wry remarks on quantification—the "reporting of meaningless data with a statistical accuracy beyond reproach" (SN: 1370)—he began in mid-May to conduct four further surveys—polls on insanity, medical ailments, copulation, and criminal cases. He also deployed the one standardized "projective" psychological technique of his fieldwork, an adaptation of the Stein sentence completion tests. Tannengin wanted to teach about ceremonial and exchange, which Schneider was now "convinced" was a "central theme" of the culture; but although he felt it deserved "complete and detailed" treatment such as Bunzel and Benedict had given Zuñi ceremonial "business," time was "wasting," and he had done nothing on depopulation (1254). He began to interview women, whose victimized "tenderness" he now contrasted with the men's "coldly empirical a-morality." Although noting that his own "bias" was a sensitivity to "injustice," Schneider toyed with a theory—later disapproved demographically (Underwood 1973)—that young women sought to "delay" male-imposed "responsibilities of adulthood," and that the abortions they induced were a cause of depopulation (SN: 1402–5, 1582–90; cf. Schneider 1955; Hunt et al. 1954). The need to bring back something on depopulation also motivated Schneider's poll of the frequency of copulation—which unfortunately coincided with the opening of trochus-fishing season, when men were customarily enjoined from either having or discussing intercourse (SPR: DS/ Gorer 7/7/48). The poll provoked resentment, and many from Ri y refused to participate. But Schneider now "didn't care if the men got sore"; he was cashing in his chips by finally "risking bad rapport" (SN: 1422)—choosing, as he had predicted, to be "an ethnologist," not "a human being" (303).

Or, perhaps, "good rapport" and "bad rapport" seemed not so different after the party, when Schneider gave up trying to dissociate himself from the Navy and broke out of the isolation of those "concentric rings" by borrowing Carroll's Navy motorboat (SN: 1215–18, 1550–51). He did not forget, however, that it was the Navy that seemed to be the source of his rapport problems, and he launched his survey of criminal cases as an "investigation" of the administration, and Carroll in particular, in retaliation for having leaked to the Yapese word of some of his own "leaks" to Carroll (1551). Discovering that Carroll had inadvertently furthered Yapese intriques with his jail sentences, Schneider in his investigation explored the politics of the American colonial administration (and although not carried to fruition, that investigation contributed substantially to the possibility of the present essay). Only the Americans, Schneider decided, saw Yapese customs as "fixed" rules; Yapese, among themselves, rearranged customs to suit circumstance. In fact, there was no determine "traditional" order, and the more Carroll intervened in the attempt to "reestablish" one, the more he made himself the instrument of particular Yapese factions (1036–38, 1180, 1575ff.). Schneider himself had experienced something analogous, as his romantic expectations were undercut by limits enforced by the colonized Yapese; because no Yapese were politically "neutral" in the situation of domination, no real involvement—no rapport—could shut out these realities, save by invoking colonial power to silence their expression.

In this context, then, Schneider wrote to Gorer before his departure that in fact he had "good rapport," but no longer "labored under" the "misconception" that rapport was "like being loved" (SPR: DS/Gorer 6/4/48). True, he was still not reconciled to being defined by his gifts and "things." His informants' statements during the last days of his stay that they would miss him for his tobacco, coffee and sugar, Spam and biscuits, rice and beef stew, did not strike the warmest chord in Schneider's American cultural consciousness; liking him only for his gifts, he complained, they "de-personalized" the relationship (SN: 1604; cf. Schneider 1949: 341–42). Having read Malinowski but not Mauss, Schneider had no confirmation, beyond his own uncertain experience, that the food gifts were the vehicles for fully authentic Yapese sentiments, making his rapport largely a relationship on their terms. Indeed, back in March, when Tannengin had likened himself to his father, Schneider had wondered if "love on yap" was not "an exchange of concrete objects" (859). And because such exchange in fact betokened love, the major "problem" of rapport from the perspective of Yapese was not honesty, as for Schneider, but reciprocity—or its breakdown in the face of Schneider's overwhelming stores.

The Yapese themselves solved this problem on the day before his departure, gathering at his tent in the early afternoon with gifts of watermelons, chickens, taro, coconuts, yams, and fish. Schneider was "disturbed" at the
"unparalleled collection of perishables." But in speeches, his informants praised
Schneider's generosity, and when later that night Schneider grumbled about
the gifts' unportability, Tannengin—shocked—silenced Schneider with a final
commentary on the dynamics of rapport: "But it is food! Everybody likes you!"
(Schneider 1949:231–32).

Schneider flew to Guam on June 17 and was in New York on the twenty-
seventh. A few days later, Carroll took over on Yap as the naval commanding
officer, until he was transferred from the islands in October (SPR; cf. Gladcwin
1979:245). At that point Ruwepon, who had meanwhile been pleading his
case to the naval High Command in Guam, returned to Yap, where he and
Fani'ch'or were soon afterwards reinstated (SPR; Carroll/DS [1948–50]). In
August of the following year, the Yale linguist Isidore Dyen visited Fal village,
and on Schneider's behalf presented five cartons of cigarettes to Tannengin.
The old man had been living in Schneider's tent since his departure. Some
months later, he passed away (SPR: Dyen/DS 8/21/49; Ramos/DS 11/26/49).

From Cross-Cultural to Native Categories in the
Study of Kinship

Schneider was a romantic with a realistic, even pessimistic eye. Far from ideal-
izing his field experience, he regarded it as troubling. The Yapese surveil-
ance of him—as intimate as his of them—had been an unexpectedly oppressive aspect
of the fieldwork situation; so also, its "emotional sterility": he had not seen
his wife, not seen his friends, not gotten "drunk or laid" or, in public, even
"mad." His "compulsive" typing of notes had often given him "down"; now
at home, he found himself "horribly tender" and suspicious: "overreacting . . .
damn it, without any provocation" (SPR: DS/Gorer 7/7/48).

Nor did he idealize the Yapese. They seemed liberated from nothing,
neither their own psychological nor American colonial repression. They were
not blissfully sexual, nor loyally communal, nor politically easygoing, and not
by a long stretch were they egalitarian. Nor did their psychological charac-
teristics seem easily amenable to analysis from a culture and personality per-
vpective. Although there was plenty of suppressed aggression, its significance
was not clearcut; as Tannengin had pointed out, in a final interview the old
man had arranged, the culturally sanctioned contexts for expressing aggres-
sion openly were warfare and mock warfare, both of which had been abol-
ished under colonial administration (SFN:1608–10; 1634–35). When Schneider
found out in New York on his return that the Social Science Research Coun-
cil had turned down his application for a fellowship to write a dissertation
on aggression, that made it definite; he would change his thesis topic (HKP:
DS/CK 6/26/48).

Back in Cambridge on July 8, the first thing he had to handle was the
Peabody team's CIMA report, most of which he wrote himself. Aware of the
problems generated by the best-intentioned interventions, he decided to com-
pose a "very, very anonymous report" in order to protect his informants from
becoming objects of Navy attention (SPR: D/S/Gorer 7/7/48). As forwarded
by Murdock to the Navy, the report was short on politics, long on descriptive
generals, and made no policy recommendations whatsoever (Hunt et al.
1949:60, 115, 220). On the problem of depopulation, it noted that the popula-
tion had begun a "slow, but steady" increase, and advanced Schneider's theory
of abortion to explain the past decline: under earlier administrations, the in-
centive for abortion had been increased by "repressive" colonial measures, but the
Yapese suffered no Riverrian "loss of the will to live" (29, 187–92, 215).

Schneider's contribution to the report included an analysis of Yapese kin-
ship, which when augmented and revised became the first half of his disserta-
tion (60–116; cf. Schneider 1949:22–165). To write the dissertation, he coded
his field notes with the numbers of topic categories in Murdock's Outline. After
having the numbered materials retyped, he sorted them by subject, and then
wrote "segments" for the important subjects, which were "clumped into 'chapters'"
(HKP: DS/CK 11/21/48). Obviously, the process filtered out method-
ological doubts, cathartic outbursts, Schneider's daily concerns and emotions.
In terms, then, of the project that gave his field notes their distinctive char-
acter—as Kluckhohn had put it, like "a friend's private diary" (HYE: CK/DS
3/3/48)—this was the point of actual disengagement, at which Schneider in
effect "pulled all the "paranoid material" and turned to subjects which seemed
impervious to "observer's bias" (HKP: DS/CK 3/16/48). From that point on,
he referred primarily to the subject-coded series, interposing method, again
and decisively, between his field anxieties and his ethnography (cf. Devereux
1967).

Completed in August 1949, the dissertation was entitled "The Kinship
System and Village Organization of Yap, West Caroline Islands, Micronesia:
A Structural and Functional Account." The two halves of the text looked
forward to two later phases of Schneider's career. The first, on kinship, rigor-
ously applied Murdock's theoretical vocabulary in describing the Yapese "sys-
tem" as one of "double descent." On the one hand, a principle of matrilineal
descent was recognized in the relatively functionless Yapese "sib." On the other,
patrilinical principles, as modified by certain "unusual features," governed mem-
bership in and the inheritance of the multifunctional tabinau, or land estate,
which was described as a Murdocksian "compromise kin group," neither quite
"patrilineage" nor "patrilocal extended family" (Schneider 1949:25–30, 164, 199;
cf. Murdock 1940b, 1949; Hunt et al. 1949:71). Although written more under
the influence of Parsons than of Radcliffe-Brown (whose work Schneider had
encountered after returning from the field), this first part reads like a conven-
tional social anthropological treatment, with descriptions of marriage, the life cycle, and roles in "the nuclear family." By contrast, the second part, on the village, contained mostly material that had been volunteered by Tannengin; it dealt with the tabinau as "a piece of land to which a group of persons, who happen to be related, are attached" (Schneider 1949:8). This, Schneider emphasized, was "the actors' definition," as opposed to the "a priori" definitions he had employed in the first part, where he had distinguished the nuclear family as "an analytically useful unit," although it had no "recognition as an entity" in Yapese culture (5, 8, 190).

It was, however, the first half of the thesis that Schneider developed in years to follow. In 1950, he took a Fulbright teaching fellowship to the London School of Economics. While there, he maintained a background interest in psychological questions—the "neglect" of "motivational aspects" in his thesis having gone "strongly against" the grain of his "personal inclinations" (Schneider 1949:273-74).

On two important points, Schneider's thesis account diverged from the materials in his field notes, raising problems of interpretation which may be indicated briefly. Having learned of, and formulated, in the last months of his fieldwork, the distinction Yapese maintained between colonial and indigenous chieftainships, Schneider nevertheless confused the issue in his thesis, presenting "the district chieftainships" as indigenous Yapese positions and describing succession as "matrilineal" in "certain" of the districts (Schneider 1949:160; cf. 1962:7-8). Apparently, he had in mind the example of Fithingmau Niga (simultaneously a district chief and Gagil's "device") built, of course, upon "much common feeling between the chief and the members of his village about the unpredictability, the irrationality, and the obnoxiousness of the foreigners and their rules, and [upon sentiments] that the day will come when Yap will be free of unwanted foreigners" (Schneider 1949:273-74).

4. The thesis incorporated little of Schneider's material on colonial relations, except in a discussion of abuses of chiefly authority. There, Schneider explicated the avenues of political intrigue that were opened up by "foreign administrators," including the presiding of charges, "either true or false," which administrators were likely to punish with imprisonment or deportation, and the arrogation of new spheres of political authority, on the basis of rules actually promulgated by the chief himself, but pronounced as emanating from the foreigners" in Colonia. The latter "device" built, of course, upon "much common feeling between the chief and the members of his village about the unpredictability, the irrationality, and the obnoxiousness of the foreigners and their rules, and [upon sentiments] that the day will come when Yap will be free of unwanted foreigners" (Schneider 1949:273-74).

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a book on Yapese "patterns" of kinship and the effects of depopulation—although the manuscript broke off where it would have been natural to begin a chapter on the matri-group (SPR). Moving then to Berkeley, Schneider taught kinship and Parsons's "system" theory (DSL), and was on hand for the Kroeber-Parsons "summit" of 1958, at which the "relational system" of "society" was distinguished from "culture," defined as an ensemble of "symbolic-meaningful systems" (Kroeber & Parsons 1958:583).

By this time Schneider had consolidated a reputation as a leading American exponent of structural-functionalism (Murphy 1971:209). But he was soon to undergo a dramatic reorientation. In terms of the distinctions that the Kroeber-Parsons "summit" established, he shifted from the "sociological" study of kinship as a "functioning" social institution, to a "cultural anthropological" study of kinship as a "system of symbols and meanings" (Schneider 1965a, 1968b, 1972, 1976a). No doubt, this shift was promoted by his personal re-engagement with psychoanalysis between 1958 and 1960, which highlighted issues of symbolism and the subjectivity of human experience. But an equally relevant context was the recent literature from Britain, where Edmund Leach, delivering the inaugural Malinowski Lecture, had condemned the "typology making" project of "followers of Radcliffe-Brown," and questioned the value of classifying whole societies as "matrilineal" or "patrilineal"; instead, Leach urged attention to "ideas" of matri- and patri-filiation that were "present" conjointly in any one society (Leach 1961:2, 4, 7, 17).

Taking Leach's problem to his Yap materials in a 1962 essay, Schneider drew on information provided by Carroll (in earlier letters commenting on his dissertation) to reconceptualize the matri-group or "clan," concluding that matrilineal and patrilineal ties were radically different in "symbolic value" (SPR: Carroll/DS 1949-50; Schneider 1962:20-21). Symbolized by a kind of "biological relatedness" (clansmen were said to have been born "of the same belly"), matrilineal ties sanctioned inalienable bonds of "undifferentiated solidarity." By contrast, patrilineal ties were essentially "political," symbolized, like village "alliances," by "the gift and its return," they were no way "believed" to be based on "consanguinity." Thus while patrilineal "units" were "most conspicuous" from the viewpoint of political function, they were problematic as "descent groups"—raising questions of the applicability of structural-functional "descent theory" (Schneider 1962:1, 14-15, 20-21).

This was in fact Schneider's last essay to adopt the perspective of "descent theory," which he soon attacked directly in a 1963 paper entitled "Some Muddles in the Models." There he embraced the French structuralist "alliance theory" of Louis Dumont and Lévi-Strauss, which was congenial with the Kroeber-Parsons viewpoint in emphasizing problems of the "symbolic order" in cultural study (1965a:40). Criticizing Radcliffe-Brown and Murdock for "imposing our way of thinking on their system" of thought (28-29), the paper clearly signalled Schneider's "defection" from structural-functionalism (Murphy 1971:210). Although it offered no mea culpa, that was yet to come—as "the sixties" moved forward, and a "crisis" struck anthropology.

In a context of unprecedented disciplinary concern with colonial issues, the once-regnant structural-functionalist "paradigm" was attacked from numerous viewpoints, and many anthropologists linked its rejection with developments outside the discipline: political struggles in the universities and abroad, including the wars of independence of colonized peoples (Leclerc 1972; Murphy 1971; Hymes 1972; Asad 1973). In characteristically depicting native societies as functionally integrated, autonomous "micro-worlds" (Wolf 1970:3), structural-functionalists, it was now argued, had maintained "a certain agreement" between anthropology and colonial ideologies of "indirect rule" (Leclerc 1972:116, 135-36).

Amid this disillusionment, Schneider heralded an alternative to sociologically oriented functionals (with their clear potentials for instrumentality) in the "symbolic anthropology" that was exemplified by his resumed and expanded study of contemporary American cultural ideologies of kinship (Schneider 1968b, 1969a; Schneider & Smith 1973; Dolgin et al. 1977; Murphy 1976:15-17). The research had quite definite political implications, in radically compressing the distance between "anthropologist" and "other," and it illuminated the ethnocentrism of structural-functionalist kinship theory (Schneider 1984:175, 197, 1968a, 1969a, 1976a). From this perspective, Schneider more systematically called into question his own original Yapese research (1969b, 1972, 1984).

Published shortly before his retirement from Chicago to Santa Cruz in 1985, Schneider's fullest self-critical statement was a broadside attack on the comparative study of kinship as a "tenable or a legitimate endeavor" (1984:177). Although Murdock's theories were not extensively discussed, those of Murdock's more enduringly loyal students were, and his conceptions might be said to haunt the book's pages; Social Structure was prototypical of "the theory" Schneider attacked (viii, 7). But the "defects" of "conventional" kinship study were "exemplified" by a somewhat caricatured précis of Schneider's own early, Murdockian writings on Yapese kinship (1984:6, 38; cf. 1949, 1953a, 1955, 1957a). In effect, these were now repudiated.

Schneider compared his earlier work with a revised "description" of Yapese culture which reflected his later theoretical project and was partly inspired by a more recent study of Yap by his student, David Labby (1976; Schneider 1984:viii, 8; cf. 1969b). The sharpest difference was in the depiction of the Yapese matrigroup. Labby's research had revealed that Yapese conceptualized land inheritance as a transaction between matrigroups: in exchange for the garden labor that a woman invested in an estate owned by the matri-group of her husband, her sons, who were of her matri-group, received the
estate in the next generation (Labby 1976; Schneider 1984). In practice, however, this resembled patrilineal inheritance, as qualified by the inelegant "unusual features" Schneider had described in his dissertation (1949:25–30; cf. 1953a, 1956).

Schneider cast his retrospective self-critique in terms of the philosophy of science, arguing that the "faulty" theoretical "paradigm" of the "conventional wisdom" of kinship studies—which "put" many of his Yapese "data in an ambiguous or anomalous position"—had guided his perceptions while in the field, his "sorting" of materials back at home, and finally his efforts at "translation" and representation (1984:3–7, 58–59). The theories of this paradigm were not only "wrong," they were at bottom "ethnocentric" (4, 197); by applying a European conception of consanguinity as a texture of blood- and marriage-based relations "arising out of the processes of human sexual reproduction," they imposed characteristically European "biologist" ways of constituting and conceiving human character, human nature, and human behavior" (174–75). Schneider now "indicted" his own Yapese research for having violated the "one most sacred canon" of anthropological study, by placing a "blinding" prior commitment to the study of an "a priori" construct of "kinship" ahead of the "sensitive perception" and "appreciation" of the "understandings" of "the other" (1984:77, 196–97). Shooehorning Yapese conceptions into the "a priori" categories of the "genealogical grid," his first description had distorted "how the world exists in Yapese culture" (77). Eschewing this all-too-easy "cross-cultural" reference point, the revised description sought instead to explicate "native conceptions": "their groups and how they structure them," the "shared understandings," the "system of categories and units," that imbued action with "meaning" in the Yapese cultural context (75, 77, 174, 196).

From a different perspective, however, one might argue that there was more to Schneider's "inadequate" depiction of matrilineal customs than a paradigm-driven projection of a "dubious" and ethnocentricly "biologist" conception of "kinship" (1984:viii, 8). His doctoral dissertation had contained not one but two discussions of the questionably "meaning" of the Yapese matri-group—confirmation that the infant was endangered as the issue of an incestuous union (SFN:1120, 1598–1602). Tannengin, too, as Schneider had in time learned, was "unwilling" to speak of matrilineal customs of land inheritance (1038); partly because he was in fact only regent (for Fellan), and partly because the customs sanctioned inheritance of his own estate by the despoiled son of his older brother—when he would rather have had Schneider receive those lands upon his death (SFN). As it happened, Schneider's only informant to tell of matrilineal land inheritance was Gumedak, who was clearly not as despicable as Schneider had thought, and whose older brother in his home village held a chiefly land estate, making the matrilineal tie his most promising conduit to an indigenous chiefly office (37–38, 56, 116–18). But since Schneider regarded Gumedak as an index of acculturation, he reported that the "inheritance of land from the mother" was a "new" cultural "feature" (Schneider 1949:200–201; cf. 1956a, 32–34).

So we are led back to the specifics of Schneider's relationships with informants in the colonial situation he encountered on Yap. He had entered the field an ideological egalitarian, whose humanistic impulses impelled him toward just such an empathetic "appreciation" as he later advocated. But his egalitarian ideals were extremely problematic in the Yapese context, where a culturally valued hierarchy was complexly implicated in a hierarchical system of colonial relationships from which, try as he might, he could not dissociate himself. Nor could he engage issues of cultural conceptualization apart from the

segregation of kin relationships from the competitive realm of politics (Schneider 1962). In the Yapese colonial situation, however, this segregation had in fact tended to cloak the matri-group from Schneider's view; as a foreigner, scribe, and significant political power, he was for Yapese a consummately political figure. Twenty years later, when Labby worked on Yap, matri-group customs had largely fallen into desuetude and could be spoken of freely as a matter of almost purely historical interest (Labby 1976:7–11). But in Schneider's time, they were still powerfully sensitive, not only as customs of fertility recently attacked by a foreign power, but inherently—one's matri-group being as intimate as one's mother's vagina, to which informants emphasized it in fact referred (SFN:1265–67). From a colonial perspective such customs were thus at the very limit of obscurity, and one can readily understand why Schneider's poll survey had been misleading. If anything had been a "touchy subject," requiring the best possible rapport to probe, it had been the matri-group, its customs, and its potent affective meaning.

Its meaning had been potent even for Fellan, who had himself transgressed the rule of matrilineal exogamy, having been encouraged to do so by the teachers in a Japanese colonial school. On Schneider's next to last night on Yap, Fellan's wife gave birth in Schneider's borrowed powerboat; when Fellan went ashore to get a ritual coconut, he had a horrific vision of the ancestress of his matri-group—confirmation that the infant was endangered as the issue of an incestuous union (SFN:1120, 1598–1602). Tannengin, too, as Schneider had in time learned, was "unwilling" to speak of matrilineal customs of land inheritance (1038); partly because he was in fact only regent (for Fellan), and partly because the customs sanctioned inheritance of his own estate by the despoiled son of his older brother—when he would rather have had Schneider receive those lands upon his death (SFN). As it happened, Schneider's only informant to tell of matrilineal land inheritance was Gumedak, who was clearly not as despicable as Schneider had thought, and whose older brother in his home village held a chiefly land estate, making the matrilineal tie his most promising conduit to an indigenous chiefly office (37–38, 56, 116–18). But since Schneider regarded Gumedak as an index of acculturation, he reported that the "inheritance of land from the mother" was a "new" cultural "feature" (Schneider 1949:200–201; cf. 1956a, 32–34).

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subjective conceptions held—and voiced—by specific informants, and outside the charged context of their subjective responses to him—within the colonial situation which defined central issues of their lives. They consistently thrust upon the investigator of their subjectivities the range of their own subjective human concerns. From a certain perspective, this might be viewed as a conduit to understanding, rather than as obscuring the "objective" facts of the matter. And ultimately, Schneider's most enduringly valuable insights (into Yapese understandings of colonial politics and into the political importance of land and exchange) were in fact products of his "compromised" rapport relationships. Yet where he had instead denied the influence of the specific qualities of his rapport on his results—as in the poll surveys of sexuality and Yapese "knowledge" of the matri-group—his methodologically "cleansed" findings were seriously misleading.

The centrally important relationship of Schneider's fieldwork on Yap was that with Tannengin. From a certain perspective, it could be argued that, in effect if not intention, Schneider's move toward defining kinship—"real" kinship—as a biological relationship was a way of negating the reality of his troubling bond with Tannengin: "I am like your father"—"you are chief over me." From a similar perspective, it could be suggested that his later critique of the biological definition of kinship was a retrospective legitimization of that same bond. But just as the relationship was given different meanings by its principals at the time, so may it, and the others that surround it, be given various meanings from different retrospective points of view; this discussion has only begun their exploration. But from whatever perspective it may be offered, no interpretation of Schneider's ethnography can ignore the dynamics of rapport in the particular colonial situation he faced on the islands of Yap.

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In writing this essay I have drawn on research in several bodies of manuscript materials, which are cited by the following abbreviations:

DSI David Schneider interviews, conducted by the author, August 17–18 and 22–23, 1989, Santa Cruz, Calif. I have also used this form to include personal communications.

FSI Fred Strodtbeck interview, conducted by the author, January 28, 1991, Chicago, Ill.
The Invention and Appropriation of Vietnam's Montagnards from Sabatier to the CIA

OSCAR SALEMINK

In April 1926 Léopold Sabatier, the French résident in the province of Dalac in the Central Highlands of Vietnam, was forced to resign from office and barred from the province. During twelve years in office, Sabatier had facilitated colonial rule in the Protectorate of Annam by a policy of transforming the culture of the Rhade people and excluding ethnic Vietnamese influence from the Highlands. In addition to the creation of coutumiers, or customary law codes, he provided a Romanized Rhade script, established a Franco-Rhade school, transformed a ritual new year's celebration into an oath of loyalty by Rhade "chiefs," and incorporated Rhade and other Montagnard warriors into the colonial militia of the Tirailleurs Montagnards. Paradoxically, the very success of his pacification and administrative policies—as embodied in roads constructed by Montagnard corvée labor—opened up the fertile but hitherto hardly accessible Dalac Plateau to rubber plantations which Sabatier feared would destroy Rhade society. Sabatier found himself caught in the contradictions between two dominant concepts of French colonial ideology, mise en valeur and mission civilisatrice. On the one hand, there was the commitment to capitalist exploitation of natural resources, which might be contrary to the economic interests of the indigenous population—as in the case of the Highland rubber plantations. On the other hand, there was the effort to spread the "blessings" of French civilization to subjugated peoples through education, medicine, the imposition of Western law, and more generally the contact with the "superior" French culture. Because this effort implied some interest in the indigenous population, it relied on the ethnographic discourse of men like...

Oscar Salemink, a researcher at the Instituut voor Moderne Aziatische Geschiedenis of the University of Amsterdam, is the author of *Ethnografie en Kolonialisme: Minderheden in Vietnam, 1850-1954*, and in 1991 did further research there.
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