"Arapesh Warfare": Reo Fortune’s Veiled Critique of Margaret Mead’s *Sex and Temperament*

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**ABSTRACT** In *Sex and Temperament* (1935), Margaret Mead depicted the Mountain Arapesh as a nurturing, peace-loving people. But Mead’s second husband and fieldwork partner, Reo Fortune, disagreed with this in a 1939 article, “Arapesh Warfare,” which presented evidence that before pacification Arapesh society countenanced warfare. Here we show that “Arapesh Warfare” also contains a submerged argument against Mead’s personal integrity and ethnographic authority. *Sex and Temperament* had its own personal subtext, and Fortune responded to it by mobilizing rhetorical strategies drawn from an Arapesh framework of speaking. Our analysis provides insight into Fortune’s position in an anthropological disagreement that has been seen primarily from Mead’s perspective—when it has been seen at all. Fortune’s peculiar approach also speaks to a limitation on reflexivity in anthropology: the illegitimacy of criticizing personal motives in cases of ethnographic dispute, although we know scholarly works are always suffused with their authors’ personal histories and perspectives.

**Keywords:** Reo Fortune, Margaret Mead, Mountain Arapesh, reflexivity, ethnographic critique

There are my former husbands, all anthropologists and all as deeply involved as I am in the ways in which their lives and their work are interrelated.

—Margaret Mead, 1972

Anthropologists have come to take it for granted that works of ethnography cannot be fully understood without reference to the human circumstances in which they were produced. Ethnographic knowledge develops not from dispassionate observation of a given cultural reality but through the concrete activities and interpretations of particular individuals who are always embedded in personal relationships, social hierarchies, and prevailing ways of thinking and who are driven (and limited) by their own intellectual and emotional predispositions. Awareness of this has been heightened in recent decades as anthropologists have sought to eschew the authoritative voice of scientific objectivity and reflexively acknowledge their own necessarily interested and partial positioning as researchers. It has also been manifested in a broader interest among anthropologists in historical studies that explicate the substance of ethnographic works and debates by examining the biographical and cultural contexts of their principals’ lives (Marcus 2001).

There is, however, one situation where the acceptability of the personal in the ethnographic seems to break down, and that is in cases of critique. How can the personal shaping of a work of ethnography ever be criticized as inappropriate when we know that scholarly works are always suffused with their authors’ personal histories and perspectives? Moreover, a problem arises because of the structural logic of dispute: because disputes draw works and their authors into a system of opposition based on shared premises (Strathern 1984), those who would question the personal influences on an ethnographic work immediately bring into question their own personal interests, opening themselves to accusations of prejudice, vindictiveness, careerism, or other illegitimate motives. To avoid triggering this negative dynamic, those wishing to dispute the aptness, faithfulness to reality, or adequacy of another’s ethnographic portrayal are steered back toward a traditional empiricist position in which they isolate and sharpen those points of contention that are strictly impersonal, keeping the focus on “just the facts,” the hallmark of civil debate.

The delegitimizing of the personal in cases of dispute is nowhere more evident than in the long history of critical responses to the work of Margaret Mead. Often evoking counteraccusations of “Mead-bashing” (Yans 2005) or “trashign” (Shankman 2009), critics are accused of using Mead as a foil for demonstrating their “own sense of moral importance” (Silverman 2005:136). Although a number of Mead’s ethnographic projects have been subject to critique on the grounds...
that they were inappropriately influenced by personal and situational factors (see, e.g., Romanucci-Ross 1985 on Manus; Pollmann 1990 on Bali), the most highly publicized was Derek Freeman’s (1983, 1999) rejection of her portrayal of the sexual habits of adolescent girls in Coming of Age in Samoa (Mead 1928). Freeman resolutely “maintained there was nothing personal in his critique,” a matter that he explicitly linked to the scientific authority of his claims (Shankman 2009:15). Yet Freeman’s attempts to portray himself as a cool Popperian seeking only to vindicate the disinterested truth proved unconvincing even to his supporters in the discipline, while “the theme that Mead’s defenders sounded most overtly and indignantly” was that his “attack on Mead” was founded on ulterior motives (Caton 1990:205, 273; see also Côté 2000; Stocking 1992). One might think such “ad hominem” reactions are unique to this case because, despite his protestations, Freeman was clearly anything but neutral (Caton 2006). As Paul Shankman convincingly argues in his thorough retrospective analysis of the controversy, “Freeman used his knowledge not merely to reinterpret the ethnographic record but to damage Mead’s reputation in a deliberate and personal manner” (2009:227). But continuing invocations of “Mead-bashing” are not just an aftershock of the Mead–Freeman controversy. Long before it began, we can see Mead’s critics grappling with the oppositional logic of dispute. Peter Worsley, for example, attempted to preempt backlash against his criticisms of Mead by insisting that they were appropriately directed at her textual production and “not based merely on jealousy at her success, or annoyance at the ‘besmirching’ of scientific purity by making anthropology accessible to the layman” (1957:124).

In this article, we explore the significance of this negative dynamic for another disagreement involving Mead: Reo Fortune’s rejection of Mead’s portrayal of Mountain Arapesh culture. On the face of it, the disagreement revolves around a straightforward question of “the ethnographic facts”: whether the Arapesh people of northern New Guinea had institutionalized warfare. In her classic study Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies (1935), Mead depicted the Mountain Arapesh of northern New Guinea as a nurturing, peace-loving people whose culture provided them with no resources for dealing with conflict or aggression. But Fortune, Mead’s second husband and partner in her Arapesh fieldwork, disagreed with this portrayal in a 1939 article entitled “Arapesh Warfare,” which presented evidence that before pacification violence and warfare had been integral aspects of Arapesh social life.

Although clearly a response to Sex and Temperament, “Arapesh Warfare” is one of the more cryptic articles to have appeared in the pages of the American Anthropologist. Dense with native accounts of local historical events, its climax is a series of long, metaphorical speeches presented in the vernacular with only literal word glosses to aid the reader in deciphering their esoteric cultural meaning. In the article, Fortune sharpens to a point an ethnographic technicality of seemingly minor significance, namely that Arapesh warfare took place between politically “sovereign localities.” Mead’s name appears only in a footnote, and her work is discussed directly in only a few terse paragraphs near the end of the article. There is no point-by-point refutation of errors or inconsistencies in Mead’s account; nor is there any direct comment on her methods, influences, or aims. Given the theoretical richness and popular resonance of Sex and Temperament, Fortune’s oddly narrow response has had little effect on the book’s reception.

However, as we aim to show, the cryptic quality of “Arapesh Warfare” is not just a consequence of Fortune’s eccentricities or his idiosyncratic writing style (cf. Howard 1984; Lawrence 1980; Young 1980); it is integral to Fortune’s critique. For in addition to overtly contradicting particular ethnographic claims Mead made about the Arapesh, “Arapesh Warfare” contains a submerged personal argument against Mead’s morality, scholarly integrity, and ethnographic authority. The argument is submerged because it responds to the personal subtext of Sex and Temperament and because it does so by mobilizing rhetorical conventions and norms deriving not from Western scientific discourse but, rather, from a specifically Arapesh cultural framework of speaking. To that extent, Fortune’s article contains a personal message written in an ethnographic code. When we analyze that code, we can read in “Arapesh Warfare” not simply (or even primarily) an expression of sour grapes at the turning of Mead’s affections away from him but also a muted expression of Fortune’s principled difference with Mead over who the Arapesh were, how she had come to understand them, and how cultures are to be represented ethnographically. Explicating the text of “Arapesh Warfare” thus provides insight into Fortune’s position in an anthropological disagreement that has been seen to date primarily from Mead’s perspective, when it has been seen at all. At the same time, the peculiar nature of Fortune’s article speaks to the power of the structural logic we describe to deter criticism of the personal shaping of a work of ethnography in cases of dispute.

SEX AND TEMPERAMENT: MEAD’S “MOST PERSONAL” BOOK

In Sex and Temperament, Mead describes three societies of the New Guinea Sepik region that she and Fortune studied sequentially over about 16 months in 1931–33, showing how they differently configured the cultural expectations for men and women. In Mountain Arapesh culture, the sexes were little differentiated, with both men and women expected to behave in cooperative, gentle, and nurturing ways. In Mundugumor culture, these expectations were inverted, with both sexes represented as aggressive, violent, and competitive. Finally, among the Tchambuli (Chambri), the expectations for men and women differed in a pattern that reversed Western gender norms, with the men emerging as catty and vain, and the women quietly dominating political and economic life. Mead concluded from these case studies that “personality traits which we have
called masculine or feminine are as lightly linked to sex as are the clothing, the manners, and the form of headdress that a society at a given period assigns to either sex” (Mead 1935:280). Sex and Temperament has long been appreciated as an important early contribution to the anthropological study of women and gender. Disrupting popular assumptions that gender categorizations are biologically grounded and therefore natural, the book has been applauded since its publication for envisioning a world in which human beings would not be limited by the gender expectations imposed on them by society (Friedan 1997; Rosaldo 1974:18–19; Visweswaran 1997:601).

Yet it has not gone unnoticed that the book’s basic message that “human nature is almost unbelievably malleable” (Mead 1935:280) and its format of three cultural case studies bear a striking resemblance to Ruth Benedict’s Patterns of Culture (1934), published just one year prior to Sex and Temperament. Mead freely acknowledged the stimulation provided by a draft of Benedict’s book that she received in 1932 while in the field (Mead 1972:255). The mutual influence these lifelong friends—and, for a time, lovers—had on one another has been explored in numerous studies, including two full-length biographical accounts of their “intertwined lives” (Banner 2003a; Lapsley 1999). But careful readers of Sex and Temperament also note its ultimate rejection of homosexuality, which Benedict had defended, and the curious biologistic “backtrack[ing]” apparent in Mead’s notion that individual “temperamental differences” were “established on a hereditary base,” an idea central to Mead’s theorization of the cultural misfit or “deviant” in departure from Benedict (Banner 2003b:848; Mead 1935:284; see also Friedan 1997:137ff). Even while calling for a society more tolerant of individuals “perceived as sexually deviant,” Sex and Temperament affirms a biological conception of the sexes, perhaps reflecting Mead’s own changing and conflicted ideas about her sexuality as she moved toward motherhood (Molloy 2008:129; see also di Leonardo 1998:190–193; Janiewski 2005:8; Lapsley 1999:239–240; Walton 2001:162ff). This and other interpretations stress the formative importance of personal and projective elements in Sex and Temperament, elements so strong that the book has been called the “most personal” of Mead’s early works and “a study in self-knowledge” (Molloy 2008:109; Sanday 1980:341).

The other personal back story that has received attention in the literature on Sex and Temperament is the turning of Mead’s affections from Fortune to Gregory Bateson during their New Guinea fieldwork. By then in the fourth year of a marriage both conceived and lived as a “professional partnership of fieldwork,” Mead and Fortune were suffering from marital conflicts. Mead attributed these to Fortune’s insensitivity, competitive drive, and traditional sexuality, which contributed to her feeling as if in “prison” at their Arapesh field site and as if in “a nightmare prison” in Mundugumor (Mead 1972:189, 242). When Mead and Fortune encountered the attentive, intellectually supple, bisexual Bateson during a hiatus in their fieldwork, Mead and Bateson be-

![FIGURE 1. Gregory Bateson, Margaret Mead, and Reo Fortune arriving in Sydney at the end of their New Guinea fieldwork. The photo originally appeared in the Sydney Morning Herald on June 1, 1933. (Image in the public domain.)](image)
passive; whereas he was competitive and possessive, they were nurturing; whereas he was indifferent to her feelings, they were warm, caring, and responsive. While studying the Tchambuli, Mead found herself at the apex of a love triangle, a position from which she was able to resolve her own anxieties about her femininity by weaving her personal narrative into her cultural description. As did Mead herself while she was studying them, the Tchambuli Mead described lived in a “highly charged atmosphere of courtship in which no one knows upon whom a woman’s choice will fall” (Mead 1935:258).

The fact that we can read in *Sex and Temperament* an analysis of Mead’s personal concerns is no accident. Both the organizing paradigm and the specific cultural characterizations presented in the book were motivated by a private theory of temperamental types that Mead began working out in discussions with Fortune and Bateson while among the Tchambuli. Taking a cue from Benedict’s *Patterns of Culture*, this theory, which Mead and Bateson came to refer to as the “squares,” provided a common set of terms for describing both cultures and individual personalities. According to the squares, all individuals have an inborn temperament that can be classified within a four-way typological scheme, regardless of their culture. The primary axis was masculine–feminine, also called “Northern–Southern” using the gender-neutral metaphor of compass points to convey that both of these temperamental types occurred in individuals of either sex. This dimension was complicated by a second, cross-cutting axis, variously labeled “East–West” or “Fey–Turk,” that was shifting and less clear in conception but had to do with whether one tended to direct or perform for others (see Sullivan 2005). The Northern type, attributed to Fortune, is aggressive, competitive, and possessive, while the Southern type, identified with Mead and Bateson, is passive, responsive, and giving. Cultures might favor or “stabilize” one type at the expense of the others by developmental conditioning, a process detailed in *Sex and Temperament*. But the real analytical thrust of the squares was to provide a means for evaluating the relative compatibility among types, both that between individuals and cultures (this was how Mead derived her conception of “cultural deviants”) and that between individuals. The individuals of immediate interest were clearly Mead, Fortune, and Bateson themselves. As Tony Crook (2007:138) observes, it was “as if the whole New Guinea expedition were also a scientific exploration of [the anthropologists'] own compatibility, placed in an analytical frame.”

Coming to light in stages over the past 30 years, what we know about the squares helps make sense of several otherwise puzzling aspects of *Sex and Temperament*. One is the undercurrent of biologism in a book that is ostensibly about the cultural shaping of human possibility (see, e.g., Mead 1935:283–284). Due in part to Bateson’s influence, the earliest squares classification posited regular linkages between temperamental types and bodily characteristics (e.g., rounded shoulders), along the lines of the constitutional type theories fashionable at the time (Banner 2003a:403–404; Bateson 1979:191–92; Kretschmer 1925; Mead 1972:258–259; MMP: R4:8, S11:7). Knowing about the squares also helps explain the “perplexing discrepancies” that obtain between the details Mead reported in the book and her larger generalization that Arapesh culture was mild and gentle; such observations include “quarrels over women,” “man and wife attacking each other with axes,” “men beating their wives,” “a mother trying to strangle her baby and stepping on the head of another,” “violent, unreasonable rages,” and the regular “resort to sorcery” within a system of institutionalized hostilities (Thurnwald 1936:664–666). These discrepancies led one early reviewer to wonder skeptically whether Mead, “having seized by intuition or inspiration the fundamental ‘ethos’ of each of her cultures,” was writing “to describe the culture” or “to justify her inspiration” (Fortes 1936:126; see also Lohmann 2004; Roscoe 2003; Worsley 1957). By making plain how Mead’s investments in the *Sex and Temperament* paradigm were simultaneously personal and theoretical, the squares theory allows us to conclude that such skepticism was justified. Mead never formally published the squares, but in the 1930s she regarded it a major advance, and she remained convinced of its basic correctness, continuing to use it privately as an orienting framework throughout her life (Bateson 1984:160, 168; Kuper 2007:20; MMP 1975:72–73, 347–348).

**FORTUNE’S PRIVATE RESPONSE TO SEX AND TEMPERAMENT**

Although recent commentators have been relatively accepting of the personal elements in Mead’s ethnography (see, e.g., Banner 2003a:360), they were troubling to Fortune. Being cast, through the squares, as an unsuitable partner for Mead because of his inborn temperament, a “northern villain” opposed to her “southern hero” (MMP: RF/MM, c. August 18, 1933, R4:8), Fortune felt acutely that the system of contrasts Mead used to describe the Sepik cultures they had studied together wrapped Mead’s own personal agenda “in suprapersonal terms,” providing her with “an apparent scientific basis for doing what [she] wanted to do” (MMP:RF/MM, c. January 1934, R4:8; RF/MM, June 19, 1934, R4:11). “If you really want to get rid of me [just] say so,” he wrote to her (MMP: RF/MM, June 8, 1934, R4:11). But he wished she would “cut science or pseudoscience away from it and be honest about it” (MMP: RF/MM, June 19, 1934, R4:11).

Although Fortune had taken part in the squares discussions at first, he very quickly disavowed the theory. He scratched out his name on the original document and replaced it with “I have nothing to do with this” (MMP n.d.). As he told Mead afterward, he had “talked the jargon of the idea” on the Sepik only because “there was no other language you would talk in” (MMP: RF/MM, c. January 15, 1934, R4:8; see also Mead 1972:261). Because it posited a small number of temperamental categories acquired through genetic inheritance, Fortune saw the squares as a new species of racialism: instead of white and black, it divided humanity into...
two (primary) groupings, one Southern and one Northern, each with a “physiological basis, like blood groups.” Fortune moreover saw Mead as using this categorization “to make the stock race points,” including “question[ing] the wisdom of intermarriage” between races. “Franz Boas might have taught you” better, he admonished her (MMP: RF/MM, July 15, 1934, R5:1).

When Fortune received his copy of Sex and Temperament in July of 1935, his initial reaction was above all relief that it did not mention the squares. He wrote to Mead that he did have reservations that “some of the material [that] you bend” in illustration of the thesis “you break in the bending,” but he basically concurred with her assessment of “the temperamental tempo of the three cultures” (MMP: RF/MM, October 25, 1935, R5:6). Yet on further reflection, he began to have doubts. “Take the skeleton of it,” he wrote in a seven-page letter to Benedict:

This skeleton is of a curious nature: of somewhat arbitrary abstraction from the three separate social tissues involved—yet with some truth behind it—so that I said at the first blow “O well taken.” I was greatly relieved too that [Mead’s] personal mental spere of Southern and Northern personalities had taken such abstract form, so well away from prior, concrete individual judgments on her own small circle—of more invidious nature—at least of my “violence” and sadism compared with Bateson’s “gentleness” and “masochism.” Let her fix the Devil on to the Mundugumur culture, the Saint on to the Arapesh culture, and the Confusion of the Sexes on to the Tchamberi culture—well taken. But come again to consider the cultures, I cannot help but judge in a running gamut all the way from well taken—to taken, taken—to taken in. As of individuals, so of cultures—Is it all so simple? Love the Arapesh, qua Bateson. Repudiate the Mundugumur qua Fortune. Confusion in Tchamberi. . . . I pinch myself on occasion and ask myself, if this is science, or history, or what exactly? [MMP: RF/RB, January 1, 1936, R3:8]

As this passage and many other of his letters attest, Fortune was disturbed not only by the way Mead used the squares to naturalize certain judgments about the personalities of individuals close to her but also by the way she used her analysis of those personalities to simultaneously interpret the three Sex and Temperament cultures. His own fieldwork had taught him how one’s ethnographic impressions could be colored by personal experiences (Howard 1984:267), but he felt it was a sullying of anthropology to so systematically conflate the two. But how could he criticize Sex and Temperament on those grounds without entering into the record his own account of their personal circumstances, making explicit what was only implicit in Sex and Temperament? Doing so would not only lead him to replicate in his own work what he most objected to in Mead’s but would also open him to accusations of taking an unseemly personal interest in discrediting her. Fortune was in a bind: “I have to write my later ethnology under a heavy cloud of controversial presupposition about it by Margaret. It is not going to be easy . . . I need every bit of balance I can get under these circumstances” (MMP: RF/RB, January 1, 1936, R5:8). This took him some time. It was not until he had briefly revisited the Arapesh in 1936 and then begun working with the material while teaching in 1937 that he felt himself able to “make the point more impersonally” (FBP: RF/FB, February 9, 1937). “Arapesh Warfare” was the closest to an impersonal rendering that Fortune would produce. Nonetheless, at a subtextual level it is still very personal indeed.

**THE SUBTEXTUAL ARGUMENT OF “ARAPESH WARFARE”**

In the Mountain Arapesh case study that occupies fully half of Sex and Temperament, Mead depicts Arapesh culture as “a social order that substitutes responsiveness to the concerns of others, and attentiveness to the needs of others, for aggressiveness, initiative, competitiveness, and possessiveness—the familiar motivations upon which our culture depends” (Mead 1935:15). Arapesh children are raised to be “non-competitive and responsive, warm, docile, and trusting,” so that men and women alike are “maternal, cherishing, and oriented away from the self” and toward the needs of others (Mead 1935:40, 15, 265). As a result, the Arapesh are hapless in the face of conflict: “In this society unaccustomed to violence, which assumes that all men are mild and co-operative and is always surprised by the individuals who fail to be so, there are no sanctions to deal with the violent man” (Mead 1935:25–26). According to Mead, those few individuals who were given to violent impulses were considered deviants. “The violent person among the Arapesh cannot find, either in the literature, or in the art, or in the ceremonial, or in the history of his people, any expression of the internal drives that are shattering his peace of mind” (Mead 1935:314). The uniformly cooperative emphasis of the culture was reflected in its “lack of political organization” (Mead 1935:22): Arapesh named localities did not amount to “political units” of any significance (Mead 1935:15). Occasional “brawls and clashes” might disturb the quiet of Arapesh life, but these were “slenderly organized” and invariably prevented from escalating (Mead 1935:23, 27). “Actual warfare—organized expeditions to plunder, conquer, kill, or attain glory—is absent” (Mead 1935:23).

Against this placid view, Fortune’s “Arapesh Warfare” put forth a more complex picture in which Arapesh men and women, while not categorically warlike, did have cultural resources for dealing with conflict and aggression. Moreover, before pacification some 15 years prior to Mead and Fortune’s fieldwork, full-scale, deliberate warfare had played a central role in reifying the articulation between clans and larger political units, or “sovereign localities.” The moral logic underlying the institution of warfare was elaborated by the politically astute “old men” in a high oratorical form in which they exhorted their hearers to behave in culturally valued ways. Given this, Fortune meant to show, the notion that violence was extrinsic to or even incidental to the culture—a form of cultural deviance—was untenable. Fortune’s perspective has since been reaffirmed by research on the ethnohistory of Arapesh intervillage alliances (Dobrin and Bashkow 2006) and by Paul Roscoe’s restudy, which draws on Mead and Fortune’s unpublished field notes and
his own further fieldwork to conclude that “prior to pacification, the Mountain Arapesh resorted to significant levels of violence and waged war on a regular basis” (Roscoe 2003:581).4

But in addition to this overt counterclaim, “Arapesh Warfare” makes a number of subtextual arguments that have not been recognized in the literature on Sex and Temperament. These subtextual arguments are obscure in part because they are responding to the theory of the squares, which informs Mead’s analysis but was never published, thus remaining invisible to most readers. But the arguments are also obscure because they rely to a remarkable extent on rhetorical devices that make speech compelling in the terms governing indigenous Arapesh (and more broadly Melanesian) discourse rather than the universe of Western scientific discourse in which the article is explicitly framed.

In “Arapesh Warfare,” Fortune makes systematic use of authority-establishing indices of firsthand experience, and he carefully notes, using proper names, the places at which the narrated events took place, just as Arapesh people themselves do when they speak. Within an Arapesh ethos of speaking, the use of these devices is concerned with the proper transmission and public display of knowledge. We might think that Fortune had every right to speak about the Arapesh, given that he and Mead had done the fieldwork together, but this was not strictly true because of their division of labor: Fortune worked on the language, while Mead got the culture (Mead 1972:226, 236). “Arapesh Warfare” did not appear until after the first volume of Mead’s Mountain Arapesh monograph series had been published (Mead 1938); Fortune waited until then before submitting it to give her predecessor (FBP: RF/RB, April 10, 1937). At the same time, given the way that they conducted themselves while in the field, Mead and Fortune experienced Arapesh culture very differently, and aspects of Fortune’s experience that Mead did not share turn out to be critical warrants in the implicit argument he makes for his own ethnographic authority.

Whether Fortune adopted Arapesh speaking strategies consciously we do not know, but we nevertheless find them woven integrally into his article. He may not have had a full analytical understanding of the Arapesh rhetorical practices he used, but he did have a sufficiently intuitive grasp to employ them. It is clear enough from Fortune’s other ethnographic writings that he was sensitive to issues of cultural voice and verbal style. In his book Omaha Secret Societies, for example, he writes, “If the account reads in a literary style, the style is Indian” (Fortune 1932:42). He also shows himself to be sensitive to native distinctions of genre. The eighth chapter of Omaha Secret Societies provides a nice example of this; it comprises the English translations of two Omaha “tales” and four “legends,” which Fortune is careful to distinguish because his informants do, although the distinction does not bear on his point (Fortune 1932:176). So it is not surprising that he also manipulated these features to effect in “Arapesh Warfare.” We also know that he began work on the article immediately after departing from the field, when the cadence of Arapesh voices was still fresh in his mind (Dobrin and Bashkow in press). Finally, Fortune saw anthropological fieldwork as a cross-cultural passage into the lives of the people he studied, in which the goal was to become “used to dealing with them in their own world” (MMP: RF/MM, March 18, 1928, S1:15). So it seems that Fortune’s own ethnographic tendencies led him to look at his situation from an emic Arapesh perspective and even to discharge his resentment about it using Arapesh discursive conventions that he had internalized.

In contrast to Fortune’s other publications on Arapesh, “Arapesh Warfare” conspicuously describes the extent of the Arapesh territory using few objective landmarks, emphasizing instead his own firsthand experience: distances reckoned in number of “days of hard walking” (Fortune 1939:22). Indeed, in the article’s opening paragraph, there are no fewer than eight individual references to traversing the country by foot. Because of an injured ankle, Mead had to be carried into their Arapesh field site, the mountaintop village of Alitoa, and she never once traveled beyond the village periphery until some eight months later when she and Fortune departed, whereupon she was once again carried out (Mead 1940:335, Mead 1972:225, 242). Fortune, by contrast, made a series of lengthy excursions to survey the land, languages, and peoples; to manage their supply of stores on the coast; and to collect artifacts. When Mead wrote on topics such as diffusion, sorcery, pathways or “roads” of exchange, and the men’s cult, much of the information she was assimilating was acquired indirectly through him (Bashkow and Dobrin 2007). Fortune rejected her claim to authority on these topics. In responding to a draft chapter of The Mountain Arapesh monograph Mead had sent him, he reminded her that she had been “carried over one road twice under European conditions—and the whole chapter betrays it—[it] is largely garbled from my gossip to you and largely incorrect in consequence” (MMP: RF/MM, February 23, 1936, S2:2). But Fortune’s position was justified not only by his and Mead’s differing field experiences but also by an Arapesh consideration: the prerequisite conditions for the rightful ownership of speech.

In Arapesh epistemology, certain conditions must hold for a person’s speech to qualify as authoritative and valid, and an important one of these is firsthand knowledge of what is being talked about, as opposed to reports of knowledge gained through hearsay. Although their language has no grammatical evidentials, Arapesh people are highly attentive to indicators of source and evidence in others’ reports, and they specifically emphasize their firsthand knowledge of the events they recount. One way they do this is by orienting the events they relate with respect to their immediate physical experience. Mead herself provides an illustration in Sex and Temperament where she observes that when Arapesh people exchange spears during fights, “everyone notes carefully where the spear . . . hits” their bodies (Mead 1935:24). This is exactly what Fortune is telling us in his opening paragraph: I know because I walked there. This consideration
also illuminates Fortune’s peculiar choice of focus in the article: that Arapesh warfare was organized at the level of “sovereign localities.” It is true that this counters specific contentions of Mead’s that Arapesh lack political units and that they fail to distinguish killing in battle from murder within the clan. But insisting on attacking such a narrow target, given Mead’s much more general argument about the absence of a gender contrast in the culture, seems if anything to diminish, rather than bolster, Fortune’s position. The point is well-motivated from an Arapesh frame of reference, however, given that during their research Mead never crossed a boundary between sovereign localities. It was a matter on which Mead could not speak with the authority of her own experience, whereas the well-traveled Fortune could.

In Fortune’s key example, the story of a battle between Suapali and Nyauia localities, he cites the proper name of the land on which the battle took place: Nuberum-Mugueruhunum. This is just one among many Arapesh proper names the article invokes. To be sure, the inclusion of such information is justifiable from a scientific perspective in that it allows the ethnography to be independently verified, as Roscoe (2003:589) was indeed able to do some 60 years later. But it is also another example of Fortune adopting an indigenous Arapesh rhetorical ethos and turning its power against Mead: he notes immediately on mentioning the battlefield name that the fights that took place there “were not gentle” (Fortune 1939:35). To create the high degree of verisimilitude reported events require in Arapesh conversation, it is necessary to specify precisely where the events took place. When a speaker fails to give sufficient information to orient a story geographically, listeners are dissatisfied, provoking cooperative prompting and conversational repair before the speaker is allowed to proceed (see also Kulick 1992). Furthermore, uttering the proper names of battlegrounds invokes whole histories of interlocality relations: “Today, after many years of peace, when assemblies from two formerly hostile localities meet, the orators of either side call the names of these fields and stir quick applause with them” (Fortune 1939:31). In short, the battlefield name Nuberum-Mugueruhunum is not just another ethnographic detail. In an Arapesh context, the whole argument of the article could be made by allusion, simply by citing that one name.

Nearly a third of “Arapesh Warfare” is occupied by translated reports of battles fought in precolonial times and transcripts of conventionalized speeches made by “old men” presented in the vernacular. The battle reports emphasize how “determination to kill, not restraint from killing, obtains very clearly,” as when a man is reported to have said “Child, you feel it now” while sinking his spear into an enemy fighter (Fortune 1939:36). In directly quoting native speech to the extent that he does, one of the things Fortune is demonstrating is his own linguistic authority. Focusing on Arapesh language as his primary domain of study during the fieldwork, Fortune achieved a remarkable grasp of its structure and discursive conventions. Although Mead clearly acquired some competence in the language, we know that she conducted most of her Arapesh research in the colonial lingua franca Tok Pisin despite the fact that it was spoken by very few Alitoans at the time (Mead 1947:269). She also questioned the need for fieldworkers to achieve facility in esoteric discourse practices as a matter of methodological principle (Mead 1939:200).6

The Arapesh texts Fortune chooses to include are all instances of a formal speech genre called in Arapesh sakihas (plural; singular saki). The function of sakihas was exhortative or agonistic, and their style florid and allusive. Extrapolating from contemporary Arapesh practices, sakihas would have been spoken loudly and forcefully by male leaders at public gatherings, where their persuasive intent would be reinforced by the speaker’s skillful use of the genre to comment indirectly on a situation of current interest. Fortune regularly supplied native language texts, or at least translations, to support the central contentions of his work or add to their depth, and he collected many sakihas during his Arapesh fieldwork. He apparently valued them highly as a form of data, for, despite the “numerous bonfires he lit in celebration of his indifference to academic immortality,” there are multiple copies of different versions of them preserved in his archive and integrated in different ways into manuscript drafts of a never-published Arapesh ethnography of his own (McLean 1992:37; see also RFP).

Fortune even used Arapesh narrative techniques in some of his correspondence with Mead. In a report he wrote from the colonial hub of Salamau where he encountered Arapesh laborers during a return field trip, Fortune directly quotes his interaction with them in untranslated Arapesh without marking the turn changes. Although this is not idiomatic English, it is a common Arapesh method for reporting conversation (see also Besnier 1992; Rumsey 1990). In oral narration, the turn structure of the reported speech would be indicated through intonational cues. In this excerpt, italicized elements are Arapesh in the original, and bracketed elements in the glosses are inserted for clarity:

They all asked after you— I told them akokwihut wabar kwapwe—
[Fortune:] They all asked after you—I told them she stays in her village—[Interlocutor:] In Sydney?—[Fortune:] No, New York.

He reported another field conversation similarly:

aan kwa gane kabi yapakwi um—igi kwo ganaem kwa kai mone, esitik money wak, ei gatuhe lakanem and so on. [MMP: RF/MM, May 28, 1936, S2:2]
[Interlocutor:] Where is your wife?
[Fortune:] She stayed back in her place/village.
But Schemali [said:] Has she died?
[Fortune:] Oh no!
[Interlocutor:] Is she there waiting for you?
[Fortune:] Now I have no money and she has not been good towards me.
In directly quoting sakihas in “Arapesh Warfare,” Fortune is likewise bringing his voice into harmony with an Arapesh rhetorical style. Moreover, the saki was not a speech form that Mead commanded. She rejected Fortune’s contention that it was critical to transcribe verbatim these “loud ceremonial speeches which did not and were not meant to reach any conclusion” (Mead 1947:276). Nor did she find their rich use of allusive imagery impressive: “The Arapesh lack of feeling for form and their use of the most remote, dream-like associations, owing to which new subjects were continually being introduced, made some of their speeches, or formal accusations, exceedingly difficult to follow” (Mead 1947:307 n. 3). So Fortune’s direct presentation of sakihas crucially brings to bear cultural knowledge that he, but not Mead, could claim with authority.

But the saki was also a politically powerful form of verbal art that was used to comment on matters of concern in a public yet veiled way. It was for the audience to listen through the words and extract their “inner” meanings. In citing these texts, Fortune was deploying them in an authentically Arapesh indirect fashion to denounce Mead’s morality and discredit her analysis. In “Arapesh Warfare,” Fortune presents long extracts of four speeches, all of them commentaries on the problems brought about by extramarital sex and unfaithful wives. The speeches explain that a man can live well if he marries the girl to whom he was originally betrothed, but strife and discord were sure to follow if he takes a wife from among the “divorced women acquired from alien groups by seduction” (Fortune 1939:38). One of the speeches allegorically describes the destructive power of sexual desire outside properly contracted marriage; in three of the speeches, a man finds his strength undermined by a desired but uncooperative woman; and in the speech reported in the article’s central example, a woman “lacking in moral fibre” is seduced by a man from another locality, bringing on war (Fortune 1939:29). Spears are drawn and blood is shed, while the man’s heart is downcast, for the woman is now hidden in the enemy’s forests and he never sees her again.

The moral perspective expressed in these speeches suggests nothing less than that the squares equations are backward: it is not Mead and Bateson who should be identified with the Arapesh. To the contrary, Mead is the one they would deplore, the “cut-lipped woman” who is not “content to stay well” with one man and who incessantly contradicts him and undermines him: “cut-lipped-she seize your mouth; she takes out of it [all your] speech” (Fortune 1939:39). Bateson, who had seduced Mead away from Fortune, is the one they would fight against, the “secret agent, called in Arapesh speech the bera libere,” who visiting the husband’s place . . . waits his opportunity for a private word with the woman,” affecting “a soft compassion with [her] for the ‘unhappy’ marriage she had incurred” (Fortune 1939:28). In this realignment, it is Fortune who would stand with the Arapesh, bereft of his wife. The moral value Fortune placed on marital fidelity was something he and the Arapesh shared. And if the Arapesh were aligned with Fortune, then Mead’s analysis of the culture, based as it was on Mead’s identification of herself and Bateson with the Arapesh in opposition to him in the squares, was wrong.

Fortune does not argue outright for this simple reversal of Mead’s scheme. Although his evidence refutes Mead’s key claims that “warfare is practically unknown among the Arapesh” and that “the entire Arapesh social culture has selected a maternal temperament, placid and domestic in its implications, both for men and women” (Fortune 1939:36), he resists advancing a commensurable but contrary thesis about the Arapesh cultural ethos:

> It is not proper to assume that the Arapesh must be conceived either in terms of the hypothesis that the culture has a uniformly maternal tendency or in terms of alternative hypothesis. It is better to make no hypotheses. Without hypothesis, it is clear that Arapesh culture did not promote warfare to any vicious extreme. Warfare was made dependent upon women’s sexual consent in extramarital liaisons outside locality borders, and it was regarded with considerable distaste. (Fortune 1939:37)

Here Fortune is focusing his objection on the issue of how a culture should be represented ethnographically. For Mead, it was an exciting innovation to unify the complexities of personalities and cultures in a single typological scheme. But Fortune’s ethnographic style tended toward the more historicist and particularizing end of the Boasian spectrum. For him, the “maternal Arapesh” was an overly simplistic “hypothetical creation” imposed on a complex and diverse people who could be maternal and nurturing in some contexts yet competitive and violent in others. “It is not an easy task to view Arapesh social culture in its entire sweep,” he writes (Fortune 1939:36). He was not inclined to dismiss counterinstances as culturally anomalous, as Mead did with her category of “deviants.” And it made no sense to him to attribute the characteristics of individuals to cultures: “I do not know that we are entitled to personify social wholes, they have no skeletons or nervous systems, or as the rude phrase has it—no bottom to kick, and hence no temperament” (MPP: RF/MM, November 17, 1954, A3:2). Fortune studiously resisted offering an alternative characterization of Arapesh culture opposed to Mead’s “peaceful Arapesh.” Not
only did he allow for the gentleness of Arapesh family life
that Mead described, but he also even tried to functionally
integrate it with his observations about warfare patterns.
It was possible, he thought, that the “very gentle” Arapesh
“domestic spirit” was a form of defense, “so that women
will not too readily run to the enemy upon solicitation and
precipitate war” (FBP: RF/FB, February 9, 1937).

Fortune rejected Mead’s representation of the Arapesh
that emphasized a single cultural ethos modeled on her ideas
about herself and Bateson via the squares, as he felt it created
a “mess in the state of knowledge” (MMP: RF/RB, June 24,
1936, R5:8). For many years onward he called Mead to task
in his letters for the “confusion of your private wishes and
your public ethnoLOGY” (MMP: RF/MM, February 14, 1948,
February 15, 1948, R6:1). “You imagined a vain thing about
alleged ‘southern’ temperaments of sweetness and light and
‘northern’ temperaments of the reverse; and confounded
this vanitiy with ethnography and personal relations alike—
not to the great good of either. . . . You have distorted the
ethnography of the region at all points in this interest” (MMP:
RF/MM, March 10, 1948, R6:1). He repeatedly asked Mead
to renounce those of her Arapesh writings—on interlocity
relations, diffusion, the men’s cult, and sorcery—that were
based on material she had acquired indirectly through his
efforts and that thus implicated him in the offending analyses.

Addressing her privately, he phrased this quite indelicately:
“burn it” (MMP: RF/MM, February 23, 1936, S2:2). But
Mead defended her right to publish as she wished. Interpre-
ting Fortune’s objection as a claim on intellectual property
rather than a critique of her approach to ethnographic rep-
resentation, Mead argued that she had done nothing wrong,
as she had acknowledged Fortune’s contribution in the text
(MMP: MM/RF, April 18, 1936, S2:2).

Because of the personal perspective so tightly woven
into her analysis, Fortune faced the problem of how to criti-
cize Mead publicly without addressing that aspect of her
work that he found most objectionable. Some readers have
assumed that Fortune did not publish more about his differ-
ces with Mead because he was chivalrous or averse to airing
He was certainly in no professional position from which to
speak out against Mead, as he was having difficulty estab-
lishing his career.12 But to stop at such explanations is to
overlook the systematic nature of the bind in which Fortune
found himself.12 Were he to criticize Mead’s representation
of the Arapesh as personally motivated, it would open him to
precisely the same accusation: that personal interests were
clouding the ethnography. However, were he to limit him-
self to a strictly empirical critique of Mead’s Arapesh work,
this would not enable him to express what he saw as the
driving source of its error.

The solution Fortune arrived at was to present a straight-
forward empirical argument on the surface (showing that
institutionalized warfare was an integral part of the “peace-
ful” Arapesh culture), while melding his own voice with that
of the Arapesh to attack Mead indirectly on a subtler level.

We have no direct statement in Fortune’s hand that he in-
tended to pursue this strategy. But the difference between
his writing for publication and his private correspondence
is instructive. Numerous manuscript fragments contesting
Mead’s interpretations of the Arapesh ethnography appear
in Fortune’s archive, written over several decades, and all
are strictly focused on ethnographic details and their eviden-
tial basis (see RFP). This is in striking contrast to his let-
ters, where the intertwining of personal motives in Sex and
Temperament is repeatedly excoriated (Dobrin and Bashkow
in press). As we hope we have shown, elements of this
same critique emerge subtextually with careful reading of
“Arapesh Warfare,” helping to make sense of what is other-
wise a strangely opaque document. Like Sex and Temperament,
“Arapesh Warfare” is intensely personal. But whereas the au-
tobiographical resonances of Sex and Temperament connect it
to Western readers’ attitudes about gender and sexuality ac-
cording to the spirit of the times, contributing to the book’s
effectiveness (Banner 2003a; Molloy 2008), the autobiogra-
phical aspects of “Arapesh Warfare” draw on an Arapesh
ethos of speaking for their clearest interpretation, making
the article’s personal basis illegible to most readers—to all,
presumably, but Margaret Mead herself.

CONCLUSION: PERSONAL MOTIVES
IN ETHNOGRAPHIC DISPUTE

Anthropology has grown to accept and even celebrate the
fact that works of ethnography necessarily bear the impress
of their authors’ personal circumstances and the cultural
context within which they were produced. This accep-
tance reflects our internalization of important aspects of
the critique of naive empiricism, our recognition that ethno-
graphic knowledge is made and not found (Borneman and
Hammoudi 2009). But this understanding does not readily
carry over to situations of dispute, where personal motives
still have an air of illegitimacy, leading would-be critics to
focus solely on the facts—as if criticism could only be valid
if purely dispassionate. Not that this understandable ma-
neuver is very effective. After all, explanatory values are
themselves moral constructs, so disputing any ethnographic
portrayal implies a judgment about the author, calling atten-
tion to the personal and bringing the morality of the critic
into question.13 But even if it were effective, a Latourian
purification of “the facts” by bracketing the personal con-
stitutes a retreat to an unfortunately narrow vision of what
ethnography is and what its mistakes can teach us.

If ethnographic representations are irreducibly suffused
with the personal and moral, we must recognize the per-
sonal in the ethnographic as an acceptable object of critical
evaluation and understanding. The challenge is to distin-
guish between morally suspect scandalmongering and well-
justified discussion that advances our understanding of im-
portant bodies of work. In the present case, we have shown
that a knowledgeable but interested critic had principled
objections to the way Mead’s personal motivations affected
the resulting representation, to his mind crossing the line
between “bending” the material and “breaking” it—crossing the line, that is, between reliable ethnography and personal allegory.

And what of our motives? We did not set out to tell scandalous stories involving Margaret Mead. We became interested in this case while doing research of our own on Arapesh language and culture. Like Mead and Fortune, we did fieldwork on Arapesh together as a married couple: Dobrin was pursuing questions of linguistic organization suggested by Fortune’s (1942) grammar; Bashkow was interested in Melanesian ethnography and history of anthropology. Rereading “Arapesh Warfare” while in the field, we were impressed at Fortune’s insight into local people’s concerns and his skillful rendering of native voice. We were also struck by his animus toward Mead.

Researching the case later, we noticed that most writings dealing with Mead and Fortune’s relationship do so within the narrative frame that Mead herself supplied in *Blackberry Winter* (supplemented by her correspondence and interviews), where Fortune is portrayed retrospectively in much the same terms as the squares, justifying Mead’s decision to leave him. Fortune comes across as uncaring, volatile, and physically abusive (Mead 1972:230, 238, 242; see also Banner 2003a:330, 335–336, 341; Howard 1984:128, 149, 160; Lapsley 1999:224). As an anthropologist, he is shown to be ambitious to the point of paranoia, even competing with his wife over their joint research ( Bateson 1984:162; Mead 1972:231, 234, 236, 290). In their marriage, he is limited by “puritanical jealousy,” “the sternest Victorian values,” and his colonialist ideas about gender roles (Mead 1972:185, 207, 230, 243, 289; see also Lapsley 1999:195, 223; Lipset 1980:135). He is not a character whose perspective we are led to think is worth exploring.

This negative view of Fortune would seem to be confirmed by the “rambling, disturbed” (Lapsley 1999:240, 242), and “spiteful” (Howard 1984:169) quality of the many letters he wrote to and about Mead after they separated. As our experience confirms, these letters are “painful to read even now, as the reader follows the change from admiring devotion to embittered resentment” (Toulin 1984:8). However, when read closely and in sequence, they reveal principled objections to Mead’s Arapesh ethnography that became increasingly charged with anger and frustration as Mead systematically ignored them, over years and ultimately decades (Dobrin and Bashkow in press).14

Fortune’s perspective remains “missing in the many retellings” of the story of his and Mead’s failed marriage in her biography (Molloy 2008:116). And because his version of the story is so charged with bitterness, it might seem best to keep it so, limiting ourselves to “just the ethnographic facts.” Yet there is no way to understand what is at stake in this case without exploring the ways in which both his and Mead’s love interests, theoretical and professional strivings, fieldwork experiences, and ethnographic representations were intertwined. Because what we know of Fortune comes so largely from Mead’s recollections, his voice has become buried—as he himself foresaw—under a “heavy weight of presupposition” (MMP: RF/RB, January 1, 1936, R5:8). But such a morally dismissive view of Fortune as we get from Mead is only part of the story. To turn our backs on the reasons for Fortune’s bitterness is to implicitly elevate Mead’s interested views over his, though we have no justification for doing so. Recovering Fortune’s perspective—resentment and all—is necessary if we are to appreciate the subtextual currents of mutual opposition in Mead’s “most personal” book and Fortune’s reciprocally personal rejoinder in “Arapesh Warfare.”

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**NOTES**

**Acknowledgments.** We wish to thank the following friends and colleagues for their generous feedback and assistance with this project: Ellen Contini-Morava, Fred Damon, Pat Francis, Deborah Gewertz, David Columbia, Richard Handler, Roger Lohmann, Joan Mathews, Susan McKinnon, Ann McLean, Peter Metcalf, Andrew Moutu, Jim Roscoe, David Sapiro, Sharon Stein, George Stocking, Gerald Sullivan, Caroline Thomas, and Madelyn Wessel. The core argument of the article was presented by Lise Dobrin at the Chicago meeting of the American Anthropological Association in November of 2003. We received helpful feedback from the participants in the spring 2004 University of Virginia Linguistic Anthropology Seminar; we are also grateful to Tom Boellstorff and several anonymous *American Anthropologist* reviewers for extensive feedback that greatly strengthened the article. Field research on Arapesh was supported by the National Science Foundation, a Fulbright-Hays Fellowship, and the Wenner-Gren Foundation (Dobrin). Archival research and writing was funded by a National Endowment for the Humanities Fellowship (Bashkow) and grants from the University of Virginia’s Vice President for Research and Graduate Studies (Dobrin, Bashkow) and the University of Virginia’s Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences (Bashkow).

1. Lipset (2003:698), for example, finds Fortune’s “brusque dismissal” insufficient to “devastate Mead’s major claim.” Among Mead’s biographers, Howard (1984:141) and Lapsley (1999:238) likewise emphasize the weakness or irrelevance of “Arapesh Warfare,” while Banner (2003a) and Molloy (2008) fail to mention Fortune’s article at all. Although the challenge presented by “Arapesh Warfare” has been recognized by some anthropologists (Leach 1985; Lutkehaus 2008; Lyons and Lyons 2004:205, 342 n. 7; Roscoe 2003; Worsley 1957), scholars outside the discipline continue to take the gentle ethos of Arapesh culture as an established fact, discussing *Sex and Temperament* without citing “Arapesh Warfare” or acknowledging the serious questions it raises (see, e.g., Kimmel 2008:56, 354 n. 2; Newman 2005; Tarrant 2006:81ff).

3. Abbreviations used throughout this article are as follows. When referring to particular individuals:

   RB: Ruth Benedict
   RF: Reo Fortune
   FB: Franz Boas
   MM: Margaret Mead

When referring to manuscript sources:

   FBP: Franz Boas Papers, American Philosophical Society Library, Philadelphia.
   MMP: Margaret Mead Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. References are to box: file number.
   RFP: Reo Fortune Papers, Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, New Zealand.

4. Mead’s treatments of the Mundugumor and Tchambuli cultures in *Sex and Temperament* have also been revisited; see, for example, Errington and Gewertz 1987, Gewertz 1984, Lipset 2003, and McDowell 1991. Readers may wonder about the Bumbita Arapesh or the Iahita Arapesh, both located to the south of the Torricelli mountains (Leavitt 1989; Tuzin 2001) and their relevance to the Mountain Arapesh with whom Mead and Fortune worked further to the north. Whereas the designation “Arapesh” reflects a justifiable linguistic grouping, in culture the two areas are quite distinct—although of course against a background of commonalities that allow us to speak of “the Sepik region” or even “Melanesia” more generally. We discuss historical connections of exchange and travel between the people of these two areas in Dobrin and Bashkow 2006.

5. In Fortune 1942, Fortune describes the Arapesh territory in terms of major geographical features; in Fortune 1943 and 1947 he situates it in Western scientific terms in degrees latitude and longitude.

6. When it came to “using the native language,” Mead argues, it was sufficient for fieldworkers to be able to “ask questions correctly and idiomatically,” “establish rapport,” and “give instructions” (1939:196, 198, 199).

7. To our knowledge, this genre is now lost, having been completely subsumed by Christian hortatory discourse. The term *saki* continues to be used but now refers to traditional narratives with characters and events set in mythical time. The current meaning of *saki* would therefore be closer to “legend” than “formal admonition,” which is what it seems to have meant in the 1930s.

8. The Arapesh man Agilipwe was a violent “deviant” according to Mead.

9. See Rodman 1991 for a remarkable parallel instance of veiled discourse in which a Vanuatu man uses reported speech in an exotic genre—in this case, the ethnographic interview—to indirectly comment on matters of concern in his own community.

10. Fortune had seduced Mead away from her first husband, Luther Cressman, just as Bateson later seduced her away from him. By the time “Arapesh Warfare” was published, Fortune had returned home to New Zealand and married his original sweetheart, Eileen Pope.

11. Fortune was forced to accept marginal temporary teaching posts, harsh frontier fieldwork, and even unskilled labor until he finally received a permanent lectureship at Cambridge in 1947 (see Thomas 2009:309ff).

12. This dynamic could also be derived using Bateson’s concepts of *double bind* and *schismogenesis*, the latter developed around the same time as the events here described (1936:175ff).


14. It is sometimes reported that Mead remained caring toward Fortune until the end of her life, and this may in part be true (Banner 2003a:341). But she also attempted to keep him off the scene to forestall his criticism (Dobrin and Bashkow in press).

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Thurnwald, Richard

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Tuzin, Donald

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Walton, Jean
Worsley, Peter
Yans, Virginia
Young, Michael

FOR FURTHER READING
(These selections were made by the American Anthropologist editorial interns as examples of research related in some way to this article. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the author.)

Benson, Peter, and Kevin Lewis O’Neill
Fiske, Shirkey J.
Heider, Karl
Lamphere, Louise
LeVine, Robert
Rhoades, John
Salzman, Philip Carl