An impressive ideological power attaches to concepts that are compounded of opposites. The idea of fighting war to keep peace, for example, appeals to the values of war and peace simultaneously, conjoining hawkish and dovish positions to claim a Janus-faced sweet spot where these are transcended. Opposed possibilities are similarly united in the Christian doctrine that God is one and yet plural, composed of three distinct persons (the Holy Trinity). How much faith has been tested, and theologizing called forth, by the felt need to reconcile the contradictory standpoints this abiding mystery brings together! A worldly analog is Adam Smith’s celebrated dictum that private selfishness serves the general good, making it in effect its own opposite, public altruism, so that vice becomes virtue. The moral alchemy that fuses these contrarieties is famously credited to an “invisible hand,” whose identification with the capitalist market system has in the last half century become an article of faith in the secular creed of U.S. national politics.

The concept of the corporate person would seem to be such a union of antithetical elements. On the one hand, the category includes some of the largest organizations on earth, great companies with multitudes of employees working in diverse roles at far-flung locations. On the other hand, it is a unity: an individual with a single identity. How are these polarities reconciled? How can organizations of such power and scale be fit to identities modeled on the modest capabilities and dimensions of a living person’s existence? How does a collectivity, comprising numerous individuals, come to count as but one?

The most familiar explanation for how a multiplicity of individuals becomes unified in the corporate entity is that the magic is accomplished by the power of the state through the agency of the law. After all, the law explicitly confers on corporations person-like powers, such as entering into contracts and the ability to own and sell property, and the process by which a corporation is formed is the filing of legal papers with a state office. The premise that corporations owe their existence to the state and its legal facilities is emphasized in critiques such as the documentary film *The Corporation* (2004) that advocate for corporate reform through the passage of laws. While the idea that corporations are subject to laws is undoubtedly true, it does not necessarily follow from the fact that corporations are legal creations: living persons, too, are subject to law, and it is not because the law created them. Nevertheless, the popular rhetoric
supporting corporate reform exaggerates the significance of legal incorporation to
the point of depicting it as a veritable act of *creatio ex nihilo* on the state’s part: a
new life, albeit an artificial one, is brought into the world through a state-enacted
contrivance, so that the state is the legal birth parent of all corporations and retains
parental authority.¹

But how could such an awesome feat—the creation of an artificial person—be ac-
complished by the mere filing of a simple form, the “articles of incorporation”? Inter-
estingly enough, corporate lawyers almost never take these questions seriously.
Instead, they construe legal incorporation as a technical device, a contractual vehi-
cle that simply equips corporations with specific powers. From a social scientific
point of view, too, legal provisions and powers could not possibly be all there is
to the corporate person’s existence. After all, maintaining corporate status requires
numerous extra-legal social forms and procedures, such as the constitution of a board
of directors, formal meetings, record-keeping, and dedicated bank accounts. Thus,
even though they may be officially formed through a legal contrivance, corporations
also rely for their existence on other social and communicative processes, including
people’s routine linguistic attribution of causative agency to the corporate entity.

Consider everyday discourse about universities, businesses, and nonprofits. Such
organizations are frequently personified—that is to say, talked about as corporate
persons—regardless of whether they are formally incorporated or are unincorporated
entities legally. Often speakers do not actually know the legal status of the organi-
sations they talk about, and this is not something that most speakers feel they even
should know in order to speak about them correctly. Is a given company constituted
legally as a standard corporation, S-corporation, or LLC? Is it an unincorporated
partnership or sole proprietorship—that is to say, not a corporation at all? Unless
speakers are specifically concerned about taxation or liability issues that make this
relevant, they are unlikely to care. What all this suggests is that an adequate under-
standing of corporate personhood must comprehend more than the law’s role. It must
include an account of how the corporate person is fabricated in social life, culturally,
discursively, and politically.

The articles in this symposium mark an important step toward an anthropological
understanding of the concept of corporate personhood. As an ensemble they take us
well beyond the presumption that corporate personhood is essentially a reflection
of laws, and show that it is a wider phenomenon of culture, politics, and society
that is elaborated in culturally meaningful terms. One of things they show us is how
corporations, epitomized here by large companies, cultivate personas as a core part of
their brands. Corporate personas are used strategically to market products, promote
investment, attract and retain employees, and deflect public criticism. They have
instrumental value precisely because they are meaningful to consumers, employees,
shareholders, and regulators. Of course, not all corporate personas are persuasive
to their intended constituencies, and rarely does a large corporation restrict itself
to presenting just one. To some extent, corporate brand personas are serendipitous,
responding to particular circumstances, personalities, and histories. But they are
also expert products, carefully crafted by marketing professionals. The tremendous
energy companies invest in shaping and promoting their corporate personas has larger implications for culture. To make their identities maximally intelligible and compelling, companies adopt and retool symbolic building blocks like images of personal toughness and social conscience that are charged with cultural meaning. As they do so, corporations themselves reproduce and amplify certain cultural models of what personhood is. But not all models are amplified equally. Those individualistic models that emphasize positive qualities of autonomous self-direction are the ones corporations apply most consistently to themselves and their consumers.

Stuart Kirsch’s article introduces this point by looking at the corporation-as-person metaphors that are ubiquitous in everyday, nonlegal discourse. What kind of person is presumed by the predominant metaphors? Kirsch imagines an alternative world in which the corporate person metaphors we use are based on a Melanesian cultural model that emphasizes the role of nurture and reciprocity in constituting persons. This model grounds personhood in the give and take that connects persons to one another—the substances contributed by parents that form their children’s bodies during gestation, the daily acts of care that sustain them, and the active investments that enable them to attain positions of social influence and status. The person is in some degree thought of as the composite of all these relationships. This Melanesian “relational” model of the person casts into relief the autonomistic model presupposed in everyday and business discourse in the United States, which posits an unencumbered individual pursuing his or her own desires and self-interest. In this familiar Western model, which is a transparent projection of the ideology of *homo economicus*, the person’s necessary dependence on others is backgrounded and made inconsequential. The person’s relations with others are considered positive when at-will; the ideal relationships are those that individuals enter into by choice. The family is reduced to a residuum of inescapable ties that serves as the platform from which the individual departs. Since individuals are not defined by their relationships with others but instead by their autonomous choices and acts, they are constrained only by internalized morality and external laws. Perhaps this is why the law figures so prominently in popular thinking about how corporate persons are created and governable.

Drawing from his ethnography of the U.S. tobacco industry, Peter Benson explores an apparent paradox: Why would tobacco companies themselves take a leadership position in antismoking campaigns? As he explains, their involvement works like a Trojan horse. These campaigns make the companies look good, while deflecting public debate away from those policy options (like increasing taxes or prohibiting tobacco use in public spaces) that would actually be most effective in reducing tobacco consumption. Instead, the companies sponsor campaigns against smoking by children that they know will be largely ineffective, portraying smoking as a “choice” that people make for themselves and that parents should openly discuss with their children. The campaigns also urge law enforcement authorities to prevent the illegal sale of tobacco to underage purchasers. What drops away in all these campaigns is the coercive nature of addiction and the industry’s role in promoting it. With Orwellian irony, the cigarette companies flatter the autonomy and self-direction of their consumers as a way of manipulating them into addictive dependency on their products.
Another arena in which corporate expedience favors the concealment of interdependencies and the promulgation of images of self-direction is corporations’ portrayals of other corporate persons with which they are allied. This is the phenomenon explored in Robert Foster’s article on The Coca-Cola Company and the way it heads off criticism of its environmental impact by NGOs like the World Wildlife Fund and Conservation International. Because these nonprofit organizations are associated in public opinion with moral probity and environmental stewardship, their public criticism can cause damage to a business’s reputation, the value of its brands, and the sale of its products. To forestall this unwelcome possibility, which could reduce profits, the company forges partnerships with the NGOs and is advised by them proactively but also privately, while cultivating their dependence on its own corporate largesse. Thus, potential critics in effect become muzzled allies. But the value of the alliance is greatest when the NGOs are conceptualized as sovereign individuals that act independently, so that the company’s partnership with them is seen as a voluntary endorsement of the Coca-Cola Company’s environmental conduct. The NGOs’ reputation for integrity thus becomes an ornament to the company, a sort of Good Housekeeping seal of approval that increases the value of its brands.

Does the corporate bias for projecting autonomy and self-direction matter to living selves? Yes, it does, and one place we see this is in Ilana Gershon’s study of how U.S. college students who are seeking jobs present themselves in online media. Anticipating that prospective employers will look them up on the Web and social media, these young people strive to create an image for themselves that is consistent across different online media platforms like Twitter, LinkedIn, and Facebook. In other words, they brand themselves. But branding is not easy. In any business of size, brand creation and maintenance would be the work of professional teams. For college students trying to manage it all on their own, the task can be overwhelming. The brand personas they craft for themselves must reconcile two contradictory desiderata of hiring. On the one hand, if they are to succeed, job candidates must be very much “their own person,” appearing to stand out from the pack by their originality, self-direction, and leadership. On the other hand, their personal brand must signal that they are team players able to embrace new roles within a preexisting company culture. This calls for characteristics of malleability and conformity. Paradoxically this too makes a certain kind of social autonomy desirable: employers are known to be wary of candidates who have other attachments (such as to a spouse or a hometown) that may limit their commitments to their job or become liabilities in other ways. Once again, we see the elevation of autonomy as a value in the construction of personhood, but here one which living people, the aspirants to corporate jobs, internalize and apply in reimagining their own identities.

Even for a very large company, the work of producing a convincing corporate persona is a continual challenge. Like real persons, companies are internally complex, prone to inconsistency, and apt to change. They interact with diverse others, such as consumers, investors, employees, creditors, suppliers, industry associations, competitors, courts, and different levels of government. Like the various acquaintances and relations of a living person, each of these requires distinctive kinds
of responses on the company’s part. In certain contexts, corporate image-makers trumpet the virtue of such responsiveness to consumers, employees, shareholders, “communities,” or the nation. But even as they do so, they seek to project a strong, positive image of consistent, principled self-direction, which obliges them to conceal or reframe most of their company’s accommodation to others.

Dinah Rajak’s study of the South African mining giant Anglo American plc illustrates three strategies the corporation uses to finesse this problem and create the impression that its identity is internally generated. The first strategy is that the company is its leader writ large. The company’s founder or the CEO is portrayed as a culture hero whose own personality, characteristics, and values have come to define the organizational culture, so that the company as a whole has this same personality. The second strategy is that the company manages contradictions by reducing them to binaries. Anglo American employees proudly depict their company as possessing a two-sided corporate morality. One side, which they call the “coalface,” is hard-nosed, calculating, and technocratically focused on the extractive business of getting valuable “stuff out of the ground.” The other side of the company is cosmopolitan, cultured, intellectual, enlightened, and prosocial, evoking the ethos of elite English universities. The corporation presents itself as an integration of these two personas. In Anglo American’s case, the maneuver amounts to a higher-order assertion that the company determines its own moral postures and roles, however divergent and contradictory these may be. The company may have the corporate equivalent of a split personality, but it is always in the driver’s seat, remaining ever the orchestrator and master of its own nature. The third strategy is to write your own history. Just as persons continually reinterpret their own histories in light of present concerns, Anglo American is continually recasting its past in response to the changing landscape of business and politics. In its favored autobiographical narratives the company portrays itself as the shaper of its own destiny. An interesting case in point is the story Anglo American executives tell about the company’s role in apartheid. In a speech Rajak quotes, company director Nicholas Oppenheimer speaks suggestively of the company’s “divorce” from the apartheid government when the National Party took power. The company’s official account of itself highlights its participation in an industry forum convened by Nelson Mandela in 1994, implying that it played a role in designing the liberal postapartheid order. Stories like these direct attention away from the fact that at the height of apartheid, Anglo American had under its control approximately half of the South African economy and was an active collaborator in apartheid policies. Even its participation in Mandela’s forum was primarily a response to the threat of nationalization. To fully grasp the sociopolitical work done by the company’s historical revisionism, one needs an independent historical perspective like Rajak provides.

Kedron Thomas’s article describes how Mayan entrepreneurs in Guatemala justify their clothing workshops’ pirating of global brands by emphasizing their own governing functions, such as their provision of educative and redistributive services to other Maya. In this way, they rhetorically construct their workshops as laws unto themselves, true corporate communities, like the merchant guilds of premodern Eu-
rope. The case illustrates how corporations can be constituted in ways other than formal legal incorporation by state authorities. While great advantages undoubtedly flow from state-recognized incorporation for certain companies, it is not an option for all companies (as it is not for these Maya-owned clothing workshops), and it is not the only way of creating a social body that people recognize as a corporation, at least informally. This simple fact has important implications. While as noted earlier, we tend to think of corporations as entities formed by legal mechanisms and dependent on state authority, it is wrong to see the state as prior to the corporation and the corporation as a subsidiary formation that derives from it. Indeed, the state is better seen as akin to the corporation, with which it coemerged historically (Bashkow n.d.). The sibling-like relation of states and corporations was a favorite theme of the brilliant English legal historian F. W. Maitland, who in 1900 phrased the point memorably: “When all is said,” he wrote, “there seems to be a genus of which State and Corporation are species” (Maitland 1938:ix).

Work by Elana Shever (2012) also highlights the ways in which the individuality of the corporate person is like that of a government rather than a natural individual. Writing of oil companies in Argentina, Shever shows that these corporations are so similar to governments that they actually perform the state’s functions as contractors in virtually all areas, including the provision of military force, intelligence, social services, postal services, administration, transportation, infrastructure, schools, prisons, and hospitals. In Argentina, Shever writes, the activities of the state and certain corporations dovetail so closely that they can be hard to distinguish. It is an influential idea in political anthropology that one of the main products of the state’s governing practices is its own authority, indeed, its own reality (Mitchell 1999). Shever (2012) finds that this same observation also applies to corporations because they too are policy-establishing bodies that regulate people’s conduct. Also like governments, corporations operate through bureaucratic hierarchies consisting of disparate parts—divisions, departments, functional systems, locations—whose contradictory interests produce internal conflict. In the face of the reality that large corporations are messy, inconsistent, changeable structures, it takes deliberate effort to project a coherent corporate identity.

Why An Anthropological Conception of the Corporation is Needed

In much talk and writing about the corporate person, it is held to be problematic that in contrast to actual persons, the corporate entity is an artificial construction. This contrast between real and artificial persons is foregrounded by the popular critique of corporate personhood that has become a staple of Left political discourse. Responding to a series of U.S. Supreme Court decisions that have extended to corporations many of the personal rights guaranteed to individuals under the U.S. Constitution, culminating in the ruling in *Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission* (130 S. Ct. 876 [2010]), the critique suggests that the justices are so in thrall to corporate big business that they have become unable (or unwilling) to recognize the obvious difference between, say, the IBM corporation and one’s elderly aunt. A favorite target of this critique is the statement made in 2012 by Republican presidential candidate Mitt
Romney that “corporations are people, my friend” (quoted in Kirsch’s Introduction, this issue). In response to this foil, critics offer slogans like “Human beings are people; corporations are legal fictions” and “I’ll believe corporations are people when Texas executes one” (Reich 2012). A natural person laughs, cries, and dances, but lacking a human body and mind, a corporate entity is only a person by metaphor or as a technical legal fiction. Capitalizing on a long tradition of distrust of metaphorical thinking and legal casuistry, this popular critique has spawned a political movement to curtail the scope of legal recognition of corporate personhood by amending the U.S. Constitution. The goal of “ending corporate personhood” was discussed intensively in the Occupy movement in 2011, and it continues to be promoted by a network of advocacy organizations (such as Public Citizen, Rebuild the Dream, the Move to Amend, and at times MoveOn.org) that are pushing for a constitutional amendment that would remove some of the legal protections corporations have come to enjoy. As of this writing, several bills proposing such an amendment have been introduced in the U.S. Senate and House, and resolutions supporting it have been passed by several state legislatures and more than 200 municipal and county governments, including the city councils of Los Angeles and New York City.

What critics—anthropologists included—may not always realize is that the artificiality of corporate personhood is also recognized and considered problematic by the political Right and a large portion of the legal mainstream, which are similarly averse to strong or literalizing interpretations of the corporate-person metaphor. In Citizens United, the Court majority does not in any way attribute the nature of a human person to the corporation; instead, the corporation is identified with the set of living persons who direct, own, or work for it. In other words, the Court majority addresses the artificiality of corporate personhood by taking a compositional view, treating the corporation as an “association of citizens” that happens to have “taken on the corporate form” (Citizens United, pp. 33, 40, 44). Legal artifice may veil these people from view, but theoretically the living persons and their activities are always behind the false front. In sum, this position, which in law is variously called the contractarian, contractualist, aggregate, or participant theory, recognizes the artificiality of the corporate form, but resolves it by giving it a foundation in the natural individuals of which it is composed.

This compositional view of the corporation is extremely influential and widespread, and not just in law. It exists, however, in different versions, each of which identifies a different set of individuals as the corporation’s key constituents. Consider an advertising trade journal article on corporate brand personality. Starting from the premise that consumers attribute person-like identity characteristics to corporations, Keller and Richey (2006) identify the “corporate brand personality” with the “characteristics or traits of the employees” (75). Because “the corporate personality starts with the company’s employees, who bring this personality to life and actually determine who a company is . . . [i]t is therefore imperative that they embody the corporate personality the firm aspires to build” (81). The implication is that executives should “carefully manage” (75) the personal characteristics their employees exhibit: If their company is to be seen as caring, its employees must be caring; if it is to be seen as
passionate, they “must be passionate about the company, its brands, and their jobs” (77). That Keller and Richey endorse such a model is notable given that they are advertising professionals (one is a professor of marketing) who understand perfectly well that brands are created largely through advertising images. But because they understand the corporate entity’s underlying reality to be composed of its employees, these individuals’ characteristics are the ultimate referent for perceptions of the corporation’s personality, the palpable manifestations of what they call its “heart,” “body,” and “mind” (81).

Another compositional theory that is especially prevalent in the world of finance is that the corporation is composed of its shareholders. Imagine a group of friends who incorporate a startup business together. The corporation serves as the vessel of their pooled contributions of time, money, and effort, aggregating under a single legal umbrella all of their individual interests in the shared venture. In this scenario it is clear that the corporation belongs to the friends; it is their property. By contrast, other individuals who are hired to work for the company remain nonowners—mere employees—unless they are explicitly granted an ownership stake as part of their compensation. When they need to raise capital, the founders may choose to sell a part of the corporation to outside investors, and so the size of the owning group is bound to get larger over time as new rounds of capital are raised and ownership stakes are subdivided and sold to successor investors. Even so, there remains an identifiable set of individuals (founders plus investors) who own, control, and stand to profit from the corporation. In this scenario, the corporate entity is a façade for the interests of these individual shareholders.

That this holds for corporations in general is the conventional wisdom of many business professionals and those who work in finance (Khurana 2007; Ho 2009). In fact, it is precisely this view that lays behind Mitt Romney’s infamous “corporations are people, my friend” remark. Before entering politics, Romney ran a private equity firm that bought corporations to restructure and sell, so his understanding of corporate personhood reflects the well-developed perspective of his discipline. When later asked to defend his remark, Romney did so in unambiguous, compositional terms, repeating several times that corporations are people because “they’re made up of people.” “Corporations are collections of people,” he said, adding that it is wrong to think “that there’s something else out there,” besides, “of course the buildings that people work in.” All the money that a corporation makes “goes to people, either to hire people or to pay shareholders” (Goodman 2012). On this understanding, there is nothing recondite about the nature of corporate personality. It is just the sum-total of the activities and ownership interests of the individual shareholders who control it and benefit from it.

But the compositional view is seriously undermined by the fact that there are different ways of construing which set of individuals is a corporation’s constituents. As with “social contract” theories in political philosophy, which imagine state authority to be legitimated by a compact among its citizens, the compositional view presupposes a bounded constituency that is defined a priori. The problem is, this provides no grounds for determining which individuals do or do not count as the corporation’s
constituents. Is it the founders and share owners? The employees? The officers? The board of directors? There are different answers depending on one’s point of view, the context, and the type of corporation at issue. From a legal point of view, it is the directors that have the best claim, as they bear ultimate authority and responsibility for corporate acts. But in legal liability cases, in the mass media, and in public relations contexts like that examined by Rajak, it is the CEO and other top-level officers who are generally seen as embodying the corporate identity, because they represent the highest active controlling authority within the organization, and the most readily identifiable source of its personality, while serving as its public face in high-profile contexts. Yet another possibility, exemplified in popular discourse and in the field of marketing as discussed above, is that a corporation consists of the employees who actually perform the actions attributed to the corporate entity. This idea is expressed when well-meaning activists admonish one another to avoid phrasings that unjustifiably reify corporate personhood, for example to avoid saying that a corporation “thinks,” as that is impossible for an entity without human mental capacities; from this point of view, who else could the corporation be besides the employees who think for it? Finally, for an investment banker like Romney, for a corporation to be “made up of people” means that it is the property of its shareholders, the individuals for whose benefit it exists.

Also problematic for the compositional concept of the corporation is the way it takes corporate constituents to be uniform in their dispositions or interests, even though real corporate structures are internally differentiated in even the simplest of cases, and even though corporations of size are characterized by elaborate bureaucratic hierarchies, divisions, internal conflicts, and power relations. Returning to the trade journal article by Keller and Richey (2006) discussed above, which defines a company’s brand personality “in terms of the human characteristics or traits of the employees” (75), the language of employee uniformity is uncompromising: “all employees of the corporation” (76), in other words “everyone” (81), needs to embody the corporate brand identity. Such language suggests not only that the corporate whole is composed of its employees but that its nature reflects and is reflected in the characteristics of each one of them individually—a condition that could only be obtained on the implausible presumption that they were all identical. In the shareholder-centric conception of the corporation prevalent in finance, the orthodoxy that business corporations must maximize profit stands on the assumption that corporations exist to serve their shareholders’ self-interest. Under this view, the corporation’s constituents are unified through their generic representation as a set of individuals with only one relevant characteristic: they are all motivated by gain (Stout 2012). In other words, the corporation is just a scaled-up version of Economic Man.

It should not be so hard for anthropologists to see that like other social formations, the corporate whole cannot be reduced to any set of individuals, as compositional theories (or Citizens United) would have it. After all, it is the corporation itself that creates roles like director, officer, owner, employee, member, and agent, along with accepted modes for authorizing acts and attributing them to the corporate entity. While it is true (in small corporations especially) that multiple roles may be fulfilled by a single
individual, it is also the case that the corporate form allows for roles to be progressively differentiated and elaborated into complex hierarchical structures of responsibility, authority, knowledge, supervisory and reporting relationships, physical access, and so on. When seen in this light, it is a sleight of hand to say that a corporation, because it is composed of (or acted for) by a set of individuals, “consists of” those individuals. A corporation is certainly not the same as a collection of individuals who transact goods and services independently of one another in a competitive market—that hallowed scenario which has been so idealized by economists as a model of productivity and efficiency that one may legitimately wonder why people would bother to form and maintain corporations at all (Coase 1937; Williamson 1993). The corporation is as different from its shareholders or employees as a school is from its teachers and students or a play from its cast. To overlook this is to misrecognize the reality of the corporation as a social form.

It was a favorite theme of Emile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss that the concept of the person was historically and culturally relative, and that it was therefore incoherent to try to “deduce society from the individual” (Durkheim 1915:28; Mauss 1979). All social scientists are heirs to this insight, which has been built upon and expanded into a body of work showing that there is nothing natural about the individualistic notion of personhood. It is the human condition that individuals must be raised from birth by others, whose contributions help form them. There is no objective sense in which they are autonomous, and it is only during a part of their lives, indeed only certain hours of the day, that it is possible to consider them self-propelled, much less fully self-generating. Similarly, individuals only sometimes have the luxury of defining themselves by deliberate choices. Most of the time, and in most ways, individuals’ choices are shaped and limited by the choices of others, including predecessors long gone, within a field of desires, habits, and possibilities that is interactively and collectively created: otherwise known as culture. Especially when individuals are young or infirm, others frequently do things for them and speak on their behalf—as is necessarily done for corporations. So there is no small irony in the extent to which the most influential ideas about the nature of the corporation are rigorously individualistic. It is not surprising that the particular personas that corporations craft for themselves would be based on a model of the natural individual, since their goal is to connect themselves to a world of actors (consumers, employees, shareholders) who believe themselves to be capable of self-interest and unconstrained choice. But so compelling is this model that it is also the first port of call for economists, lawyers, business ethicists, and others—proponents and critics of corporate personhood alike—when, if anything in the world should be refractory to individualistic theorization, it is such a collectively produced, highly structured, relational entity as the corporation.

This article began with the suggestion that corporate personhood involves a pairing of opposites: the corporation is at once a collectivity and a set of individuals. While it might seem to us tempting to criticize the notion on account of this contradiction, to do so is to allow ourselves to be pulled into its faulty assumptions, when as social theorists we are capable of more: unveiling the contradiction for the illusion that it is. The impression of contrarieties in the enticing notion of the corporate person is
created by an anthropologically naïve reductionism that takes for granted the prior reality of the individual and that mystifies social process and form. Rather than argue with the wizard, we need to pull back the curtain and reveal that his impressive magic is nothing but a distraction. It is time to develop a thoroughly anthropological conception of the corporation.

Notes

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1. Another view is that a corporation is not made but recognized by the state, like a marriage is.
3. Ibid.
4. For keys to a vast literature on this topic, see Orts 2013; for a penetrating critique, see Ireland 2003.

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